

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
AS A FUNCTIONING SYSTEM

BY

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A B S T R A C T

It is the thesis of this study that the Organisation of African Unity is becoming less and less instrumental in the promotion of unity among the African states, being eclipsed by the various regional and sub-regional groupings on the continent. Some may consider this view premature, arguing that the Organisation is still going through a "teething" period; and the writer, too, once held this opinion. But closer study and reflection soon disabused him of that belief. There is, after all, a distinction between an organisation which is suffering from "teething" problems, but whose members apply the appropriate "medication" to remedy these problems, and another whose members are continually reinforcing sub-groups (subsystems), or forming new ones in an attempt to attain the very objectives set within the framework of their organisation. In the former, members take measures designed to strengthen the organisation in order to make it more relevant in the attainment of their objectives: if the organisation is not effective in a particular area - of conflict resolution, perhaps, or trade and economic co-operation - it is provided with the requisite resources to perform this function. When this is happening, the "teething" period may be very difficult, but the organisation can be expected to emerge with a much more reinforced structure and capability than it had at its inception. But when old sub-groups are being reinforced, or new ones established to perform the very functions that the organisation itself is intended to perform, what may appear to be a "teething" period may in fact simply be a prelude to decay and demise.

At this point, one might argue that the O.A.U. has at least helped in defusing border disputes between Algeria and Morocco, Ethiopia and Somalia, and Somalia and Kenya. And it is true that the Organisation should be given some credit for these accomplishments. But with the possible exception of the replacing of British soldiers by Nigerian troops in Tanzania after the army mutiny in that country early in 1964, the O.A.U. has been singularly unsuccessful in resolving the internal conflicts of any of its member states; the Congolese

and Nigerian civil wars are only the most grievous cases in point. As is well known, these conflicts produced extreme tensions within the Organisation, straining relations between certain member states and causing the severance of diplomatic relations between others. And if an organisation is to continue effectively as a going and growing concern, it must be in the position to resolve such conflicts if it is to avoid the consequences of damage to its own existence.

The O.A.U. has also been faced with another problem, which is twofold: the responses of member states, of other international organisations, and of non-O.A.U. states to the Organisation's decisions. As will be shown, some O.A.U. members have ignored its decisions on certain issues, producing tensions within the Organisation. The O.A.U.'s resolutions on regional and sub-regional groupings and colonialism come readily to mind. Yet, the ability of any organisation to attain the objectives set by its members is contingent, in part, on the level of their response to its decisions. Secondly, the responses of other international organisation's and of non-O.A.U. states to the Organisation's resolutions on colonialism and apartheid in Africa, particularly Southern Africa, have been such that the O.A.U. is no closer to attaining its objectives in this area than it was at its inception in 1963. It should be added that part of the problem is also due to division within the various liberation movements on the continent. However, for official as well as personal reasons, neither these movements nor the O.A.U. Liberation Committee will be treated in this study. The point that will concern us here is whether or not a change of tactic is necessary vis-a-vis other international bodies and non-members.

In the economic sphere of interaction among the African states, the O.A.U. has been completely eclipsed by the various regional and sub-regional groupings on the Africa continent and by the Economic Commission for Africa; and this too has had a dynamism of its own. As we shall see, the more relevant the regional and sub-regional groupings have become in matters of economic and trade co-operation, the more conflicts have tended to be resolved within their own

framework of organisation, rendering the O.A.U. irrelevant not only in economic matters, but also in certain political aspects as well. Throughout the continent, there is a continual drive towards the strengthening of old economic sub-groupings or the formation of new ones, a clear indication that the O.A.U. is not performing the economic function that it was originally intended to perform. And although some of these proposed sub-groupings have not yet materialised, the important point is that the search continues in the absence of an alternative within the framework of the O.A.U. itself. One could argue that the single problem of transport, among others, makes a sub-regional approach more realistic. But no sooner is this argument raised, than we see that the Joint African and Malagasy Organisation (O.C.A.M.), whose members spread from Senegal in West Africa to Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, has already established a common market for sugar and is in the process of setting up another for meat. In addition, the O.C.A.M. members of the eighteen African states associated with the E.E.C. have been using their organisation to articulate and channel the demands of the "18" to the E.E.C., thus making the organisation a great deal more relevant than the O.A.U. in matters of trade and economic co-operation with the E.E.C., even in respect of the non-O.C.A.M. members of the "18", Mali, Mauritania and Somalia.

This study of the rise and decline of the O.A.U. is divided into three parts. Part I, the introduction, contains a brief historical sketch of the search for African unity, leading to the establishment of the O.A.U., and the model (in terms of systems analysis) that has been used in analysing the Organisation. In Part II, we concentrate on the responses of member states, non-member states, and other international organisations, to the O.A.U.'s decisions on colonialism and regional and sub-regional groupings, the changes that have occurred within the O.A.U., and the Organisation's record on conflict resolution. In Part III, an attempt is made to demonstrate the extent to which the African states are searching for economic unity, resulting in the eclipse of the O.A.U. In a concluding chapter, a general summation is made of how the Organisation is becoming less and less instrumental in the promotion of unity in Africa.

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CANDIDATE'S EDUCATION AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE.

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DECLARATION

I used systems analysis in making a comparative study of the functioning of the South-West Africa and New Guinea mandates for the "Diploma of the Institute" at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies. However, the systemic model used in the present study is substantially different from that used in the South-West Africa and New Guinea study.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS USED IN TEXT.

A.A.P.C.	All-African Peoples' Confernece.
A.A.P.O.	All-African Peoples' Organisation.
C.I.A.S.	Conference of Independent African States.
E.C.A.	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
E.C.E.	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
E.E.C.	European Economic Community.
G.A.T.T.	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
G.R.A.E.	Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile.
I.B.R.D.	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
I.C.A.O.	International Civil Aviation Organisation.
I.L.O.	International Labour Organisation.
N.A.T.O.	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
O.A.S.	Organisation of American States.
O.A.U.	Organisation of African Unity.
O.C.A.M.	Joint Organisation of African and Malagasy States (Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache)
O.E.R.S.	Organisation of Riparian States of the Senegal River (Organisation des Etats Riverains du Fleuve Sénégal); also Senegal River Basin States.
U.A.M.	Union of African and Malagasy States (Union Africaine et Malgache).
U.A.M.C.E.	Union of African and Malagasy Economic Co-operation (Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique).
U.D.E.A.C.	Central African Customs and Economic Union (Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale).
U.N.C.T.A.D.	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
U.N.E.S.C.O.	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.
W.H.O.	World Health Organisation.
Z.A.N.U.	Zimbabwe African National Union.
Z.A.P.U.	Zimbabwe African People's Union.

PART I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although Pan-Africanism had been the theme of several Congresses in Europe and America before the wave of independence in Africa, the search for African unity was begun on a much more concrete scale after the independence of Ghana in March 1957.¹ The First Pan-African Congress, convened by a Trinidadian barrister, H. Sylvester Williams, in London in 1900, was attended principally by delegates from America and the West Indies. The objects of this Congress were to give people of African descent a sense of solidarity and to protest against the injustices of colonialism and racial discrimination. The Second Congress, held in Paris in 1919 under the Chairmanship of Dr. DuBois, called for international protection of Africans, and for African participation "in the Government as far as their development permits". The Congresses of 1921 (London and Brussels), 1923 (London and Lisbon), and 1927 (New York) continued to press the demands made by the two previous Congresses. Although all these Congresses

1. There is already a vast literature on the Pan-African Congresses and the search for African unity. See, for example, W. E. B. DuBois, The World and Africa, New York: Viking Press, 1947; George Padmore Pan-Africanism or Communism?, London: Dobson, 1956; Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism, London: Longmans, 1969; C. Legum, Pan-Africanism (rev.ed.), New York: Praeger, 1965; L. Gray Cowan, The Dilemmas of African Independence, New York: Walker, 1964; Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity, London: Pall Mall Press, 1968; Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1970; George Shepperson, "Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism," Independent Black Africa (ed. W. J. Hanna), Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, pp. 192-207; J. Ayo Langley, "Pan-Africanism in Paris, 1924-36", The Journal of Modern African Studies, V.VII, No.1, 1969, pp. 69-94; St. Clair Drake, "Pan-Africanism, Negritude, and the African Personality", "Independent Black Africa" (ed. W. J. Hanna) Chicago, 1964, pp. 530-540; Paul-Marc Henry, "Pan-Africanism: A Dream Come True," Africa (ed. P. W. Quigg), New York: Praeger, 1964, pp. 161-171; Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," African Politics and Society (ed. I. L. Markowitz) New York: Free Press, 1970 pp. 444-458; R. C. Good, "Changing Patterns of African International Relations", The American Political Science Review, V. LVIII, No. 3, September 1964, pp. 632-641; Julius K. Nyerere, "A United States of Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, V.I, No. 1, 1963, pp. 1-6; A. Segal, "Africa Newly Divided?" The Journal of Modern African Studies, V.II, No. 1, 1964, pp. 73-90; Clyde Sanger, "Toward Unity in Africa," Foreign Affairs, V.XLII, No.2, January 1964, pp. 269-281; Emperor Haile Selassie, "Towards African Unity," The Journal of Modern African Studies, V.I, No. 3 September 1963, pp. 281-291; I. W. Zartman, International Relations in the new Africa, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

were organized and dominated by non-Africans they did not fail to have some effect in Africa. For example, in 1920, Joseph Casely Hayford brought together the National Congress of British West Africa, which demanded increased African participation in the colonial administrations of the four territories (Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria) and the setting up of a West African University and a Court of Appeal. (The British Government declared that the demands were "premature"). The Sixth Pan-African Congress of 1945, which was held in Manchester, had a strong African representation. Although Dr. DuBois and Dr. Peter Milliard (a West Indian) were joint Chairmen, Dr. Nkrumah was one of the two Secretaries (the late George Padmore was the other).¹ Unlike the previous meetings the Manchester Congress was militant. Instead of limiting its demands to social justice and African participation in the various colonial governments "as far as (African) development permits", the 1945 Congress demanded "for Black Africa autonomy and independence", and warned that its participants would "fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment". In this connection, the Congress exhorted colonial peoples "to organize effectively. Colonial workers must be in the front of the battle against imperialism. Your weapons - the strike and boycott - are invincible.... Colonial and subject peoples of the world, Unite!" Unity here was principally unity at the territorial level with a view to autonomy and independence. It was not until twelve years later, after the independence of Ghana, that the search for continental unity began in earnest.

During Ghana's independence celebrations, Dr. Nkrumah declared that national independence for his country would be meaningless unless it was linked with the total liberation of Africa.² Accordingly, he called for a conference of African leaders to discuss the future of Africa; and in April 1958, the first Conference of Independent African States was held in Accra, being attended by Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, the U.A.R. and Tunisia. These were, at the time,³ the only independent African states, excluding, of course, South Africa.

1. No relation to the former Liberian Ambassador to Washington with the same name.

2. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 136.

3. Ghana invited South Africa, but the latter turned down the invitation because the colonial powers were not invited.

The leaders at the Conference pledged themselves to avoid commitments that "might entangle them to the detriment of their interest and freedom"; called for self-determination and independence in the dependent territories of Africa and for support of the various nationalist movements on the continent; urged France to recognize the Algerian people's right to self-determination and independence; condemned racial discrimination, and called on all U.N. members to intensify their efforts to eradicate it. They also proclaimed their intention to co-operate in economic, technical and scientific developments, and to settle their differences by peaceful means; and they resolved "to preserve the unity of purpose and action in international affairs which we have forged among ourselves".¹

It was after this conference that Dr. Nkrumah directed his attention to mobilizing the nationalist organisations in the various dependent territories of Africa; and in December 1958 the first All-African Peoples' Conference was convened in Accra, bringing together delegates from sixty-two nationalist movements. Like the Conference of Independent African States, the All-African Peoples' Conference condemned colonialism and racial discrimination and called for self-determination and independence in the dependent territories. But the A.A.P.O. did not stop there; it also called for a Commonwealth of Free African States. And at this point we should note the different objectives of the various leaders involved in the search for African unity. Nkrumah thought in terms of political fusion at the continental level. Men like Modibo Keita, Leopold Senghor, the late Barthelemy Boganda of the Central African Republic, and Foulbert Youlou, the now deposed President of Congo-Brazzaville, were principally concerned with the fusion of a limited number of territories. Tubman preferred, as an immediate priority, co-operation in the economic, political, diplomatic and other spheres, and not the political fusion that was sought by Nkrumah, Keita, Senghor, Boganda and Youlou; Houphouet-Boigny's position was similar to that of Tubman's; so too was that of the late Leon M'ba of Gabon. The search for unity proceeded therefore not only along different paths, but with different objectives in mind.

1. For full text of resolutions adopted, see "Appendix 4" in Legum, op.cit., p. 157ff.

The return of General de Gaulle to power in France in 1958 and his quarrel with Sékou Touré offered the first opportunity for an attempt at political fusion between two African states (Ghana and Guinea) - a step in the direction of Nkrumah's concept of unity throughout the continent. As is well known, when Guinea voted for complete independence in 1958, France discontinued its aid to that country. In addition to de Gaulle's displeasure over Guinea's "No" vote, Houphouët-Boigny is said to have urged the General to act forthrightly in order to give substance to the Ivory Coast's leader's warning that those territories which preferred independence to continued existence within the French Community would suffer. French aid having been withdrawn, Guinea was isolated in francophone Africa and in need of external help. In an effort to help Guinea overcome its difficulties, President Tubman offered to assist in whatever way possible, and discontinued pressing for the return of land claimed by Liberia, which the French had incorporated into Guinea, thus relieving the fledgling sister state of a possible border dispute. In November 1958, however, Ghana and Guinea announced that they had formed a Union. In May 1959, Touré and Nkrumah announced that they would "seal (their Union) in practice". At this point, Tubman invited Nkrumah and Touré for talks on the future of the continent at Sanniquellie, Liberia, in July 1959. In his opening speech at the Sanniquellie conference, Tubman said:

Freedom, unity and co-operation should be the noble objectives of all peoples. But these will never be assured if we fail to create the right conditions which all Africans... can wholeheartedly support. Thus, in our determined search for African unity, let us endeavour to evolve that formula which will be sufficiently flexible for each nation to maintain its national sovereignty and its peculiar identity.....²

Tubman proposed that all discussions on African unity be exploratory, and that no decision be taken until other African territories with fixed dates for independence had attained their independence, and until other independent African states had been consulted and could participate as founding members. Nkrumah was of the opinion that:

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1. I. Wallerstein, "Elites in French-Speaking West Africa: The Social Basis of Ideas"; The Journal of Modern African Studies, V.III, No. 1, 1965, p.12;
I. W. Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 15-16.
 2. The First West African Summit Conference held at Sanniquellie, (July, 1959, the Liberian Information Service) p. 20.

to attain our national freedom without binding ourselves together in some form of closer international unity will not only jeopardize our individual sovereignties but expose our small countries to external pressures and make us the political football of others. Apart from that, our very economic and social development can only be sustained and accelerated in terms of our closest political union.

In the end, Tubman carried the day. The three leaders proposed, in a joint declaration, the convening of a special conference in 1960 of all independent African states and non-independent territories with fixed dates for independence to discuss and work out a charter that "will achieve the ultimate goal of unity between independent African states". A declaration of principles, proposing a Community of Independent African States, was agreed upon to be presented to the proposed special conference as a basis for discussion. There was no question after the Sanniquellie conference but that Nkrumah's drive for immediate organic political unity of African states had been brought to a halt. The subsequent conferences of independent African states held in Addis Ababa in 1960 and 1963 further doomed Nkrumah's attempts at political fusion.

Unity in terms of political fusion was also advocated in French West Africa.² In this area, before and after the Loi-Cadre of 1956, Houphouët-Boigny was calling for closer and stronger ties with France, while Leopold Senghor, Modibo Keita, Sékou Touré, Djibo Bakary of Niger and others wanted greater autonomy from France and closer union among the francophone states of West Africa. In December 1958, those who desired closer union held a conference in Bamako to discuss federation.³ Present at this conference were Dahomey, Upper Volta, Senegal and Mali (Soudan). At Bamako, these countries agreed to hold a federal

1. Ibid, p.22.

2. Under the Loi-Cadre, limited powers devolved on the various territorial assemblies of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. These assemblies were empowered to form cabinets and to take decisions on such internal matters as the territorial civil service, agriculture, customary law and health. For a more comprehensive treatment of this topic, see W. J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, pp. 73-88; Edward Mortimer, France and the Africans 1944-1960, London: Faber, 1969, Chapter 16.

3. For an interesting account of the federalist and anti-federalist struggle in West Africa, see W. J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; Edward Mortimer France and the Africans 1944-1960, London: Faber, 1969.

constituent meeting in Dakar in January 1959. A federal constitution was unanimously adopted at the Dakar meeting, providing for the creation of the Mali Federation, consisting of the four countries, within the French Community. Constituent assemblies in Senegal, Soudan and Upper Volta adopted the federal constitution during the same month (January). In an attempt to forestall the creation of the Federation, Houphouet-Boigny proposed the formation of a loose economic co-operation in West Africa. With French assistance in the form of pressure on Upper Volta and Dahomey,¹ this tactic worked well. Upper Volta - whose leader, Maurice Yameogo, had declared in January 1959 that his country gave "its total and complete adherence"² to the Federation - decided against joining the Federation and, in April 1959, Upper Volta co-operated with the Ivory Coast to establish the 'Council of the Entente'. During the same month, Niger joined the Entente. Following the withdrawal of Upper Volta from the federalist movement, Dahomey lost its contiguity with the proposed Federation. The alternative was obvious. When the Legislative Assembly of the Federation met in Dakar on April 4, 1959, Soudan and Senegal were the only countries represented. Modibo Keita of the Soudan was elected Head of the Federal Government, and Senghor President of the Federal Assembly and the new Federal party, the African Federalist Party (P.F.A.). In May, Dahomey became a member of the Entente. On June 20, the Mali Federation attained its independence, a move which persuaded Entente countries also to seek independence, which was granted in August.

In an attempt to bridge the gap between the Federation and the Entente, Houphouet-Boigny had visited Dakar, the Federation's capital, in May, where he indicated his desire for a "broad union" between the two camps. But no sooner had the Mali Federation been formed, than it collapsed under the weight of its inner contradictions. Keita wanted a strong Federal Government, a system for which Senghor did not have much enthusiasm. Keita's economic and foreign

1. Foltz, op. cit. p. 105ff; Legum, op. cit., p.78.

2. Le Monde, 20 January, 1959.

policies were anti-French and "left-of-centre" while those of Senghor were liberal and pro-French. The issue came to a head when the Soudanese opposed Senghor's candidature for the Federal Presidency, dismissed Mamadou Dia (a Senegalese) as Minister of Defence, and declared a state of emergency on August 19, 1960. The following day, Senegal seceded from the Federation and declared its independence; and Keita and other Soudanese Federal ministers were deported to Bamako. On September 22, the Soudan declared its independence, retaining the name of the defunct Federation - Mali.

Like Keita and Senghor, the late Barthelemy Boganda of the Central African Republic had tried to form a federation in Central Africa; but Boganda's plan was never implemented. What he called for was a "Central African State", consisting of the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon; this was to lead eventually to a "United States of Latin Africa" which was to include Cameroon, Rwanda, Burundi and the Portuguese and Spanish colonies in Southern Africa. Condemning what he described as "the geographic error of European explorers", Boganda continued to advocate federation in Central Africa until his death in a plane crash in April 1959. But M'ba of Gabon was not interested in political fusion; and Youlou was principally concerned with heading a Ba-Kongo state, including members of the same ethnic group in Congo-Kinshasa¹ and Angola. What finally emerged from these attempts was the decision to maintain a customs union and a joint administration for communications and transport. In North Africa, also, unity in terms of political fusion within a Greater Maghreb was advocated by political parties like the Tunisian neo-Destour, the Moroccan Istiqlal and the Algerian F.L.N. However, since the April 1958 conference in Tangiers, at which it was recommended that the three countries should federate, the Maghreb Federation has not materialized.

After the dissolution of the Mali Federation, consultations between Presidents Touré and Keita in November and December 1960 led to a meeting in

1. Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 357-359; Afrique Nouvelle, 7 November, 1958; Le Monde, 8 February, 1968.

Conakry of Ghana, Guinea and Mali on December 24 at which Mali received an \$11.2 million loan from Ghana. At a subsequent meeting in April 1961, a union of the three states was formed. But like the Ghana-Guinea Union that preceded it, the Union of African States remained a "paper union". But having brought about a nominal Union of African States, Nkrumah then sought to dismember the Entente alliance. Taking advantage of Upper Volta's dissatisfaction with the financial arrangements in the Entente, Nkrumah met President Yameogo at Paga in June 1961 to demolish a specially constructed wall, symbolizing the formation of a customs union between their two countries. Shortly after the Paga meeting, Upper Volta received a loan of £2 million from Ghana. But when financial arrangements in the Entente were revised in favour of Upper Volta, Yameogo turned his back on Nkrumah.

At Sanniquellie, on the other hand, Tubman had set the tone for unity in terms of co-operation. This approach was accepted by the overwhelming majority of the participants of the June 1960 Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa. There was a heavier attendance at this conference than at that of Accra in 1958, the number of participants having increased from eight to fifteen. The trend was therefore to consider African unity in terms of co-operation in the political, economic, diplomatic and other spheres, but not the merger of political entities as Nkrumah (and the francophone federalists) had hoped. With a difference of opinion as to what unity meant, a unity of purpose could not be ensured. Towards the end of 1960, the number of independent African states increased considerably; and two coalitions were beginning to emerge with different objectives. Starting with a conference in Abidjan in October 1960 and another in Brazzaville in December, twelve francophone states (Senegal, Dahomey, Chad, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Mauritania, Madagascar, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Niger and Congo-Brazzaville) decided to form the Union of African and Malagasy States (U.A.M.), which was pro-French, supported Mauritania, whose existence was being threatened by Morocco, condemned foreign interference in the internal affairs of Congo-Kinshasa and supported the Congolese central Government headed by President Kasavubu, and called for an end to the Algerian

war and for self-determination in Algeria. The support given Mauritania by the Brazzaville states displeased Morocco, as this was clearly a coalition against it. That Morocco called a conference in Casablanca in January 1961 was therefore not unexpected. Those represented were Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Libya, the U.A.R., Mali and Ceylon. Libya and Ceylon were observers. Another coalition was formed - the Casablanca bloc; this bloc supported Lumumba (who had been dismissed as Prime Minister by President Kasavubu), called for self-determination and independence in Algeria, declared its determination to support the Algerians and their Provisional Government by "all means" in their fight for independence, and supported Morocco's claim to Mauritania.¹

Two opposing blocs now appeared on the African continent, and a bridge had to be built between, if the search for unity was to be a success. Consultations between Senghor, Silvanos Olympio, Tubman and Balewa resulted in the decision to hold a conference in Monrovia. In May 1961, a summit conference of African and Malagasy states was convened in Monrovia. The participating countries were Liberia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Togo, Sierra Leone, Samalia, Libya and the Brazzaville states. The Casablanca states decided to stay away; the Arab states objected to the exclusion of the Algerian Provisional Government (at the insistence of the Brazzaville states); Morocco would not attend the same conference with Mauritania; and Ghana, Mali and Guinea felt that the conference was "inopportune". At the Monrovia conference, unity in terms of co-operation, as opposed to political fusion, was further specified. In addition to calling for non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and co-operation based on "tolerance, solidarity and good-neighbour relations, periodic exchange of views, and non-acceptance of any leadership", the Monrovia states indicated that the "unity" they were advocating was not "political integration of sovereign African States, but unity of aspiration and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity".²

1. See "Appendix 15" in Legum, op. cit., pp. 205-210 for full text.

2. CHAMS, Resolution on the Means of Promoting Better Understanding and Co-operation Towards Achieving Unity in Africa and Malagasy (Monrovia, May 8-12, 1961).

Although the Casablanca states boycotted the conference, the door was left open to them. In the words of the Nigerian Premier, Tafawa Balewa,

...to avoid any impressions of divisions in Africa, this conference should do all possible to co-operate with those countries that participated in the Casablanca conference. All resolutions passed by this conference should be communicated to them as well as to all independent (African) countries which did not participate in this conference. 1

However, the simple act of sending conference documents to the Casablanca states was not enough to reconcile the difference of approach that existed between the Monrovia and Casablanca groupings. In January 1962, the Casablanca bloc again boycotted another Monrovia-states conference held in Lagos, despite the Nigerian Prime Minister's efforts to have both groups present at this conference. Indeed, the Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku, complained that the Casablanca states had not had "the courtesy" to acknowledge documents sent to them for their observations. 2
Algeria was once again the major stumbling block. It was at this meeting that the Charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation (the name of the Monrovia states), based on a Liberian draft, was adopted "in principle". The decision to adopt the Charter "in principle" was taken to leave the door open to the Casablanca states.

After the Lagos conference, there was a movement towards a middle ground. Emperor Haile Selassie sent his representatives to various countries to discuss the pressing issues facing the continent. In March 1962, President Senghor warned the U.A.M. states in Bangui against the proliferation of organisations in Africa. The Senegalese leader said that he considered the U.A.M. to be only a regional organisation whose objective was to build a "united Africa". During the same month, President Keita visited Upper Volta where he and President Yameogo issued a communiqué, announcing that they had agreed to "speed up" African unity by bringing about a rapprochement between the Monrovia and Casablanca blocs. 3
In June, President Houphouët-Boigny stated in London that the "prime objective" of his foreign policy was to facilitate a "coming together" of the two groups. 4

1. Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States (Monrovia, May 8-12, 1961) p.4

2. West Africa, June 16, 1962, p.645.

3. West Africa, March 31, 1962, p.347.

4. West Africa, June 16, 1962, p.661.

Also in June, President Hamani Diori of Niger, at a reception in Conakry, called for a summit meeting between the two blocs, while President Touré¹ referred to his Nigerien guest as "a member of the avant-garde for African progress". Later, at a summit meeting of the Casablanca states in Cairo, Touré was the leading spokesman for African unity; at a press conference in the Egyptian capital, the Guinean leader said that the prominence given to the difference of approach between the two groups was an "imperialist attempt to keep Africa divided". In its final communiqué, the Cairo conference appealed to all African states to "meet soon" with the Casablanca states in order to form a common organisation. Towards the end of October, Presidents Touré, Keita and Houphouët-Boigny met in Guinea for the first time since 1958. Houphouët-Boigny disclosed later that they had made a "formal and precise undertaking" to work for a meeting of the Monrovia and Casablanca groups "as soon as possible".²

This search for a common ground was accompanied - and partially caused - by strains within one of the two groups of states - the Casablanca group. As has been argued, this bloc was formed to counter the positions of the Brazzaville states on the Congo-Kinshasa crisis, the Algerian war and Mauritania's right to independence. The Casablanca powers supported Partice Lumumba in the Congo and, after his deposition and assassination, his protégé, Antoine Gizanga, who established in Kisangani (then Stanleyville) a regime that was said to be the "legitimate government" of the Congo; the Brazzaville states backed the government headed by Joseph Kasavubu; the Casablanca states condemned French policy in Algeria and called for independence in Algeria, while the Brazzaville states were pro-French and called for negotiations between both sides in the war; Morocco's claim to Mauritania was supported, at least in part, by other members of the Casablanca bloc, while those of the Brazzaville group recognised Mauritania's independence. The strains on the Casablanca alliance were occasioned by several differences.

1. Ibid, p.655.

2. Africa Report, V.VII, No. 7, July 1962, pp. 13-14; West Africa, November 3, 1962, p.1215.

Firstly, as has been stated, Morocco had initiated the formation of this group to counter the support given to Mauritania by the Brazzaville states. But even within the Casablanca bloc, the attitude that Mauritania was a part of Morocco was not maintained for long; in fact, towards the end of 1961, President Nkrumah received Mauritanian President Ould Daddah in Ghana, an act that was hardly expected to meet with Morocco's approval. In addition, King Hassan II was beginning to feel uncomfortable about the close and friendly relations that had developed between the U.A.R. and Algeria. Moreover, Col. Nasser and President Ben Bella were sympathetic towards the Moroccan opposition party, Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, and announced that they would not attend a conference of the Casablanca group which was scheduled to have been held in Morocco on May 8, 1963 (the Moroccan general elections were due to be held on May 17); and their refusal to participate brought about the collapse of the conference, which did little to enhance the King's prestige. Secondly, the Congo crisis, which had been an important cause of the emergence of the two groups, had ceased to be important when the Kisangani (Stanleyville) regime of Gizanga fell. Thirdly, after the independence of Algeria, the Casablanca bloc lost another important raison d'etre. The championing of independence for Algeria had provided the group with an important cohesive factor. Fourthly, in January 1963, President Olympio of Togo was assassinated; and there was a strong suspicion, even within the Casablanca group, that Nkrumah may have been implicated. Fifthly, Touré felt dissatisfied when Nkrumah, with an eye to the pending Addis Ababa summit conference, called for a new charter for the political unification of Africa without consulting other members of the Casablanca bloc. When therefore, the

1. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p.147.

2. Stuart Schaar, "King Hassan's Alternatives", Africa Report, V.VIII, No. 8 August 1963, pp. 11-12.

3. Dr. Nkrumah is said to have instructed his British Chief of Staff, Gen. Alexander, to conduct military manoeuvres along the border with Togo shortly before the latter's independence, the first of its kind since Ghana's independence. Gen. Alexander was also instructed to formulate an invasion plan. See W. S. Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, p.85.

4. Legum, op. cit., p.77.

historic African summit conference was convened in Addis Ababa in May 1963, the Casablanca group had lost its cohesion and existed only in name.

With the May 1963 conference in Addis Ababa, continental unity would appear to have been attained. But had it? Or had the form been mistaken for the substance? To suggest that the conference was unimportant would be quite erroneous; the fact that the Casablanca and Brazzaville states were almost fully represented was an accomplishment in itself. (The only country that chose to stay away was Morocco because of Mauritania's presence; and after Olympio's assassination, Togo's participation was felt to be undesirable.) The May 1963 summit was therefore truly continental. But what type of continental unity - if any - was attained? As the proceedings of this conference have been exhaustively treated in other studies,¹ it suffices for us to outline the type of unity that the O.A.U. is intended to promote. In this connection, the Charter states that the Organisation's objectives are: "(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; (b) to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; (d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and (e) to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".² It is, of course, clear from these objectives that the unity which the O.A.U. is intended to promote is co-operation and not political fusion. But to what extent has the O.A.U. promoted co-operation? Is the Organisation becoming more or less relevant in the promotion of unity in Africa? Before attempting an answer, let us first consider the model that will be used in analysing the functioning of the O.A.U..

1. See particularly Z. Cervenka, The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter, London: Hurst, 1969, Woronoff, op. cit.; also V.B. Thompson, op. cit.

2. Article II, Charter of the Organisation of African Unity.

CHAPTER II

A SYSTEMIC MODEL OF THE O.A.U.

Professor Karl W. Deutsch has advised us, and rightly so, that, in any search for a model which matches an empirical situation that we wish to study, at least two criteria should be taken into consideration. Firstly, a model should be selected on the basis of its relevance: it should "resemble" the situation, enabling us fairly adequately to use it as a tool for the particular research. Secondly, the model should provide an economy in the presentation of the particular situation; that is to say, the situation under study should be somewhat simplified by the model.¹ Accordingly, in our treatment of the Organisation of African Unity, we shall make use of the models offered us by some contemporary theorists of systems analysis as applied to the study of international relations. This is not to be understood, however, as a blanket acceptance of the models offered by this school. None of the existing models, by themselves, help us in this particular study; but an eclectic model based on the existing ones provides us with a useful systematic framework for our task. With this in mind, let us proceed.

In discussing the O.A.U. as a system, we are considering it as having units (member states) and subsystems (a composite of a limited number of member states) that have a regular pattern of interaction which makes them distinguishable from their environment with which they interact. In this regard, a system is a set pattern of interaction, and not merely a composite of random interactions; random interactions do not constitute systems.²

In this study, we will not concentrate on the formal, institutional sub-³systems of the O.A.U. which have already been treated in other studies.⁴

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1. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, Glencoe: Free Press, 1963, pp. 16-17.
 2. Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York: Wiley, 1957, p.4; see also Peter Nettl, "The Concept of System in Political Science", Political Studies, V.XIV, No. 3, October 1966, p.307; C. A. McClelland, Theory and the International System, New York: Macmillan, 1966, pp. 20-21; G. Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System", World Politics, V.XIV, No. 1, October 1961, pp. 121-122; J. D. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", World Politics, V.XIV, No.1, October 1961, p.80
 3. These subsystems are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, the Various Commissions and ad hoc committees.
 4. For example, see Z. Cervenka, The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter, London: Hurst, 1960; Jon Woronoff, Organising African Unity, Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1970.

Instead, our primary focus will be the informal subsystems which are eclipsing the O.A.U. These informal subsystems¹ are the Joint Organisation of African and Malagasy States (O.C.A.M.), the Entente, the East African Community, the Conference of East and Central African States, the Senegal River Basin States (O.E.R.S.), and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (U.D.E.A.C.). This division is not however an attempt to compartmentalise the O.A.U. states, since some states are members of more than one subsystem. Moreover, there are times when a high degree of unity has been demonstrated between the various informal subsystems, depending on the particular issue involved.

Like all other systems, the O.A.U. has two types of functions to perform, one social and the other task. The former consists of all functions whose performance is necessary for the existence of the system, while the latter² includes functions that are performed in pursuit of set objectives. The O.A.U.'s efforts to resolve conflicts among its members as well as its insistence that member states adhere to certain principles in their interactions with each other are examples of its social functions. And the Organisation's task functions are those performed in pursuit of set objectives like the eradication of colonialism and apartheid from Africa and political, economic, scientific and cultural co-operation in Africa.

The continued existence of the O.A.U. presupposes some means of sustenance; hence it needs food or fuel, so to speak. Borrowing from Professor David Easton's³ model, we say that inputs and intakes cause the Organisation to operate, and outputs enable us to identify its work. The research task here involves the identification of all inputs and intakes that enter the system, the forces that are operative in shaping and changing them, the processes or stages through which they are

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1. These subsystems are considered to be informal because they are not represented as such within the institutional framework of the O.A.U.
 2. Jean Siotis, "The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in the Emerging European System" (unpublished paper, 1966) p.5ff.
 3. Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics V.IX No. 3, April 1957, p.385ff. I prefer to use "intakes" to designate actions within the O.A.U., instead of "withinputs" as suggested by Easton.

transformed into outputs, and the feedback effects of the outputs on the system. Inputs or intakes may be demands on the O.A.U. or supports to convert demands into outputs or to help the Organisation to maintain itself. These inputs and intakes are responsible for determining the O.A.U.'s behaviour.¹ At one time, the inputs may be more important in determining this behaviour; at another, the intakes may be decisive. As to what these inputs and intakes are depends on the particular issue involved and the attitudes of member and important non-member states.

The O.A.U., like all systems, is generally faced with situations in which decisions must be taken either in connection with its internal needs or as a response to inputs from the environment. These decisions are the outputs of the O.A.U. But before a particular decision is taken certain forces are brought to bear in determining its final form. This aspect is called the "conversion process";² in it is involved the transformation of all inputs and intakes into outputs. In observing this process, we are interested in identifying those forces that are responsible for shaping particular outputs. But to say that a "conversion Process" goes on within the O.A.U. is not the same as saying that the process is always controlled from within. Indeed, the situation sometimes arises when one or more member states are partly or entirely influenced by non-members whose inputs of demands and supports these states can ignore only at the risk of adverse repercussions. In this connection, it should be added that units tend to continue interacting regularly within the framework of their system as long as they are - or believe they are - in a position to exercise some influence in determining the behaviour of their system, or if non-interaction within the system is less preferred than failure to exercise such influence.³ However, in the event of the

1. Cf. Ibid, p.386 ".... the behaviour of every political system is to some degree imposed upon it by the kind of system it is, that is, by its own structure and internal needs. But its behaviour also reflects the strains occasioned by the specific setting within which the system operates....."

2. Gabriel Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems", World Politics, V.XVII, No. 2, January 1965, p.190ff.

3. For a somewhat similar attitude of a clientele group participating in the decision-making of a board, see H. A. Simon et al., Public Administration, New York: Knopf, 1950, p.465.

latter situation, the units that are unable to exercise influence will tend to reinforce their existing subsystem(s) or form a new one at the expense of the system. As we will see further in this study, the Entente states (led by the Ivory Coast) took the initiative in forming O.C.A.M. so that, among other things, the group could exercise more influence within the O.A.U.

When a given empirical situation is treated as a system, the assumption is that it exists within an environment; otherwise, there would be no point in trying to study it as such. A prerequisite for the existence of any system is that it should have fairly definite boundaries, enabling the observer to distinguish between it - with its interacting units and subsystems - and its environment.¹ Although a system forms a part of its environment, with which it interacts, this distinction must be borne in mind for analytical purposes. In order to have a fairly accurate understanding of a functioning system, it is generally useful that we observe its environment - which consists of other systems that I have designated as "environmental components"² to avoid confusion with the particular system under study - to identify the types of inputs that are being introduced into the system. Hence in treating the O.A.U. as a system, we will be interested in determining how the policies of other international organisations and non-member states affect the Organisation's ability to pursue some of its objectives. The United Nations, NATO, the E.E.C., the Organisation of American States and the major non-O.A.U. states are examples of the O.A.U.'s "environmental components".

All systems experience change; the problem is to determine when change results in the emergence of another system. Our indices of change are the stakes of conflict and co-operation.³ In this connection, it is analytically useful

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1. Kaplan, op. cit., p.4; Easton, op. cit., pp.384-385; Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe: Free Press, 1951, p. 3ff; G. A. Coddington, Jr., "A Systems Approach to the Comparative Study of International Organisations" (unpublished paper, 1966) p.7; Almond, op. cit., pp. 187-188. I am grateful to Prof. Siotis for having made Coddington's paper available to me.
 2. E. B. Kesselly, "South-West Africa and New Guinea: A Systems Approach" (unpublished Mémoire presented for the Diploma of the Institute, Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1967) p.8.
 3. Prof. Stanley Hoffmann limits his index of a change of system to the stakes of conflict; a position with which I disagree. See his The State of War, London: Pall Mall Press, 1965, pp. 92-93.

to distinguish between what constitutes a change in the system and a change of system.¹ When one set of elite was replaced by another in Upper Volta following a military coup in January 1966, this was simply a change in the O.A.U. because it did not bring about a rearrangement of the African states in actual or potential conflict or co-operation. Upper Volta continued to co-operate with its partners of the Entente. What then are the conditions under which a new system emerges? This happens when one or a combination of the following conditions is fulfilled: (1) when there is a change of the units in actual or potential conflict; (2) when there is a change of the units in actual or potential co-operation; (3) when there is a change in the means of conducting conflict; and (4) when there is a change in the degree of co-operation. In October 1963, Algeria and Morocco changed the means of conducting their dispute from diplomatic negotiations to armed conflict; through O.A.U. mediation, the two states discontinued their border war and reverted to diplomatic negotiations. The same thing holds for the Ethiopia-Somali and Somali-Kenya border disputes. When Dr. Nkrumah was deposed in February 1966, relations between Ghana and Guinea deteriorated, while Ghana's relations with the Entente states improved because of Nkrumah's downfall. Following two military coups in Nigeria in 1966 and the secession of Biafra from the Nigerian Federation in 1967, relations between Federal Nigeria and four O.A.U. states (Tanzania, Gabon, Zambia and the Ivory Coast) changed from friendly interaction to hostility. Tshombe's accession to power in the Congo in 1964 resulted in the deterioration of relations between that country and a number of African states. When Tshombe was removed from power, the Congo's relations with those states that were hostile to him improved. In 1967, Congo-Kinshasa severed diplomatic relations with Rwanda when the latter refused to extradite to the Congo mercenaries who had fled to Rwanda from Bukavu. In 1968, Pierre Mulélé (a former Congolese revolutionary) returned to Congo-Kinshasa from Congo-Brazzaville, after assurances from General Mobutu's Government that he would not be executed. In spite of these assurances, Mulélé was executed; and

1. I discovered after writing this section on change that Prof. Raymond Aron also makes this distinction. See his Paix et Guerre Entre les Nations, Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1962, pp. 155-156.

relations between the two Congos deteriorated, with charges and counter-charges on both sides. The overthrow of Dr. Obote by a military coup in Uganda in January 1971 resulted in Tanzania and Uganda changing their interaction from friendly co-operation to hostility and in the change of venue for the O.A.U. 1971 summit conference from Kampala to Addis Ababa. The Uganda coup also strained relations between Uganda and Zambia. Following an abortive military coup in Morocco in July 1971, the Libyan leader, Col. Gadafy, expressed support for the plotters and called on them to try again. And when a number of officers were executed in Morocco in connection with the abortive coup, Gadafy recalled his ambassador to that country.

These interactions resulted in basic rearrangements of the African states in potential conflict as well as those in actual or potential co-operation and brought about changes in the means of conducting conflict. As is evident, interactions among O.A.U. states are characterised by a state of flux, co-operating states of one period engaging in conflict interaction in the next, and vice versa. In addition, as we shall see later, some African states have gone a full cycle in their interactions, passing from co-operation to conflict and back to co-operation.

Connected with the question of change is the resolution of conflict. From time to time, a system may be faced with conflict situations; and in order to continue functioning effectively, it must be in a position to resolve any conflict that threatens to result in dysfunctional tension. In this connection, conflict is resolved either by "encapsulation" or "pacification". When the opposing

1. A. Etzioni, "On Self-encapsulating Conflicts", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.VIII, No.3, 1964, pp. 242-255. For other approaches to the resolution of conflict, see R.M. Goldman, "A Theory of Conflict Processes and Organisational Offices", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.X, No. 3 1966, pp. 328-343; K.J.Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behaviour and Some Figures on Procedures", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.X, No.3, 1966 pp. 272-296; D.A.Zinnes, "Hostility in International Decision-Making", The Journal of Conflict Resolution V.VI, No.3, 1962, pp.236-243; V.Aubert, "Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and of Conflict Resolution", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.VII, No.1, 1963, pp.26-42; M. Barkun, "Conflict Resolution Through Implicit Mediation", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.VIII, No.2, 1964, pp. 121-130; Q.Wright, "The Escalation of International Conflicts", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.IX, No.4, 1965, pp.434-449; P.S.Gallo, "Cooperative and Competitive Behaviour in Mixed-Motive Games", The Journal of Conflict Resolution V.IX, No.1, 1965, pp.68-78; H.H.Kelly, "Experimental Studies of Threats in International Negotiations", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.IX, No.1, 1965, pp.79-105; G.Marwell, "Conflict over Proposed Group Actions: A Typology of Cleavage", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.X, No.4, 1966, pp.427-435; L.Randolph, "A Suggested Model of International Negotiation", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.X, No.3, 1966, pp.344-353; A. James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping, London: Chatto & Windus, 1969; International Conflict and Behavioural Science (ed. R.Fisher) New York: Basic Books, 1964.

sides in a conflict agree on certain rules (the "capsule") in their conflict, the conflict becomes "encapsulated"; certain methods of conducting the conflict are legitimised, while others are excluded. As is evident, "encapsulation" provides only partial resolution; however, it limits the expression of conflict within mutually acceptable boundaries. The border disputes involving Algeria and Morocco, Ethiopia and Somalia, and Somalia and Kenya were "encapsulated" by the O.A.U., with the disputants undertaking to settle their disputes by diplomatic negotiations to the exclusion of armed conflict and press and radio propaganda.

In the case of "pacification", the disputants are required to discontinue their conflict interaction, but are not limited or bound by any "capsule". Hence the mode of resuming the conflict, should the need arise, is unpredictable; and this state of affairs may lead to dysfunctional tension being produced periodically in the system. As will be seen further in this study, the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah in February 1966 resulted in the deterioration of relations between Guinea on the one hand and Ghana and the Ivory Coast on the other because of Guinea's support for the deposed Ghanaian leader. During the latter part of 1966, Ghana arrested the Foreign Minister of Guinea, Beavogui, and members of his delegation - when their plane landed in Accra en route to Addis Ababa for an O.A.U. conference - on the grounds that Ghanaians were being detained in Guinea. Through the mediation of an O.A.U. "Committee of Wisemen", Ghana released the Guinean ministerial delegation, and Guinea repatriated those Ghanaians who wished to return home. But the two countries did not agree on any set rules for conducting their dispute. While an armed clash did not occur, most probably because of lack of a common frontier, the disputants continued their press and radio attacks against each other.

Having outlined our eclectic model, let us now attempt to analyse the functioning of the O.A.U. But before doing this, an important caveat is needed. It would be foolhardy to claim that there is a complete correspondence between systems analysis and the functioning of the O.A.U. Only the unwary would claim this. However, such an approach can provide a useful, systematic framework which allows us - although with some degree of arbitrariness - to simplify the

functioning of the Organisation. By treating the O.A.U. as a system, we can distinguish its various subsystems that are now eclipsing it in almost every sphere of interaction in which its members are involved. In addition, the concept of interaction in such an analysis enables us to assess the types of changes that have occurred in respect of the O.A.U.

Finally, the two spheres of interaction selected for analysis are the political and economic. In the political sphere, we will attempt to answer the following questions: How responsive have member states been to the O.A.U.'s decisions on sub-regional groupings, colonialism and apartheid in Africa? How responsive have other international organisations and non-O.A.U. states been to O.A.U. decisions on colonialism and apartheid in Africa? Is a change of tactic necessary in pursuit of the Organisation's objective concerning the eradication of colonialism and racial discrimination from Africa? What types of changes have resulted from the bilateral and multilateral political interactions of the O.A.U. states? Restated: has there simply been changes in the O.A.U., or has a new system emerged? How successful and relevant has the Organisation been in conflict resolution? In the economic sphere, we will attempt to answer such questions as: How relevant is the O.A.U. in the promotion of economic co-operation among the African states? And what are the feedback effects of sub-regional economic co-operation on the functioning of the O.A.U.?

PART II

THE POLITICAL SPHERE OF INTERACTION

CHAPTER III

THE O.A.U. AND SUB-REGIONAL GROUPINGS.

A subsystem may either reinforce the structure of its system or weaken it by pursuing goals or methods that make it compete with the latter. In the first instance, the degree of cohesion in the system tends to be high, since the subsystem serves as a "whip" to make the units more responsive to the system's outputs. In the second case, the subsystem tends to vie with the parent system for the loyalty of the units, a situation which may either continue indefinitely or the one may adjust to the other. If the system makes the adjustment, then it will become subsystem-dominant, being controlled by its subsystem. However, if competition continues, supportive inputs and intakes designed to make the units more responsive to the system's outputs will tend to be less effective, leading to a situation in which the system would find it difficult to perform its task - if not its social-function. In this chapter, we shall examine the relationship between the O.A.U. on the one hand and the Joint Organisation of African and Malagasy States (O.C.A.M.) and the Conference of East and Central African States on the other. Our purpose is to determine how these two subsystems have affected the functioning of the O.A.U. and what implications their existence has for the Organisation.

After the founding the O.A.U. in May 1963, the question arose as to whether other forms of groupings should exist on the African continent. Towards the end of July 1963, the U.A.M. states met in Cotonou to decide their organisation's future. The Dahomean President, Hubert Maga, told his colleagues that "far from being replaced ...by the O.A.U. Charter, (the U.A.M.) is, on the contrary, one of its best guarantees". While agreeing to dissolve the organisation's group at the U.N., the Cotonou conference decided to maintain the U.A.M., at least temporarily. The prevailing view at this meeting was that the U.A.M.'s existence would enable its members to exercise considerable influence within the O.A.U. On August 2, President François Tombalbaye of Chad said that the U.A.M. was an "experienced regional organisation ready to work for African unity in

1. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

conformity with the Addis Ababa (O.A.U.) Charter, but not to sacrifice itself to a new organisation". But the President of another U.A.M. state took the opposite position. Speaking in Abidjan early in August, President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania declared that the U.A.M. had been a step towards African unity, and was about to merge with the O.A.U. The Mauritanian leader warned that the U.A.M. should not "compromise" African unity.¹

The decision to maintain the U.A.M. was criticised by President Touré (among others) who considered it to be an "insolent resurgence"; he believed that the U.A.M.'s activities were draining the O.A.U. Charter of its "essential dynamic content".² At the O.A.U. Council of Ministers' first ordinary session in Dakar in August 1963, a resolution was adopted which, in part, recommended that all regional and sub-regional groupings in Africa conform to the O.A.U.'s Charter and meet the following criteria: (a) geographical realities, and economic, social and cultural factors, common to the states concerned; and (b) co-ordination of economic, social and cultural activities peculiar to the particular states.³ After the Council's Dakar session, the Malagasy President, Philibert Tsiranana, said in Nice that he was "very much" a supporter of the O.A.U., provided it "respects its regional groupings" which, while consolidating it, represented "Africa's different trends".⁴ At the summit meeting of the U.A.M. states in Dakar in March 1964, the retiring President of the organisation, President Yameogo of Upper Volta, said that until an "effective and unshakeable" interdependence among the African states was achieved, it was the "duty" of the U.A.M. states to "go on thinking" in terms of their own grouping. But at the Dakar conference, the prevailing view was that the U.A.M. should 'depoliticise' itself and concentrate on economic and cultural matters. The newly-elected President of the organisation, Ould Daddah, said that "the matters of politics would be left to the O.A.U. The U.A.M. was renamed Union Afro-Malgache de

1. Afrique Nouvelle, 2-8 & 18-22 August, 1963; West Africa, August 10, 1963, p. 882; A. F. P., Africa, August 5, 1963, pp. 11-12.

2. West Africa, August 10, 1963, pp. 882-887.

3. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, p.9.

4. A. F. P. Africa, August 19, 1963, p.6

Co-operation Economique, with its headquarters in Yaoundé. When, however, the foreign ministers of the former U.A.M. states met in April 1964 in Nouakchott, Mauritania to initial the Charter of U.A.M.C.E., the Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and the Central African Republic were not represented. These states had disapproved of the "depoliticisation" of the U.A.M. In a communiqué issued early in May 1964, the Political Bureau of the ruling Senegalese Progressive Union (U.P.S.) deplored the attitude of "certain parties" that were said to be opposing the formation of U.A.M.C.E. at a time when Senegal was "deploying all efforts which could give a framework (cadre) to the aspirations of the African people and concretise their determination (inébranlable volonté) to unite". The Senegalese party expressed regret that "four brother members of U.A.M." had not been represented at the initialing of the U.A.M.C.E.'s Charter.¹

Thus the U.A.M. was shorn of its political aspects. But the situation was shortlived. On 27 September, 1964, the banned Sawaba Party in Niger issued an appeal for the overthrow of President Hamani Diori. (The Party was led by Djibo Bakary who lived in Accra). In October, armed Sawaba bands launched a series of attacks on customs posts and public buildings in Niger, resulting in the deaths of several people. After these attacks, the Niger National Assembly demanded that the Government denounce the "interference" by "neighbouring countries to the south" in Niger's internal affairs, and condemned a certain "great power" for allegedly organising subversion against Niger. Later, the Niger Government announced that captured terrorists had confessed that a number of Sawaba commandos had been trained in Ghana, China and Algeria for subversive activities in Niger.² In January 1965, a Togolese customs official was killed on Togolese territory by Ghanaian border guards, resulting in renewed tension between the two countries since the assassination of President Olympio in 1963.

Following the foregoing events, the Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta (which had not approved of the transformation of the Union of African and Malagasy States into a purely economic organisation) began a drive to form a new organisation

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1. Afrique Nouvelle, 13-19 & 8-14 May, 1964; West Africa, May 9, 1964, p.511; A.F.P. Africa, March 12, 1964, pp.9-10; Le Monde, 10-11 May, 1964.
 2. Le Monde, 13 October, 1964, 4 February & 15 April, 1965; Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., October 1-31, 1964, p.166.

that could enable the former U.A.M. states, as a bloc, to exercise more influence within the O.A.U. so that concerted pressures could be exerted on leaders like Dr. Nkrumah, who, in the view of the Entente states, was not observing the O.A.U.'s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states. In terms of our model, units tend to continue interacting regularly within the framework of their system as long as they are - or believe that they are - in a position to exercise some influence on the behaviour of the system, or if non-action within the system is less preferable than failure to exercise such influence. However, in the latter situation, the units will tend to reinforce their existing subsystem or form a new one at the expense of the system. Hence in mid-January 1965, President Houphouet-Boigny convened a meeting of the Entente states in Yamoussokro,¹ Ivory Coast, to resolve the Niger-Dahomey dispute so as to reinforce the cohesion of the Entente in preparation for the pending U.A.M.C.E. meeting in February in Nouakchott. A communiqué issued after the talks said that the four Entente states "were in agreement on all points examined".² On January 23, President Houphouet-Boigny, in the presence of his colleagues from Upper Volta and Niger, accused Communist China of training Africans at Nankin "to assassinate those who have their eyes open to the Chinese danger in order to replace them with servile men who will open the doors of Africa to China". Those who "push the Chinese towards Africa" were badly mistaken because, with Africa's wealth, the Chinese "would break like a wave and sweep Europe away like a wisp of straw". "In Ghana, Brazzaville, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa", Houphouet-Boigny alleged, "it is China that is there, obstinate, intelligent, trying to mislead us and pit us against each other".³ Concerning the Congo-Kinshasa crisis, the Ivory Coast's leader said that what the Entente wanted was that Congo-Kinshasa "should not be a Cuba on the flank of Africa where the two blocs could confront each other at our expense (notre plus grand malheur)". Early in February, Yameogo and Diiori echoed Houphouet-Boigny's allegation. Yameogo said that the Entente was fighting against "the penetration (investissement) of Africa by Chinese Communism", while Diiori alleged that

1. This dispute will be treated later.

2. Le Monde, 16, 19 & 20 January, 1965.

3. This crisis will be treated later.

the attacks of the Sawaba Party had been "organised, financed and led by Communist China", and that the arms used were "purchased with Chinese money deposited in the banks of Brussels, Geneva and Accra". Turning to the Congo crisis, Yameogo said that Tshombe was "the only legal representative of the Congo", and that "any system" which sought to depose him was "against the Congo". Regarding the U.A.M., the Voltaic leader said that the Entente had never approved of "the transformation" of that organisation and had therefore not signed the Charter of U.A.M.C.E.; the Entente states were not going to participate in the pending Nouakchott conference in order to sign the Charter; they wanted to discuss "common interests", and to see what measures could be taken "to revive that which we knew during the epoc of U.A.M."¹

At the Nouakchott conference in February 1965, the Entente states, excluding Dahomey, were supported by Gabon, Togo and Madagascar in pressing for the politicisation of the Union of African and Malagasy Economic Co-operation (U.A.M.C.E.) so that the organisation could also be involved in political matters (which the organisation had left exclusively to the O.A.U.), thus giving its members, as a bloc, a greater degree of political influence within the O.A.U. Opposed to this idea were Cameroon, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville and Mauritania which were suspicious of an organisation that would rival the O.A.U. However, the conference accepted the Entente's proposal and politicised U.A.M.C.E., renaming it the Joint African and Malagasy Organisation (O.C.A.M.), under the Mauritanian President, Ould Daddah, as its first President. In a communiqué issued after the conference, the participants said that the main objective of the new organisation was to reinforce their co-operation and solidarity in order "to accelerate their development in the political, economic, social, technical and cultural spheres". The "malaise" from which the O.A.U. was said to be suffering was due "essentially" to the "failure" to respect its Charter: "certain states" particularly Ghana, were condemned for "(receiving) agents of subversion and (organising) training camps for subversion on their territory"².

1. Le Monde, 26 January & 4 February, 1965. For an interesting article on the alleged Chinese Communist activities in Niger, see Gilbert Comet, "Un cas d'intervention chinoise en Afrique occidentale: le Niger", Le Monde, 4 February, 1965.

2. Le Monde, 14-15 February, 1965; Afrique Nouvelle, 18 & 24 February, 1965.

After the Nouakchott conference, President Tsiranana said:

.... We used to have faith in the O.A.U.... However, we realised that our colleagues deceived us. That is the truth. They got us through our good faith, our honesty and our frankness, so to speak. We were too frank. So we decided that, if that was to be the case, we would baulk. 1

The Malagasy leader warned President Nkrumah to stop supporting subversive elements in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa; otherwise, he said, many African states would not participate in the O.A.U. summit conference scheduled to be held in Accra in September 1965. Tsiranana wanted Ghana to give assurances that it would "no longer do silly things because timidity is now finished.... We are now strong enough to riposte anyone...." ² President M²ba of Gabon expressed his satisfaction with the "energetic position" taken by the conference against "foreign subversion". On February 17, 1965, President Tombalbaye of Chad said in Fort-Lamy that, "(if) necessary, O.C.A.M. will impose its views to end the Congo crisis by aiding materially and morally the legal Government...." Congo-Brazzaville, on the other hand, expressed reservations about the formation of O.C.A.M., arguing that the charges levelled against Ghana were "without proof": the Government in Brazzaville dissociated itself from "certain declarations by responsible Africans" who had participated in the Nouakchott conference and noted "with satisfaction that O.C.A.M. had not formulated any precise objectives". President Tubman expressed disapproval of subversion, and of interference in the internal affairs of other states, but preferred to have the matter discussed at the scheduled Accra meeting. The Liberian leader called on the O.A.U. Council of Ministers to empower a special commission to normalise relations between Ghana and the O.C.A.M. ³ states.

About a month after the formation of O.C.A.M., Presidents Touré, Keita, Ben Bella and Nkrumah met in Bamako, after which Ben Bella, Keita and Touré had a further meeting in Conakry. An official communique was not issued; but, upon returning to Algiers, Ben Bella stated that he and his colleagues had adopted "a common

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1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., February 1965, p. 237.
 2. Le Monde, 14-15, February, 1965.
 3. A. F. P. Africa, February 15, 1965, p.10; Afrique Nouvelle, 25 February to 3 March, 1965; West Africa, February 27, 1965; p.321; Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., March 1965, p.255.

attitude vis-a-vis the present manoeuvres in Africa, inspired by imperialism and colonialism!¹ On March 23, 1965, the Ghanaian Government reopened its side of the border with Togo, having agreed in February to pay compensation for the death of the Togolese customs official in January. However, border incidents did not cease, and Togo announced in early April that it had detained two Ghanaian border guards who were said to have carried out raids against Togolese villages.² Then on April 13, an attempt was made to assassinate President Diori. Amadou Diop, the would-be assassin, was reported to have confessed that he was a member of the ~~Jamhuri~~ Sawaba Party, and that the assassination attempt was part of a plot for subversive activities against Niger, supported by Ghana. Diori publicly confirmed this later. In a letter to the Niger President, confirming an earlier telegram congratulating him on his escape, President Nkrumah expressed "shock and horror" at reports that the Niger leader had accused him of having been personally implicated in the assassination attempt. If the reports were accurate, Nkrumah said, then "the enemies of the O.A.U., the enemies of the Union Government of Africa, and the enemies of Africa itself must be behind such a fabrication with the sole purpose of sowing dissension and discord among us". The Ghanaian President urged his colleague "to get this monstrous fabrication out of your mind. As the Koran points out, a man whose heart is pure fears nothing, for Allah is with him". Diori, however, repeated his accusation, whereupon Nkrumah, in an interview with a Nigerian newspaper editor, described O.C.A.M. as "the American group of states in Africa" whose stand on Africa "is indistinguishable from that of U.S. imperialism - support for Tshombe, anti-Ghana (and) disruption of (the) O.A.U."³

Meanwhile, the Entente states, led by the Ivory Coast, were taking steps to have the entire O.C.A.M. membership boycott the pending O.A.U. summit conference in Accra. Delegations were sent to Gabon, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and Nigeria. But Ould Daddah, the President of O.C.A.M., and

1. Le Monde, 14-15 & 17-18 March, 1965.

2. These border guards were later released by Togo.

3. Ghanaian Times, April 23 & May 20, 1965.

Keita agreed in Mauritania to call on all African states "to redouble their vigilance in order to foil the plot to divide the O.A.U. and Africa".¹ Towards the end of April 1965, the Nigerian Premier, Tafawa Balewa called for an extraordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers to discuss the dispute between Ghana and the Entente states. The Nigerian President, Azikiwe, said that the O.A.U. members were "morally bound" to participate in the Accra conference, and added that the African states "should be fair. It is very delicate in international relations to jump to conclusions. The culprit should be given an opportunity to defend himself".² The Congo-Brazzaville President, Massambat-Debat, expressed the view that, if some African states had "serious grounds" for being reproachful towards Ghana, he was "far from believing" that the method that was being pursued would consolidate African unity. The Brazzaville leader said that the strategy employed to pressure Dr. Nkrumah was "suited rather to dividing us than uniting us in our organisation".³

During the latter part of May 1965, a majority of the O.C.A.M. states, again led by the Entente, voted at a meeting in Abidjan to boycott the Accra conference and to admit Congo-Kinshasa to their organisation. O.C.A.M. delegations were sent to the U.A.R., Tunisia and Libya to win support for a boycott of the O.A.U. meeting in Accra. President Touré attacked these delegations, describing them as "the commercial travellers for division", and said that the O.A.U. itself, and not Ghana, was the target of O.C.A.M.'s activities. O.C.A.M., the Guinean President declared, stood for "organisation commune africaine de menteurs (joint African organisation of liars)", and was "the first of a new mystification forged to sap the basis of African unity (and) retard the evolution of Africa for the benefit of imperialism". Later, Touré accused Houphouët-Boigny of supporting subversive activities against Guinea, and of bringing about division between Guinea and other African states and France. Touré described O.C.A.M. as a "club of puppets (club des fantoches)", but added that his country was prepared "to maintain and reinforce"

1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., April 1965, pp. 272-273; West Africa, May 1, 1965, p. 479.

2. West Africa, May 1, 1965, p. 479.

3. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., March 1965, p.272.

the basis of a "sound understanding" with the peoples and states of O.C.A.M. in the struggle against "the colonialists, imperialists and puppets". Interestingly, President Houphouët-Boigny hardly said a word in his own defence; it was President Yameogo who said that President Touré had shown by his attack on the Ivorian President - the man who had "made (fabriqu^é) him within the R.D.A." - that he, Touré, was "not a Head of State worthy of sitting on the same bench with those who truly wanted African unity".¹

Towards the end of March 1965, President Tubman proposed that a fact-finding team be sent to Ghana so as to investigate O.C.A.M.'s charges that subversive elements were based there.² In June, an emergency session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers was held in Lagos to consider O.C.A.M.'s decision to boycott the pending O.A.U. conference in Accra. Addressing the Lagos conference the Nigerian Prime Minister, Balewa, warned that a "dividing line" had appeared within the O.A.U. Balewa added that the African states were either "big enough to resolve the difficulties that now confront (the O.A.U.), in a realistic and humane manner, or we gonon deceiving ourselves with diplomatic niceties until our organisation breaks up". While O.C.A.M.'s threat to boycott the Accra meeting could not be ignored, Balewa said, the meeting should be held as scheduled in the interest of African unity. As was expected, Ghana denied the Entente's charges of subversion; the Ghanaian Government promised, however, to guarantee full security for all delegations in Accra, remove all undesirable elements from its territory and ban all subversive political groups. The Secretary General of the O.A.U., Diallo Telli, was invited to visit Ghana before the conference in order to ascertain whether or not these promises had been fulfilled. The Council then adopted a resolution which, among other things, called on O.A.U. member states to do everything possible to ensure the success of the summit conference scheduled to be held in Accra, and appealed to members of the Organisation to abstain from any propoganda that would compromise the success of the Accra conference; it also called on Ghana and the Entente states to resolve their dispute by peaceful

1. A.F.P., Africa, June 1, 1965, pp. 7-8, 11 & 17; Le Monde, 9,12,15 & 10-21 June, 1965.

2. A.F.P., Africa, June 1, 1965, p.9.

negotiation and recommended that all O.A.U. states attend the Accra meeting.¹ A day after the Council's resolution, Mauritania, whose President was also President of O.C.A.M., announced that it would participate in the Accra conference. Then on July 7, 1965, Mauritania also announced that it had withdrawn from O.C.A.M. The Mauritanian President had declined to attend the O.C.A.M. summit meeting held in Abidjan in May, and so had Presidents Ahidjo and Massambat-Debat. These men were reportedly dissatisfied with the irregular manner in which the Abidjan meeting was convened; they felt that Ould Daddah, as President of the organisation, should have convened the conference, and not President Houphouet-Boigny. In addition, the three men believed that the prior approval of all O.C.A.M. members should have been obtained before the admission of Congo-Kinshasa. In a speech on July 10, 1965, the Cameroonian President, Ahidjo, warned that his country would remain in O.C.A.M. "(for) the moment" in the hope that "things will sort themselves out, and that the organisation will function normally". Otherwise, Ahidjo added, "we will ask ourselves why we should continue to remain in O.C.A.M.". On 3 August 1965, the Mauritanian Ambassador to the U.A.R., M. Elhadramy Elkhateri, said that his country had withdrawn from O.C.A.M. because of the insistence of "certain member states" on bringing "politics" into the organisation. This, the Mauritanian diplomat said, was contrary to the objectives of the O.A.U.²

Meanwhile, the Accra meeting was postponed from September to October 1965, and Ghana was doing all it could to have the meeting fully attended. Nkrumah himself made quick visits to several African countries and sent messages to the heads of state he could not visit, giving assurances that everything was being done to facilitate the success of the conference. On August 27, Diallo Telli said that he was satisfied that all political refugees had been removed from Ghana, as demanded by the O.A.U. Early in October, Senegal, another O.C.A.M. member, announced that it would participate in the Accra conference. And on October 13, Nkrumah met with his colleagues of the Entente states in Bamako to inform them of the measures taken by Ghana to guarantee the safety of all delegates.

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1. A.F.P. Africa, June 11, 1965, p.9, June 15, 1965, p.6; O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, pp. 71-72.
 2. A.F.P., Africa, June 15, 1965, p.19, June 18, 1965, p.37, July 9, 1965, p.12, July 13, 1965, pp. 3 & 4, August 6, 1965, p.21; West Africa, July 17, 1965, p.803.

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in Accra. But in spite of these efforts, the O.A.U.'s attempt to have the O.C.A.M. states fully represented at the Accra meeting was less than successful. Restated in terms of our model: when competition exists between a subsystem and its system, supportive inputs and intakes designed to make the units (of the subsystem) more responsive to the system's outputs will tend to be less effective. Hence, although Ghana and a number of African states - including four O.C.A.M. members (Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon and Mauritania, which later withdrew from O.C.A.M.) - had introduced supportive intakes to make member states respond positively to the Council's decision that O.A.U. members attend the Accra meeting, the majority of the O.C.A.M. states were absent when the Council met in Accra on October 14 in preparation for the Assembly's meeting. These states were the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Chad, Gabon, the Malagasy Republic and Dahomey. On October 21, the Entente states and Togo (which was not then a member of the Entente) announced that they would not participate in the summit conference. President Tsiranana said that, if the conference had been held on the date originally agreed upon, his country would have participated because it was "profoundly attached" to its "African membership". Unfortunately, the Malagasy leader said, his ministers were "too preoccupied" with their "duties"; and as for himself, he was already committed to "official visits". In this connection, it should be noted that, after the O.C.A.M. Abidjan meeting in May 1965 (at which the decision to boycott the Accra conference was taken), Tsiranana said in Paris that he would not attend the Accra conference because he was "not a candidate for paradise". President Tombalbaye expressed the view that President Nkrumah had not "kept his word", while the Gabonese President, M'ba, said that "obligations" and the "difficulty" of transport between Libreville and Accra made it impracticable for his country to participate.²

Since 1965, the various groupings in Africa, including O.C.A.M., have not, as groupings, posed a similar dramatic challenge to the O.A.U. With the downfall of Nkrumah, the Entente states feel less - if at all - threatened. In any case,

1. A.F.P., Africa, October 15, 1965, p.9.

2. A.F.P., Africa, June 1, 1965, p.9, October 22, 1965, p.5; Afrique Nouvelle, 21-27 October, 1965.

the Entente itself has undergone change since 1965. Maurice Yameogo, the most vocal spokesman of the Entente, was overthrown in a military coup in January 1966. Dahomey has changed its Government at least three times, and the Togolese leadership has also changed. The working relationship among the various leaders of the Entente states is therefore not as strong as it was in 1965. It will be recalled that the Entente was the moving force in the drive to politicise U.A.M.C.E. and rename it O.C.A.M. in 1965. With these changes in the Entente, O.C.A.M. has in turn become less political and has tended to concentrate on economic and trade co-operation, becoming (in effect) more like what the U.A.M. was originally transformed into in 1964 - U.A.M.C.E. Other groupings in Africa - such as the East African Community, the Senegal River Basin State (O.E.R.S.), the Central African Customs and Economic Union (U.D.E.A.C.), the Conference of East and Central African States - have not, so far, posed a direct dramatic challenge to the O.A.U. comparable with that presented by O.C.A.M.¹

Of these groupings, the Conference of East and Central African States needs special mention here, as the others will be treated in Part III. While it does not have a formal structure, the Conference of East and Central African States has met fairly regularly (at least once a year) since President Kenyatta of Kenya first convened it in Nairobi in April 1966. The Conference has not, so far, taken any decisions contrary to those of the O.A.U.; on the contrary, the intakes of this subsystem have tended to be supportive, reinforcing the system's outputs. At its first session in April 1966, the Conference issued a communiqué which, in part, expressed regret that economic sanctions against Rhodesia had failed, and declared that the participating states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Malawi, Congo-Kinshasa, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and Rwanda) would exert pressure on Britain to take "effective and decisive" measures against the minority regime in Rhodesia; the communiqué also appealed to the Africans in Rhodesia to intensify their struggle against the Smith regime, and promised to give Zambia the requisite assistance to overcome problems brought about by U.D.I. in Rhodesia. The Conference also decided that refugees were not to be given military training,

1. The potential challenge that these groupings pose will be treated in Part III.

communication facilities, or financial or other assistance in their host countries for action against their own governments, and that the eleven states would refrain from propaganda campaigns against neighbouring countries. On the same day that the communique¹ was issued, the Kenya Government began arresting leaders of the southern Sudan secessionist organisations in Kenya. Shortly thereafter, Uganda and Sudan agreed to form a special committee to handle the repatriation of Sudanese refugees from Uganda.

In February 1967, the Conference met in Kinshasa and issued a joint communique² - known as the "Kinshasa Declaration" - which, among other things, reaffirmed the participants' support for the liberation movements in Africa. The communique² promised renewed support for the O.A.U.'s efforts to co-ordinate these movements, and called on freedom fighters (as had the O.A.U.) to unite in the struggle for independence; it "unreservedly condemned" the United Kingdom (as did the O.A.U.) for its handling of the rebellion in Rhodesia, and called for the use of force (in accordance with O.A.U. resolution) to end the rebellion; it also announced the participants' support for, and solidarity with, each other in the maintenance of their security and preservation of their sovereignty. The countries that were represented at the Kinshasa meeting were Congo-Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and the Central African Republic. At another summit meeting in December 1967 in Kampala, the participating states (Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, Somalia, Congo-Kinshasa, Sudan, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda and Burundi) approved recommendations made by a previous ministerial conference, calling for closer economic and technical co-operation, the development of transport and communications in the area, and security measures to ensure the stability of member states.

To say, however, that the present sub-regional groupings do not now pose a direct and dramatic challenge to the O.A.U. is not the same thing as saying that they do not pose any challenge. Such a conclusion would not be sustained by an observation of present trends. As we shall see, the Organisation is being eclipsed

1. A.F.P., Africa 5 April, 1966, pp.1ff. & 19.

2. The Standard (Tanzania), February 15, 1967; Uganda Argus, December 18, 1967.

by the various regional and sub-regional groupings in Africa. Even if all its member states had adhered to the August 1963 decision, limiting the activities of regional and sub-regional groupings to "geographical realities and economic, social and cultural factors common to the (participating) States" and "co-ordination of economic, social and cultural activities peculiar to the States concerned", this trend would most probably not have been avoided, as we shall see further on in this study - particularly in respect of O.C.A.M., the Entente, and the O.E.R.S. It is not uncommon that, as a subsystem becomes more and more relevant in its own particular sphere of interaction, its parent system becomes even less so; and as the subsystem becomes more and more successful in one sphere of interaction, other spheres are more likely to be transferred to it at the expense of the system. But instead of anticipating our general conclusions, it may be more prudent to continue our inquiry into the functioning of the O.A.U. by discussing next how member states have been responding to the Organisation's decisions on the eradication of colonialism and racial discrimination from Africa - a discussion reserved for the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

RESPONSIVENESS OF MEMBER STATES TO O.A.U.

DECISIONS ON COLONIALISM AND APARTHEID

An important indication of how successfully a system is functioning is the level of the responsiveness of its units and subsystems to its outputs in pursuit of set objectives. One of the O.A.U.'s objectives is the eradication of colonialism and racial discrimination from Africa;¹ and in this chapter, we attempt to assess the responses of O.A.U. member states to the Organisation's decisions on colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa in order to determine the "feedback effects" of these responses on the functioning of the Organisation. In this way, we can arrive at some evaluation of the strength and effectiveness of the O.A.U. The three cases selected for discussion are Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese colonies in Africa. As we shall see, the types of outputs have been such that, while there is unity as to the objectives in these areas, there is not a unity of action.

Rhodesia

The Rhodesia issue has presented the O.A.U. with its severest test thus far, by placing considerable strain on the cohesion of the Organisation. For the first time since its inception, the O.A.U. was faced with a situation in which a white minority regime had imposed its rule on an overwhelmingly African territory in direct opposition to the Organisation's declared objective of eradicating "all forms of colonialism from Africa". The O.A.U.'s resolution on the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia (including the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain) and the responses of various member states to this resolution are well known. But what were the effects of these responses on the functioning of the Organisation? Before answering this question, let us briefly sketch the background to U.D.I. in November 1965.

In 1953, the Central African Federation - consisting of Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), Southern Rhodesia and Malawi (Nyasaland) - was formed, in spite of

1. The O.A.U.'s decisions on conflict resolution - which are in keeping with its objective to "promote unity and solidarity" among the African states - and the responses of the particular states involved will be treated in the chapter on conflict resolution; and the decision on economic co-operation - which is in pursuit of its objective to "co-ordinate and intensify...co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa" - will be treated in Part III.

opposition from the African nationalists in the three territories, who feared that it would strengthen white supremacy in Central Africa. The arguments for federation were presented in glowing economic terms by its proponents. Federation, it was said, would create a larger economic unit and attract development capital. Besides, it was argued, the three territories had complementary economies. Another rationale was that federation would promote racial "partnership". But attempts to make this "partnership" a principle of the Federation's Constitution failed to gain the requisite support from the whites. The Federal Legislative Assembly consisted of six African, three whites elected or appointed to represent African interests, and twenty-six whites elected on a narrow franchise. The number of seats in the Assembly was later increased to fifty-nine with approximately the same proportion. Since the creation of the Federation in 1953, all attempts to bring about a genuine partnership among the races of the Federation had been resisted by the overwhelming majority of the white population. That the African nationalists sought to dismember the Federation was therefore not unnatural. With Dr. Banda's return in 1958 to lead the Malawi Congress, opposition to the Federation became more intense. In early 1959, matters came to a head when disturbances in Malawi followed nationalist agitation against the Federation. These disturbances resulted in the deaths of a number of Africans and the detention of many more; Dr. Banda was among those detained. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the reasons behind the disturbances, reported, among other things,

1. For a more comprehensive background to the Federation and African opposition to it, see H.W. Chitepo, "Developments in Central Africa" in Federalism and the New States of Africa (ed. D.P. Currie), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 3-28; B.T.G. Chidzero, "African Nationalism in East and Central Africa", International Affairs, V.XXXVI, No.4, October 1960, pp.464-475; R.I. Rotberg, "The Rise of African Nationalism: The Case of East and Central Africa", World Politics, V.XV, No.1, October 1962, pp. 75-90; T. Ranger, "The Politics of the Irrational in Central Africa", The Political Quarterly, V.XXXIV, 1963, pp.285-291; R.I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966; B.V.Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict, London: L. Frewin, 1968; K. Young, Rhodesia and Independence, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967; R. Welensky, Welensky's 4,000 Days, London: Collins, 1964; J.J.B. Somerville, "The Central African Federation," International Affairs, V.XXXIX, No. 3, July 1963, pp. 386-402.
2. Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report by the Conference on Federation held in London, January 1953 (Command 8753); Federal Scheme prepared by the Conference held in London, January 1953 (Command 8754).

that the Malawi Congress had widespread support in the territory, and that there was strong opposition to the Federation.¹ Following the disturbances in Malawi, about five hundred members of the Zimbabwe Congress were detained without trial; they were later tried, but acquitted.

Meanwhile, the Conservative Government in Britain was preparing for a general election. In July 1959, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, announced that a Commission headed by Lord Monckton had been appointed to advise on the review of the Federation. Macmillan, in an attempt to impress the African nationalists, is said to have toyed with the idea of having an Asian as head of this Commission; but Lord Monckton was finally elected.² After the 1959 elections in Britain, Iain Macleod became Colonial Secretary, and in April 1960, following Macmillan's famous "wind of change" speech in South Africa, Macleod released Dr. Banda. A few months later, Malawi was granted a new Constitution which provided for elections in 1961. In October, Lord Monckton's Commission reported, inter alia, that the Federation was very unpopular, confirming what the Devlin Commission had said earlier. If the Federation were to continue (the Commission argued) then African representation in the Federal Assembly needed to be increased, the franchise revised so as to reflect the population, racial discrimination declared illegal, and Zambia given a new Constitution. Each territory should also have the right to secede.³ When Kaunda visited Britain in December, there were rumours that Macleod had assured him that Zambia would be given a Constitution similar to that for Malawi.⁴

Contesting the 1961 Malawi elections on an anti-Federation platform, the Malawi Congress won an overwhelming majority, receiving about 94% of the votes and twenty-two out of twenty-eight seats in the territorial Assembly. Meanwhile, talks on Rhodesia in February 1961 resulted in a compromise plan which was accepted

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1. Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, July 1959 (Command 814).
 2. Dan Horowitz, "Attitudes of British Conservatives towards Decolonisation in Africa during the Period of the Macmillan Government 1957 - 1963" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford, 1967) p.62; Welensky, op.cit., p.145. I am grateful to Prof. Dennis Austin for having made Horowitz' Thesis available to me.
 3. Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, October 1960 (Command 1148).
 4. Horowitz, op., cit., pp. 105-106.

by the nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo, who later repudiated it after it became clear that his followers were against it. Under the plan, there were to be upper - and lower - roll seats, qualifications being such that fifty Europeans and fifteen Africans would be elected to the territorial Assembly. Also in February 1961, it was announced that elections would be held in Zambia on the basis of a three-roll system: an "A" roll, a "B" roll and a common roll. From the qualifications set out for the franchise, a European majority in the Zambian Assembly was unlikely. By October 1961, Macleod's African policy had so displeased members of the Conservative Party that he had to leave the Colonial Office to be replaced by Reginald Maudling.² But although Macleod's plan on Zambia was later modified by Maudling, the trend towards eventual majority rule in that country was not reversed. In fact, Maudling said later that he had already considered the Federation to be doomed before he became Colonial Secretary because of Lord Malvern's definition of "partnership" as "the relationship between horse and rider".³ Towards the end of October and then early in December 1962, elections in Zambia resulted in an anti-Federation majority, held by Dr. Kaunda's United National Independence Party and Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress. The two parties formed a coalition Government headed by Kaunda. Once the territorial Governments in Malawi and Zambia were headed by anti-Federation leaders, only an inveterate optimist would have expected the Federation to continue. Early in 1963, R. A. Butler, the Minister for Central African Affairs, announced that any territory which wanted to secede from the Federation could do so.

But while self-government was being granted to Zambia and Malawi under majority rule, Rhodesia remained under white control. With the founding of the O.A.U. in May 1963, the struggle against colonialism in Africa took on another dimension: the independent African states, in pursuit of an O.A.U. objective, had come out strongly against colonialism. The verbal attack against Britain's policy in Central Africa became more concentrated and intense. In September 1962,

1. J. Day, "Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists and the 1961 Constitution", The Journal of Modern African Studies, V.VII, No.2, 1969, pp.221-247.

2. Horowitz, op. cit., p.105ff.

3. Ibid, p.179.

the minority government of Sir Edgar Whitehead had banned the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (the African nationalist party) and exiled its leaders to remote areas in Rhodesia. In spite of this ban, Sir Edgar had told the Trusteeship Council in October that "there is no doubt" that the Africans could gain control of the territory "in fifteen years";¹ but Sir Edgar was soon replaced by Winston Field who, after the British Government had yielded to African nationalist pressure for the dissolution of the Central African Federation, began demanding independence for Rhodesia.

In response to an O.A.U. decision in 1963, the African Group at the U.N. and African members of the Commonwealth began to exert pressure² on Britain for majority rule in Rhodesia. In February 1964, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers called on the British Government to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence, to convene a constitutional conference of all political parties in the territory in order to decide the independence issue on the basis of universal suffrage, and to take measure to end political unrest in Rhodesia. O.A.U. members were requested to "reconsider" their diplomatic and other relations with the United Kingdom, if that country failed to respond positively to the Organisation's decision on Rhodesia; the Liberation Committee was instructed to strengthen its support of the nationalists in the territory; and the African Group at the U.N. was requested to take the requisite diplomatic steps to pressure Britain into implementing previous U.N. resolutions on Rhodesia.^{3 4}

Meanwhile, the Federation was dissolved in December 1963. Following its demise, tension between the nationalists and the minority government in Rhodesia was intensified. A right-wing revolt in the Rhodesian Front Party against Field led to his replacement by Ian Smith in April 1964. A few days later, the African nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo, and some of his supporters were arrested and jailed on charges of "enticing the public to violence and disrupting the public".⁵

1. The New York Times, October 31, 1962.

2. The nature of the pressure applied through the U.N. and the Commonwealth will be assessed in Chapter V.

3. These resolutions will be treated in Chapter V.

4. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, p.26.

5. The New York Times, January 2, April 14, October 27,28, & 29, 1964.

On October 23, Smith dismissed the Commander of the Rhodesian Armed Forces, General John Anderson. Ostensibly, the General was "retired" because of his age - he was fifty - but the consensus of opinion was that he was retired because of his opposition to U.D.I. On the same day, Smith told Europeans in the territory:

I believe it is imperative that we obtain our independence and thus retain civilised government in this part of Africa. We have put behind us the old cap-in-hand attitude when dealing with the future of our country and have adopted a new, firm and determined approach.... 1

On October 26, Smith obtained the consent of the government-paid chiefs and headmen in the territory to independence under white rule. The British Government (first Conservative then Labour) opposed this method of consultation because it was felt that a representative African opinion could not be ascertained by such means. On October 27, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, said that the United Kingdom hoped that "internal pressures" would bring about a change of government in Rhodesia. In addition, Smith was warned that U.D.I. would be "an open act of rebellion" and "treasonable". It was also made clear that financial and trade links with Britain would be jeopardized. The following day, the United States announced that it had been following events in Rhodesia "with intense interest and mounting concern".² Towards the end of October, Smith said that he would not consider a "yes" vote in the pending November 5 independence referendum as a mandate for U.D.I.; his government, he said, would continue to negotiate, but would request an "appropriate mandate" from "the people" to declare U.D.I., "if so desired".³ On November 5, the overwhelming majority of the almost all-white electorate that voted in the independence referendum favoured independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, which provided for a very gradual increase in the number of Africans participating in the political process of the territory. After his victory in the referendum, Ian Smith renewed a previous suggestion that Bottomley should come to Salisbury for talks. The Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, made it known that Bottomley would come, provided he was allowed to meet individuals representing a cross section of the Rhodesian population, including the detained nationalist leaders, Nkomo and Sithole.

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1. The Times, October 24, 1964,
 2. The New York Times, October 27, 28 & 29, 1964; The Times, October 28, 1964.
 3. The Guardian, October 30, 1964; The Times, October 30, 1964.

Smith refused.

In March 1965, Bottomley stated that the British Government would not use force to bring about constitutional changes in Rhodesia.¹ During the same month, the Smith regime announced that general elections would be held on May 7, to strengthen its position so that "essential changes" could be made in the 1961 Constitution. On April 25, the British Government repeated its warning of October 1964 that it would impose economic sanctions, if the white minority regime seized independence. The following day, the Smith regime issued a white paper, stating that it had decided on "counter-measures" to protect the territory's interests.² A few days before the May 1965 elections, the Association of Rhodesian Industries and the Associated Chambers of Commerce said that U.D.I. would be "prohibitive", if Britain imposed economic sanctions. The sugar and tobacco associations had already warned that U.D.I. would cost Rhodesia Commonwealth preference. These pressure groups were later joined by the Rhodesia National Farmers Union which indicated that, in the first year, economic sanctions imposed by Britain would deprive the territory of about £14 million sterling in tobacco sales alone.³ In spite of these warnings, the Rhodesian Front won all fifty seats of the predominantly white "A" roll electorate. Shortly after the elections, Smith stated that his regime would seize independence, if the whites were in danger of losing their "civilisation" to the "Communists" and "extreme racialists".⁴ Later, the Smith regime's representative in London, Evan Campbell, said that the whites would declare U.D.I., if the British Government refused to grant independence to the territory.⁵

At the Accra summit conference of October 1965, the O.A.U. Assembly considered the idea of having African members of the Commonwealth withdraw from that association, should Britain grant independence to Rhodesia under white domination. However, this step was thought to be excessive, since the Organisation did not

1. The Guardian, March 9, 1965. It is difficult to see how this disclosure was calculated to deter the Smith regime.

2. The Times, April 1 & 27, 1965; The Guardian, April 26, 1965.

3. The Guardian, May 3 & 4, 1965; The Times, May 3, 1965.

4. The Times, May 10, 1965; The Sunday Times, May 9, 1965.

5. The Guardian, May 19, 1965; The Times, May 19, 1965.

have adequate information concerning the intentions of the United Kingdom. The Assembly therefore called on member states to "reconsider their political relations" with Britain, if independence were granted to the territory under white control. In addition, it was decided that a declaration of U.D.I. by the minority regime should be opposed by all means, including the use of force, and that independence be obtained on the basis of majority rule. To this end, a Committee of Five on Rhodesia was established, consisting of Kenya, the U.A.R., Zambia, Tanzania and Nigeria. The Committee held three meetings and set up two sub-committees, one to deal with the economic aspects of the problem and the other the political aspects.¹

In November 1965, the Rhodesian question took on another dimension when the whites actually declared U.D.I. The British Government imposed selective economic sanctions, but ruled out the use of force. In Africa, not surprisingly, the reaction was one of outrage. A series of pronouncements was issued from the various African capitals. President Massambat-Debat of Congo-Brazzaville called for an armed intervention in Rhodesia and said that he would volunteer "personally", if a "crusade" could be formed to free the Africans in the territory. The Foreign Minister of Chad, Jacques Baroum, associated his country with all "common action" by the various African states to bring democracy to Rhodesia. Niger's Defence Minister, Ycouba Djibo, wanted the rebellion "put down immediately". The Somali Premier, Abdirazak Hadui Hussein, promised that his country would "spearhead" the implementation of the O.A.U.'s decisions on Rhodesia. Albert Margai of Sierra Leone called for the "strongest possible action" against the rebels. The U.A.R. announced that no vessels dealing with the rebel territory would be permitted to pass through the Suez Canal. The Presidents of the four Senegal River states (Mauritania, Guinea, Mali and Senegal), in a joint communiqué, urged all African states to consider themselves "at war" with Smith's regime. President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria declared that his country would "never admit" in Africa a racist regime such as that formed by the white rebels in Rhodesia.² The Prime Minister of Nigeria, Balewa, stated that rebellion had no other remedy than to be

1. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Sixth Extraordinary Session, Addis Ababa, December 1965, ECM/PV.1(VI)p.4.

2. A.F.P. Africa, 10, 1965, p.36ff.

crushed by force; and since the Smith regime had rebelled against Britain, the only method of handling it was to deal with it "savagely". At the same time, the Nigerian leader disagreed with a reporter who suggested that the United Kingdom had disappointed the African members of the Commonwealth. The Rhodesian question, Balewa said, was a delicate one; and no government wanted to be hasty in handling a delicate problem.¹ Dr. Nkrumah announced that Ghana was ready to place its Armed Forces at the disposal of the O.A.U., the U.N., or Britain, in order to end the rebellion. President Touré also offered the O.A.U. a battalion of troops for "Operation Rhodesia". A motion was put before the National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa, calling on the Government to arrange a conference of African defence ministers to organise the defence of Africa against the "threat posed by the Rhodesian rebellion".² And Dr. Nyerere declared that the African states could not accept a situation where a small minority used force to impose its will on a large majority. The Tanzanian leader continued:

If we accept that, we should accept another colonial era in Africa. We do not deserve our independence in Africa. Nothing could be more humiliating to Africa than to accept that situation.³

On 15 November 1965, Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta, Obote and Kaunda met in Nairobi to discuss the Rhodesian crisis, and to hold a routine meeting of the East African Common Services. A brief communiqué issued after the talks said that the East and Central African leaders had agreed on a joint line of action towards the Rhodesian problem. President Nyerere told reporters that he and his colleagues had decided on how to aid Zambia, and that arrangements were being made concerning this. Four days after the Nairobi summit meeting, the Tanzanian Minister for Regional Administration, Oscar Kambona, who was also Chairman of the Liberation Committee, told an emergency meeting of the O.A.U. Committee of Five on Rhodesia in Dar-es-Salam that it should recommend to O.A.U. member states "a catalogue of concrete pressures" which could be applied to Britain so as to "wake her up to her responsibility" in Rhodesia.⁴ President Banda was about the only African

1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., November 1965, p.409.

2. A.F.P., Africa, November 10, 1965, p.36ff.

3. The Nationalist, November 13, 1965. D., 1965.

4. The Nationalist, November 16, 17 & 20, 1965.

leader to suggest that all countries "must follow Britain's lead" in handling the Rhodesian crisis because the territory was "Britain's responsibility".¹ On November 22, the O.A.U. Secretariat announced that the Committee of Five on Rhodesia had proposed an extraordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers for early December. On the following day, the Committee called on all O.A.U. member states to bring into immediate effect a complete blockade against Rhodesia and to consider withdrawing their heads of diplomatic mission in London.

During the latter part of November 1965, there were press reports that President Kaunda had requested that the British Government send troops, and R.A.F. fighters and bombers, to Zambia. Kaunda himself told a press conference on November 25 that British military intervention was the only alternative to a racial or ideological war in Central Africa. The Zambian leader disclosed that his country was receiving offers of military aid "daily", and that he was under pressure to accept these offers.² When saboteurs destroyed a power pylon and cut the main power line from the Kariba Dam to the Zambian copper mines, the Conservative Opposition, many of whose members had strongly opposed the sending of troops to Zambia decided, in principle, not to oppose a decision of the Labour Government to accede to Zambia's request for military assistance. But the Conservatives wanted the British Government to be in complete control of British troops in Zambia, who should be under strict orders not to cross the border into Rhodesia under any circumstances. In addition, Kaunda was to give assurances that Zambia would not accept military aid from any other source.³ The Labour Government accepted the conditions stipulated by the Opposition, but not without some modification. When Harold Wilson announced the decision to send troops and R.A.F. aircraft to Zambia, he stated that these forces would be "under unequivocal British command", and that they would not enter Rhodesia to protect the Kariba Dam, as Kaunda had requested. The British Prime Minister added however, that, if the Smith regime interrupted Zambia's power supply from Kariba, Britain would not "stand idly by".⁴

1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., November 1965, p. 409.

2. The Guardian, November 23 & 26, 1965; The Times, November 27, 1965.

3. The Times, November 27&30, December 2, 1965; The Observer, November 28, 1965.

4. The Guardian, December 2, 1965.

Kaunda accepted the offer of R.A.F. aircraft, but refused to have a token British infantry battalion in Zambia because of its defensive assignment.

Meanwhile, early in December 1965, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers met in Addis Ababa to consider the Rhodesian question. The Liberian Secretary of State, Rudolph Grimes, on his arrival in Addis Ababa, told reporters that the rebellion must be quelled "as quickly as possible". Kojo Botsio, then Ghanaian Chairman for State Planning as well as Chairman of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, stated that Britain had handled the crisis inadequately, and that the O.A.U. should be prepared to step in, if the British Government did not act immediately. He claimed that about 4,000 Ghanaians had volunteered for military action against the rebels. The Tunisian Foreign Minister, Mongi Slim, said that his Government wanted the Organisation to take "effective action" to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia; and the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmud Riad, declared that economic sanctions would not succeed. ¹ When the Council met, Tanzania's Second Vice President Rashid Kawawa said that it was:

the O.A.U. and Africa which must lead the way in finding a solution to this crime (U.D.I.) against humanity committed by the European settlers of Rhodesia and their accomplices. The die is cast and this conference has to show in clearest terms that Africa has got the courage and will to fight for the principles which we have so often proclaimed in all international forums. ²

Kojo Botsio exhorted the conference to:

act so that the whole world will know that the Sixth Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers sealed the doom of the Ian Smith regime, and that any power which supports this rebellion directly or indirectly would also suffer the wrath of Mother Africa. ³

Concerning the question of economic blockade against Rhodesia, the Tunisian representative said that, since a blockade would have serious repercussions against Malawi and Zambia, the conference should "fully consider" the implications of an economic blockade for these two O.A.U. members. The representative of Malawi pointed out that his country could comply "only up to a certain point". At this point, the Chairman, Botsio, said that there was no need for further discussion; ⁴ the blockade against Rhodesia was on, and the conference should accept it.

1. The Times, December 3, 1965.

2. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Sixth Extraordinary Session, ECM/PV.1 (VI) Addis Ababa, December 1965, p.4.

3. Ibid, p.8.

4. Ibid, pp. 37-38.

But Kenya's Foreign Minister, Murumbi, felt that Zambia and Malawi should be allowed to make the best arrangements so as to obtain goods from neighbouring countries other than Rhodesia and South Africa. The Cameroonian representative held a similar view, namely, that if a decision was to be made on economic sanctions, it must be unanimous.¹

After discussing the economic blockade against Rhodesia, the conference turned to the more crucial question: the severance of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. The Committee of Five on Rhodesia had called for the withdrawal of all African heads of diplomatic mission from London. This measure was decided upon "as a start" in the application of pressure on Britain.² However, the Senegalese representative expressed the view that the simple withdrawal of heads of diplomatic mission would "mean absolutely nothing" because they would have to be replaced. If Britain was responsible for Rhodesia and had accepted U.D.I., then the O.A.U. should start with Britain. How was the Organisation expected to adopt measures which would mean the use of force when it was unwilling to take diplomatic measures? The conference, the Senegalese said, was forgetting that the minority regime in the territory could not have declared U.D.I. if it had not been assisted by Britain.³ Therefore, "all sanctions" were to be taken against Britain. This view was fully supported by the Somali, Malian, Sudanese and Guinean representatives.⁴ This ad hoc subsystem was opposed by another led by Ghana.⁵ The Ghanaian representative wanted the conference to "seriously consider" any step leading to the severance of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. Ghana was prepared to offer troops for action against the Smith regime. In taking military action against the rebels, the Ghanaian said, the O.A.U. would certainly

1. Ibid, pp. 38-39.

2. Ibid, pp. 40-41.

3. One would be hard put to describe the Senegalese charge as "unfounded", considering the fact that Britain specifically ruled out the use of force before U.D.I. Even in a simple game situation, a player keeps his options open and does not announce, in advance, intended moves, unless he wants his opponent to take appropriate counter-measures if and when those moves are made. And since one can hardly believe that British decision-makers are unaware of this, the Senegalese position is well grounded.

4. Ibid, p.41ff.

5. Not Botsio, who was the Chairman.

clash with Britain; and this would lead to the rupture of relations. But, "for the moment", Ghana did not think that the Council had "any liberty" to take "lightly" the severing of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. Uganda¹ and Zambia also felt that the conference should take a more cautious line. Mauritania supported the Senegalese position; it felt that the situation was "a singular one" and needed "a singular handling".²

After several other representatives had expressed their views on the question more or less along the two lines, Guinea submitted a text for approval which read, in part, "The Committee of Five having noted that Britain has tolerated the establishment of the illegal Government of the white European minority....decides... on the breaking off or severance of diplomatic relations with Great Britain". The Senegalese representative proposed that the text should simply read: "The Council of Ministers having examined the report of the Committee of Five decides (on) the immediate breaking off of diplomatic relations with Britain by all member States of the O.A.U."³ The Senegalese text was supported by the Egyptian representative who felt that the Council should not amend the recommendation of the Committee of Five, but should make its own decision.⁴ The Zambian representative also supported the Senegalese text, but wanted a time limit to be set for the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain. The Senegalese representative disagreed: if the Council set a time limit, the United Kingdom would be given a chance to disrupt the cohesion of the Organisation; therefore, a decision should be taken on the "immediate" rupture of diplomatic relations. The word "immediate", the Zambian rejoined, could mean "now" or "three months". If the conference simply said "immediate", some states would sever relations the following day, while others might take "weeks" to do so. This position was supported by Congo-Brazzaville and Ethiopia. Kenya wanted it specified that O.A.U. members would be "obliged" to

1. Ibid, p. 46ff.

2. Ibid, pp. 52-53.

3. Ibid, pp. 62-63.

4. Ibid, p.63.

sever diplomatic relations, if Britain did not send troops to quell the rebellion. At this point, the Tunisian representative expressed the view that, as the report of the Committee of Five had been submitted to the various delegations at the opening of the conference, to consider the severance of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom was not "appropriate" as a decision for the conference. This position was supported by the Libyan representative who warned the Council against adopting "emotional resolutions" that could not help in crushing the rebellion; he could not agree to the adoption of such a resolution because it was a "very serious" one and more "instructions" were needed from his Government.¹

The various delegations having stated their positions, Ethiopia then submitted this draft resolution:

This Session decides that if the United Kingdom Government does not crush the rebellion and restore law and order in Southern Rhodesia by December 15 (1965), Member States of the O.A.U. should sever diplomatic relations on that date.²

Sierra Leone supported this draft, but wanted it to contain a stipulation that Britain would establish majority rule in Rhodesia. The Chairman, Botsio, said that it would be difficult for the United Kingdom to establish majority rule in fifteen days. Nigeria therefore formally proposed that the words "...and thereby prepare the way for majority rule" be added to the Ethiopian draft after "law and order".³ As the shape and form of the final resolution began to emerge, the Malawi representative expressed a technical reservation: his Government would give the resolution its "serious and moral support", but there was a constitutional difficulty. Malawi was due to become a republic in July 1966; if diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were severed on December 15, 1965, this would mean seizing republic status by that date.⁴ The Chairman felt that the Malawi explanation was unnecessary and appealed strongly to the Council for a unanimous

1. Ibid, pp. 63-64 & 70-71.

2. Ibid, p.71.

3. Ibid, pp. 72-73.

4. Ibid, p. 73.

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adoption of the draft resolution.

Initially, thirty countries supported the draft resolution, none against, three abstained (Malawi, Niger and Libya) and two were absent (Gambia and Rwanda). The two absentees had, however, informed the O.A.U. Secretariat that they would accept "all resolutions" adopted. After the vote, Niger changed its position and requested that it be recorded as having supported the resolution. When the Chairman again appealed for a unanimous adoption of the draft resolution, Malawi also changed its position and supported it. But the Libyan delegate repeated that he needed more instructions from his Government. However, after considerable pressure from the Chairman, and from Somalia and Senegal, Libya "reserved" its vote, allowing the decision to be taken by "unanimity".² Thus, the Committee of Five's intake on the Rhodesian crisis was transformed into an output, although the final output was different from that recommended by the Committee, since the request for the withdrawal of heads of diplomatic mission was replaced by a call to sever diplomatic relations.

In the resolution that was finally adopted, the Council decided, among other things, firstly, that all O.A.U. states should immediately impose a complete economic blockade against Rhodesia; secondly, that, if Britain did not quell the rebellion, restore law and order, and prepare the way for majority rule by December 15, 1965, all O.A.U. members should sever diplomatic relations with that country on that date; and thirdly, that all O.A.U. members should inform the Secretariat of the measures taken to implement this resolution.³ At the end of the Council's meeting, the Uganda Foreign Minister, Felix Onama, told newsmen in Addis Ababa that his country attached "great importance" to its membership in the Commonwealth, but that Uganda was prepared to sacrifice this in the interest of African unity because Britain had disappointed the Africans on the Rhodesian question. Similar views were expressed by Mainza Chona, the Zambian Minister of Home Affairs, and Gershon Collier, the deputy leader of the Sierra Leone

1. Ibid., p.74.

2. Ibid., pp.75-76.

3. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions p.91.

delegation to the O.A.U. emergency meeting. The head of the Congolese (Kinshasa) delegation, M. Bolela (the country's Ambassador to Switzerland) said that Congo-Kinshasa "fully subscribes to all O.A.U. resolutions, and notably to those concerning Rhodesia". The Congolese Ambassador added that his country would not "avoid its obligations concerning a rupture with...Britain", and that the Congo had, "here and now", decided to put its air and military bases at the O.A.U.'s disposal.²

Given the very high level of agreement at which the African states decided to sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, it was not unreasonable to expect a concomitant level of response. However, to use the language of the model, units and subsystems that are responsible for the introduction and conversion of particular intakes and inputs into outputs may not necessarily be more responsive to the resultant outputs. This may be due to at least two variables: an over-estimation of the units' or subsystems' ability to respond at the time of the conversion of the particular intakes and inputs, or the introduction of inputs and intakes that negate the need to respond. For example, shortly after the decision was taken to break off diplomatic relations with Britain, the Tunisian President, Habib Bourguiba, told newsmen in Abidjan that he was against "defiance" and "intimidation". The Tunisian leader said that only "co-ordinated, persevering and intelligent" action on the part of the people of Rhodesia themselves could solve the problem. In Yaounde', on December 11, Bourguiba clarified his position. A concerted action against the Smith regime would be effective only if the Africans in Rhodesia surmounted their differences and united. An African intervention which was not preceded by this would risk becoming a "Palestine situation" and would renew "the criminal error that was committed against Israel in 1948". Given the militant support of the Africans in the territory, the various African states would certainly be obliged to assist in the liberation of Rhodesia; but all diplomatic measures should be exhausted before military means were employed. The objective was the isolation of the minority regime with "maximum external support".

1. The Times, December 6, 1965.

2. Le Monde, 10 December, 1965.

Under the circumstances, why should the African states sever diplomatic relations with Britain or try to "intimidate" that country by an attitude that was "falsely bellicose"? If the African states wanted to have some chance of winning the fight against Smith, they had to forget their "ideological quarrels", avoid "brinkmanship (les surencheres)" and the "politics of blackmail" which had "failed so lamentably" in the Congo crisis of 1960. The African members of the Commonwealth, Bourguiba added, were in a better position to define an effective course of action because of their influence on Britain. ¹

Meanwhile, on December 8, President Kaunda said that his country could not tell other African states whether or not to sever diplomatic relations with Britain. However, he felt that it was his duty:

to explain to my fellow leaders the difficult position in which Zambia would find itself in circumstances which would follow that action.... I have always maintained that Rhodesia is a British responsibility; and as such, it is Britain's duty to get us out of the situation caused by the illegal declaration of independence. ²

The Nigerian Premier, Balewa, was reported as having said that the severance of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom had "far-reaching implications" as far as his country was concerned and was "unlikely to contribute" towards the attainment of the objective which African states desired. ³ On December 10, President Kenyatta told the Kenya House of Representatives that his Government supported the O.A.U. decision to break off diplomatic relations with Britain on December 15, if the British Government had not quelled the rebellion by that date. But he added:

It is however obvious that since this resolution was announced, there have been conflicting reactions by various African states. This means that action taken would not be effective and could in fact be abortive. We are particularly concerned that the Zambian Government has expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of breaking diplomatic relations with Britain.

We believe that any action taken must advance the cause that we are supporting in Rhodesia. Division among (the) African states will have serious repercussions not the least of which would be a threat to the O.A.U. itself.

In the circumstances, the Kenya Government has now decided to consult more fully with our East African neighbours, including Zambia and other African states, to determine the best action to take.... ⁴

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1. The Guardian, December 6, 1965; Le Monde, December 14, 1965.
 2. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. & Cul., December 1965, p.424.
 3. The Washington Post, December 11, 1965.
 4. The Nationalist, December 11, 1965. (See The New York Times, December 11, 1965)

On the same day that President Kenyatta spoke in connection with the O.A.U.'s decision on severing relations with Britain, President Nyerere said that "the honour of Africa" required that the resolution be honoured. The following day, Emperor Haile Selassie called for a delay in the implementation of the resolution so that the African leaders could consult and show "cohesion" and "efficiency" in solving the Rhodesian problem, while President Kaunda flew to Mbeya in Tanzania for talks with President Nyerere. Meanwhile, the U.A.R. and Algeria announced that they intended to abide by the O.A.U.'s decision.¹ On December 12, Nyerere told a press conference that some African states and Britain were "using" Zambia as "an excuse" for refusing to honour the resolution. The Tanzanian leader declared that Dr. Kaunda had not requested that Tanzania refuse to comply with the O.A.U.'s resolution; on the contrary, the Zambian President had said that those who claimed to be "friends" of his country should put "maximum squeeze" on the Smith² regime.

On the eve of December 15, Dr. Nyerere said that Britain had not shown a "serious determination" in its handling of the Rhodesian crisis, and he criticized those African states that refused to comply with the O.A.U.'s resolution. Tanzania, Nyerere stated, had no "honourable alternative" but to comply with the Organisation's decision. He continued:

If we ignore our own resolution, neither our suffering brethren in Rhodesia, in Mozambique, in Angola, in South Africa, in (Namibia), nor the broad masses of the people of Africa, or for that matter the non-African members of the United Nations Organisation could ever trust Africa to honour a pledge solemnly undertaken by Africa's leaders, Smith will rejoice; Verwoerd will rejoice; Salazar will rejoice. Where can we hide ourselves for shame? 3

In a joint communiqué, on December 14, Somalia and Tanzania condemned Britain for its "half-hearted" measures in handling the rebellion and undertook to honour their pledge to break relations with the United Kingdom in compliance with the O.A.U.'s resolution. In Mogadishu, the Somali Government, which had already severed diplomatic relations with Britain in March 1963 over the Kenya Northern Frontier

1. The Nationalist, December 11 & 13, 1965; The New York Times, December 12, 1965.
2. The Nationalist, December 13, 1965.
3. The Nationalist, December 15, 1965.

District dispute, announced that it would not resume diplomatic relations with that country. This announcement was in response to an earlier British statement that the United Kingdom was prepared to resume relations with Somalia "at any time",¹ if the Somali Government so desired.

On 15 December, 1965, Tanzania severed diplomatic relations with Britain, being the first Commonwealth country ever to do so. In Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian Government announced that it would not break off relations with the United Kingdom "for the time being".² On December 16, Dr. Nkrumah announced that his country was severing diplomatic relations with Britain, while most of the African delegations at the U.N. either walked out or absented themselves when Harold Wilson went to address the General Assembly on the Rhodesian question. The following day, Britain imposed an oil embargo on Rhodesia, a move that the British Government had previously refused to make. The United States also took similar action on the same day. Meanwhile, the R.A.F. began an air-lift of fuel to Zambia from Tanzania. While the then Liberal Party leader, Jo Grimond, welcomed the imposition of oil sanction against the Smith regime, Edward Heath (Leader of the Opposition) considered it "a grave development in the Rhodesian situation". More than 120 Conservative M.P.s signed a resolution denouncing what they called the Labour Government's attempts to bring about an "unconditional surrender" of the Smith regime. In a debate in the House of Commons, the Conservative leadership did not oppose the imposition of an oil embargo, but it rejected the use of force or a blockade of the Mozambique port of Beira to enforce the embargo.³

By December 21, only nine U.A.U. member states had severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. They were Tanzania, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Guinea, Algeria, the U.A.R., Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville. The Central African Republic announced that it would continue to maintain relations with Britain. Congo-Kinshasa called for another U.A.U. conference and said that it would also maintain diplomatic relations with Britain "to avoid being prejudicial towards our Zambian

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1. A.F.P., Africa, December 17, 1965, pp. 18-19.
 2. The Nationalist, December 16, 1965; The New York Times, December 16, 1965.
 3. The Guardian, December 18 & 22, 1965; The Observer, December 19, 1965; The Times, December 22, 1965. It was not explained how the embargo could be made effective with the elimination of the use of force.

and Rhodesian brothers". Even Algeria, which did sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, made it a point to announce that the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain would not affect its economic ties with that country. The President of Upper Volta, Maurice Yameogo, had said (on December 11) that Africans "are obliged to observe that something has gone wrong with the international system controlled by the Big Powers. The black race has lost a battle, and we are witnessing a retreat that has the value and significance of a challenge to all formerly colonized populations". But at the Niger independence celebrations in mid-December, Yameogo and his Ivorian and Nigerien colleagues claimed to have been "realists" for not complying with the O.A.U.'s decision.¹ A Proposal by Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Sierra Leone that the O.A.U. Assembly meet to discuss the Rhodesian crisis did not receive the requisite support; the proposed summit conference was therefore never held.² When states like Tunisia, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria expressed reservations about the resolution, and, when Britain made its move on oil sanction, giving an impression of toughness with the Smith regime, the O.A.U.'s cohesion was disrupted. Thus, although the level of agreement at which member states adopted the resolution on the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain was very high, only a quarter of the entire membership actually responded positively to the resolution.

If, in terms of the model, all units and subsystems fail to respond positively to all outputs of their system, the effect is that the system will either cease to exist or become ineffective. Should the system become ineffective under this condition, the level of tension as a result of a universal failure to respond positively to its outputs will tend to be low, since no units are in a position to take the others to task for not responding. However, if some units are responsive and others are not, even if this situation is not continual, a high level of tension tends to develop within the system, affecting succeeding intakes inputs and outputs on some issues - provided the issue over which tension develops is a topic of further discussion, and provided, of course, that those units which

1. Le Monde. 14 & 19-20 December, 1965.

2. O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV. 2 (VI) p.2; A.F.P., Africa, January 21, 1965, pp.35-36.

fail to respond are seen to do so. Thus when the O.A.U. Council of Ministers met for its sixth ordinary session in February/March 1966, a high level of tension was clearly evident. The Nigerian representative told the Council that, although his country had not implemented "the whole" of the resolution on Rhodesia, Sir Abubakar, the Nigerian Prime Minister, had flown to London to inform the British Government of the "anxiety" and "disappointment" in Africa caused by Britain's handling of the rebellion. Following the Prime Minister's journey, Nigeria had called for a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, which was held in Lagos. This conference had established two committees: one to watch the effects of sanctions on Rhodesia, and the other to be concerned with assistance to Zambia.¹ Nigeria wanted the Council to "re-appraise" and consider "new avenues" for solving the Rhodesian problem and not to engage in "recriminations".² Yet "recriminations" could hardly be avoided once this issue became a topic of further discussion.

The representative of Upper Volta told the Council that his Government had taken "a series of measures" concerning the economic blockade of Rhodesia, in compliance with the Council's resolution of December 1965. The Somali and Dahomey³ representatives also announced that their Governments had taken similar measures. Malawi said that it had not concealed the fact that it was in a "very difficult position". However, in compliance with the Organisation's resolution, it had abrogated all trade agreements with Rhodesia. All imports from the territory were being subjected to "normal" customs tariffs, and the "privileged position" that Rhodesia once had on the Malawi market had been "completely dismantled".⁴ Rwanda and the Central African Republic also announced that they had imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia.⁵ The Zambian delegate disclosed that, if his country had severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, Zambia would have had to spend a million pounds sterling or more a month for air-lifting oil. Because Britain was "responsible" for the problems facing Zambia, the Zambian Government

1. O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV.3 (VI) p.36.

2. Ibid.

3. O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV.2 (VI) pp.4-5.

4. Ibid., p.5.

5. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

had decided that the British Government should pay for its "mistakes". In addition, Britain had imposed sanctions against Rhodesia in stages up to 75%. The delegate from Zambia then said that his Government had threatened to remove its reserves from London, and had followed up this threat by removing £10 million sterling; the British Government had refused to give in. The Zambian Government had then said that it would withdraw all of its reserves, whereupon Britain had increased its sanctions to 85% and then to 90%.¹ Tunisia wanted to know what useful purpose the decision to rupture diplomatic relations with Britain had served: the Council should decide whether it would adopt resolutions "simply for the pleasure of doing so", or whether it was interested in taking "effective action".² The Dahomey representative felt that "mature peoples and statesmen worthy of the name" were those who recognized their "limitations and errors", whereupon the delegate of Mali said that, although the decision of certain member states not to sever relations with the United Kingdom was understandable, "exaggeration" should be avoided; the Council had taken a decision that it considered to be "right".³ Guinea followed this up by adding that the "heart of the matter" was that O.A.U. members should be "consistent with themselves". If other members were unable to implement the decision on Rhodesia taken by the Council, then they should "find other excuses" to justify their position which, to Guinea, "seems unjustifiable"; as far as Guinea was concerned, it was prepared to implement any O.A.U. decision, including the use of force, for the liberation of Africa.⁴

The various views having been expressed, Algeria then introduced a draft resolution which, in part, called for the intensification of training nationalists from Rhodesia, and the recognition of the Zimbabwe African People's Union as the sole liberation movement in the territory that should receive the O.A.U.'s exclusive support.⁵ A counter draft, sponsored by fifteen states (Tunisia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia,

1. Ibid, p.26ff.

2. Ibid, p.14.

3. Ibid, p.22; O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV.3 (VI) p. 9ff.

4. O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV.3 (VI) p.19ff.

5. O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV.5 (VI) p.18ff.

Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, Congo-Kinshasa and Kenya), was presented by Tunisia. The fifteen-nation draft, among other things, called on Britain to take "effective measures", including the use of force, to quell the rebellion in Rhodesia; called for the setting up of a Committee of Solidarity for Zambia to seek technical and economic assistance from O.A.U. members for Zambia; recommended against recognition of any nationalist party in Rhodesia; and called for the freeing of member states of the "diplomatic implications" of the December 1965 resolution. The Central African Republic, Dahomey and Uganda later associated themselves with this resolution. The U.A.R. representative said that the severance or resumption of diplomatic relations was a privilege which all states have and which the Council could not confer, as it was not entitled to do so. Having made this observation, the Egyptian delegate withdrew from the conference, explaining that the U.A.R.'s participation was serving "no useful purpose".² Algeria's draft resolution was rejected and that of the group of fifteen (an ad hoc subsystem) adopted. At this point, Mauritania expressed the view that the Council had taken a "backward step", while Burundi said that the resolution adopted contained "absolutely nothing" to encourage the Africans in Rhodesia. Somalia expressed its disappointment and withdrew followed by Algeria. Mauritania announced that it would continue to be present at the conference, but would not participate. Kenya, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania withdrew in protest against the presence of the delegation representing the new Military Government in Accra which had replaced Nkrumah in February 1966.³

It was against this background that the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, at its seventh ordinary session in October/November 1966, limited itself to "bitterly and unreservedly" condemning the "talks about talks" that were being conducted between the British Government and the Smith regime, "strongly" condemning Britain for refusing to quell the rebellion in Rhodesia and calling on the United Kingdom to take all measures, including the use of force, to end the rebellion.⁴ The failure

1. Ibid, pp. 20 & 24-25.

2. O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV. 6 (VI) p.2.

3. Ibid, pp. 16 & 47; O.A.U. CM/Cttee. A/PV.7 (VI) pp.1ff. & 19; The New York Times, March 4, 1966.

4. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, pp. 100-101.

of most member states to sever diplomatic relations with Britain was continuing to have a feedback effect: no longer was the United Kingdom presented with an ultimatum. It should be added that, while three quarters of the African states ignored the decision to break off diplomatic relations with Britain, the O.A.U.'s decision on economic sanctions against Rhodesia - according to available U.N. statistics - has been largely observed by O.A.U. members, with the exception of Zambia, Congo-Kinshasa and, of course, Malawi.

Before drawing any conclusions from the decision to sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and from the responses of various African states, let us first discuss the question of the O.A.U.'s policy towards South Africa's apartheid and Portuguese colonies in Africa, since the three issues are inter-connected.

South Africa and Portuguese Colonies in Africa

Like the question of Rhodesia, South Africa's apartheid policy is another problem that the African states had been attempting to solve before the inception of the O.A.U.² With the founding of the Organisation, the fight against apartheid in South Africa was co-ordinated within its framework. The attack was therefore given the appearance of a united front. The O.A.U. called on its members to sever diplomatic and consular relations with South Africa (and Portugal), to boycott trade with the Republic, to close their ports and airports to the ships and aircraft of South Africa and to forbid its aircraft from flying over their territories. With the exception of the decision on trade boycott, the Organisation's other decisions have been observed by a large majority of member states. Malawi has, of course, ignored the Organisation's decisions in respect of South Africa; and there is now a bi-weekly flight between Madagascar and South Africa. However, as we have argued, if some units are responsive to the system's outputs and others are not, a high level of tension tends to develop, affecting the intakes, inputs and outputs on various issues. So it was that when the O.A.U. decided in September 1967 that the Nigerian-Biafran conflict should be resolved on the basis of a united Nigeria, and Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia recognised Biafra, the O.A.U.'s decisions on South Africa were also affected. On September 29, 1969, the Foreign

1. U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965, 1966 & 1967.
For figures see Appendix A.

2. In Chapter V, we will treat the attempts to apply pressure on South Africa through various international bodies.

Minister of the Ivory Coast, Arsene Usher, said that as long as Africa was "indifferent" to the Nigerian civil war, his country would, as a matter of protest, abstain on all anti-South African resolutions until the end of "this shameful, fratricidal war".¹ The following day, the Gabonese Foreign Minister, Ayoune, said that the situation in South Africa had not changed, in spite of previous resolutions characterized by "shattering condemnation". In view of this, Gabon felt that a "new strategy" was necessary; while awaiting the formulation of this "new strategy", Gabon would not be associated with "inapplicable resolutions". In fact, the Gabonese President, Bongo, had already told Dr. Christian Barnard (the South African heart-transplant surgeon) in April 1969 that he saw "no obstacle" to the establishment of contact between his country and South Africa, notably in the medical field. In addition, President Bongo said that Gabon was prepared to send a medical mission as "observers" to South Africa.² Later, the Ivory Coast and Gabon were joined by several other francophone states, and by Ghana and Uganda in calling for a "dialogue" with South Africa.³ Thus far, this ad hoc subsystem has not mustered the requisite support within the O.A.U. to have this position adopted by the Organisation; however, their change of policy in respect of South Africa is another indication that O.A.U. members no longer speak with one voice concerning the means to be employed against colonialism and racial discrimination in Southern Africa.

Whether or not the Nigerian civil war was really the reason for the change of attitude by the Ivory Coast and Gabon in respect of South Africa is a matter of speculation. However, it is likely that a similar crisis within the O.A.U. may create a situation in which some member states will feel free, either because of a genuine dissatisfaction with the Organisation's handling of the particular crisis or because of some motive unconnective with the crisis, to ignore the O.A.U.'s decisions on sanctions against the minority regimes of Southern Africa.

1. Afrique Nouvelle, 4-10 December, 1969.

2. Ibid.

3. It is not likely that the South African Government will be persuaded by diplomatic niceties to change its racial policy. John Vorster and his cabinet colleagues have an all-white electorate to answer to. Is this electorate prepared to accept peacefully a change that could lead to non-white domination? Not even an inveterate optimist would answer in the affirmative.

According to available United Nations publications, there has been a mixed response to the O.A.U.'s decision on trade sanctions against South Africa. At the time of the decision, in May 1963, the independent African states that had measurable trade links with South Africa were Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, Congo-Kinshasa, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R., Tanzania (then Tanganyika), Togo and Uganda. Since May 1963, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius have attained independence. Of these twenty-two countries, only five (Uganda, Togo, Tanzania, Sudan and Kenya) have, apparently, imposed almost total trade sanctions against the Republic. In this connection, it should be added that those African states which did not have important trade ties with South Africa at the time of the May 1963 decision have, on the whole, apparently, avoided establishing such ties. However, with the recent call for a "dialogue" it is more likely that the Organisation's decision on trade sanctions may be adversely affected. Before drawing any conclusions, however, from the mixed response to the O.A.U.'s decision on economic sanction against South Africa, and from the present proposal for a "dialogue" with Pretoria, let us look at the question of the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

The "wind of change" that swept across the African continent in the late fifties and early sixties was also felt in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. As the wave of nationalism grew stronger, the Portuguese resorted to arrests and various forms of oppression. Insisting that its colonies are integral parts of the metropole, Portugal maintains thousands of troops in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissao to fight the African nationalist movements that have been active in these territories since the early sixties.

1. Data are not available for South Africa's trade with the Ivory Coast and Tunisia after 1963, but the total trade between South Africa and the Ivory Coast in 1963 was \$3.321 million and that between the Republic and Tunisia was \$0.768 million.
2. U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1963-1967. For figures, see Appendix B.
3. Although the O.A.U. Liberation Committee and the nationalist movements will not be discussed in this study, other authors have treated the fight for independence in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissao. See J. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, V.I, M.I.T. Press, 1969; The Institute of Race Relations, London, Angola: A Symposium Views of a Revolt, London: Oxford University Press, 1962; E. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, Penguin, 1969; A. Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, London, Stage 1, 1969; B. Davidson, The Liberation of Guiné, Penguin, 1969.

To try and force Portugal into changing its colonial policy, the African states have been operating through the United Nations and other international bodies,¹ and have given direct aid to the nationalist movements. In May 1963, the independent African states decided to sever diplomatic and consular relations with Portugal, to impose economic sanctions against it, to close their ports and airports to its ships and aircraft, and to prohibit Portuguese aircraft from flying over their territories. Here again, as in the case of South Africa, the O.A.U.'s decision on Portugal, with the exception of the economic aspect of sanctions, has been largely observed by O.A.U. members, excluding Malawi.² Congo-Kinshasa did not sever diplomatic relations with Portugal until October 1966, following a demand by the Congolese National Assembly that the Government do so, a decision motivated principally by the Congolese belief that pro-Tshombe mercenaries were being harboured in Angola. Prior to that time, Congo-Kinshasa maintained that it recognised Portugal "within its European frontiers", and that the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (G.R.A.E.) represented the people of Angola. Most of the Congolese deputies who called for the severance of diplomatic relations with Portugal, however, wanted commercial ties to be maintained.³ Twelve other independent African states had significant trade links with Portugal at the time of the May 1963 decision. They were Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Tunisia, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, U.A.R. and Morocco. Later, Zambia and Malawi became independent, bringing the total to fifteen.⁴ Of these, only four (Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon and Sudan) have, apparently, almost completely implemented the O.A.U.'s decision on economic sanctions. As in the case of South Africa, those African states that did not have important economic ties with Portugal at the time of the decision have, on the whole, apparently, not taken steps to establish such ties.

1. This aspect of the pressure on Portugal will be treated in Chapter V.
2. The Malawi High Commissioner to Britain is also accredited to Portugal. I am grateful to Mr. Z. D. Kadzamira (a Malawi research student at Manchester) for the information.
3. Le Monde, 7 October, 1966.
4. U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1963-1967. For figures, see Appendix C.

Although tensions have not resulted, so far, from the very mixed response by member states to the Organisation's decision on trade with South Africa and Portugal, it should be noted that this aspect of the O.A.U.'s decision is less dramatic and emotive than the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations. Moreover, the performance of member states has not yet been a subject of debate within the Organisation. This brings us to another point: the demands made on member states - or, more accurately, the demands that member states make on themselves - concerning economic sanctions against South Africa and Portugal. These demands are not balanced by economic opportunities within the framework of the O.A.U. For example, the decision to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia was not accompanied by the establishment of a free trade area, or some other form of economic union, within the framework of the Organisation, making it possible for member states which would suffer economically from the imposition of sanctions to balance their losses. Nor did the O.A.U. attempt to provide alternative markets, or sources of supplies, for exports and imports of those members. Similarly, the decision to sever diplomatic relations with Britain was not accompanied by economic alternatives to neutralise possible economic disadvantages. Tanzania, for example, lost a £10 million loan from Britain as a result of Dr. Nyerere's implementation of the O.A.U.'s decision on the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain. But no attempt was made within the framework of the Organisation to obtain a similar loan for Tanzania.

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Until the O.A.U. becomes relevant to the economic life of its members, its decisions on colonialism and apartheid are likely to continue to be of marginal importance to the actual policies pursued by the majority of its members in respect of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. For, while O.A.U. members want to eradicate colonialism and apartheid from Africa, most of them are not prepared - with their developing economies - to undergo the economic (and military) hardships involved other than aid to the liberation movements and pressures exerted through international bodies. The Zambian Government, for example, informed the O.A.U. that, if Zambia had implemented the Organisation's decision to sever diplomatic relations

1. In Part III, we will demonstrate more fully the irrelevance of the O.A.U. in this sphere.

with Britain, Zambia would have had to spend about a million pounds sterling a month for air-lifting oil alone, not to mention other possible problems.

While therefore a particular decision may be accepted in the interest of unity, its actual implementation can result in economic hardship, leading to possible political instability, and no leader can be expected to accept this consequence.¹ The dilemma hardly needs emphasis.

Another method of toppling the minority regimes of Southern Africa is direct military action by the O.A.U. But the present border and other disputes, involving a number of African states, limit the Organisation's ability to seek a military solution. Of the forty odd O.A.U. members, only the U.A.R., Algeria, Ethiopia and Morocco have the collective air power to seriously challenge South Africa, Portugal and the Smith regime. However, the U.A.R.'s Armed Forces are presently concerned with the confrontation with Israel. Algeria and Morocco have an unsettled border dispute and are therefore not likely to assume military commitments that would involve a substantial diversion of forces that might be needed in the event of another border war. Ethiopia also has an unresolved border dispute with Somalia, in addition to being faced with the guerrilla activities of Eritrean nationalists. These four states are therefore preoccupied with other priorities.

Lacking the economic and military leverage to eradicate colonialism and apartheid from Africa, the O.A.U. has tended to exert pressure on South Africa, Portugal and Britain through other international organisations. As neither the system - nor any of its units and subsystems - is capable of attaining the objectives set in respect of colonialism and apartheid, the system has tended to rely on its "environmental components". But to what extent has the O.A.U. succeeded in this tactic? In the next chapter, we shall attempt an answer.

1. This does not mean that O.A.U. members should continue voting for resolutions that they have no intention of implementing. The prestige and credibility of the Organisation are hardly enhanced by such discrepancy.

CHAPTER V

RESPONSIVENESS OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND NON-O.A.U.

MEMBERS TO O.A.U. DECISIONS ON COLONIALISM AND APARTHEID.

Because a system exists within a given environment, it is useful to examine its interaction with its environment in assessing how well or how badly it is functioning. As stated in Chapter II, the O.A.U.'s environment consists of other international organisations and non-O.A.U. members, which, for the purpose of this study, have been designated as "environmental components". We want to know how the environment is responding to the system's outputs and, of course, how the system responds to the inputs of its environment. It is in this sense that we now examine the O.A.U.'s decisions on Rhodesia, South Africa and Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the responses of other international organisations, principally the U.N., and non-O.A.U. states, to these decisions. Since one of the objectives of the O.A.U. is the eradication of colonialism and apartheid from Africa, a treatment of these case studies should give us some indication of how this objective is being pursued in respect of the "environmental components".

Rhodesia

As was indicated in the previous chapter, the founding of the O.A.U. in May 1963 meant that the attack against Britain's policy in Central Africa took on another dimension when its members came out strongly, in unison, against colonialism. No longer were the Monrovia and Casablanca states co-operating on an ad hoc basis, but the entire African membership of the U.N. (and of other international organisations) was now pursuing an O.A.U. objective. In August 1963, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the U.A.R., acting for the O.A.U. in the Security Council, requested the Council to consider the situation in Rhodesia, which the General Assembly (through O.A.U. initiatives) had already described as "deplorable, critical and explosive". The Conservative Government in Britain had refused to intervene in the territory on the grounds that a well-established convention prevented such intervention in the internal affairs of a self-governing colony. In addition, Britain had announced that it would transfer control of the Central African Federation's powerful air force and army to the white minority government in Rhodesia. Such a transfer, the African Group argued, was a grave danger to peace

because the British Government had stated that it had no authority to intervene in the territory's "internal affairs". The African states therefore called¹ for an investigation of the situation by the Council. During the debate in the Council, the African Group warned of the inherent danger in the transfer of a potent air force and army to the racist regime in Rhodesia.² The British representative maintained that his Government was not in a position to answer for the "internal policies" of Rhodesia, and that the air force was being "returned" to the colony because "local revenues" from that territory had financed it.³ On September 12, Ghana, on behalf of the African Group, introduced a draft resolution in the Council, calling on Britain not to transfer to Rhodesia, "as at present governed", any attributes of sovereignty until a government fully representative of all races in the territory was formed. The resolution also called on the United Kingdom not to transfer to the territory armed forces and aircraft as envisaged in the Central African (Victoria Falls) conference of 1963.⁴ The following day, the draft resolution submitted by Ghana received eight votes (including that of Norway, a NATO member); the United Kingdom voted against, and France and the United States abstained. Since Britain is a permanent member of the Council, its negative vote constituted a veto. The draft resolution was therefore rejected. But, in October, the General Assembly also called on Britain not to transfer political and military powers to the white minority regime in Rhodesia.⁵

We have already seen how the Central African Federation was dissolved in December 1963, how a right-wing revolt within the Rhodesian Front Party in April 1964 led to Ian Smith's accession to power, and how the Smith regime took repressive measures against the African nationalists. In February 1964, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers requested the African Group at the U.N. to take the requisite

1. U.N. General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Official Records, Supp. No. 2 (A/5802), p.43ff.

2. Ibid., p.47.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., pp.48-49.

5. Ibid., pp.51-52; The New York Times, October 15, 1963.

steps to exert pressure on Britain to implement previous U.N. resolutions on Rhodesia. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London in July, Dr. Nkrumah called for a constitutional conference, and for democratic elections. President Kenyatta saw no reason why Rhodesia could not be granted independence on the basis of universal adult suffrage, just as other African states had attained independence. Dr. Obote proposed that the conference issue a declaration to the effect that Britain alone could grant the territory its independence, that the principle of "one man one vote" would be applied to it, and that a constitutional conference would be convened. If the minority regime refused to attend the conference, Obote further proposed that the constitution be suspended.¹ The Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, submitted a draft declaration calling for racial equality and democracy in the Commonwealth. In addition, he stated that his country was prepared to offer a "crash programme" for the training of Africans from Rhodesia so as to give them the opportunity to occupy important administrative and other posts in the territory.² At the end of the conference, a compromise communique³ was issued in which the Commonwealth Prime Ministers recognised Britain's responsibility to lead its colonies to independence, welcomed the decision of the British Government that the existence of "sufficiently representative" institutions would be a condition for granting independence to Rhodesia, and "noted with approval" the United Kingdom's undertaking that it would not recognise a U.D.I. in the territory.³ The British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, promised to give "careful consideration" to the request of the African Prime Ministers that a constitutional conference be convened, and that the detained African nationalist leaders be released. But the British Prime Minister emphasised that the minority government was responsible for the "internal affairs" of the territory.⁴ Shortly after the Commonwealth conference, Sir Alec announced that he had invited Ian Smith

1. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, p.26; The Times, July 10 and 11, 1964.

2. The Guardian, July 14, 1964.

3. The Guardian, July 16, 1964.

4. Ibid.

to London for talks. But in Salisbury, Smith declared that he would not accept the position that a constitutional conference should be convened, and would treat the proposal "with the contempt it deserves".¹

During the second half of 1964, a Labour Government replaced the Conservative one, but there was no basic change in Britain's position. In fact, Bottomley let it be known in March 1965 that the British Government would not use force to bring about constitutional changes or majority rule in Rhodesia. During the same month, the Smith regime announced that general elections would be held on 7 May 1965 to strengthen its position so that "essential changes" could be made in the constitution.² On 21 April, the African Group requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider what was described as the "very serious situation" in Rhodesia. The decision of the white minority regime in the territory to hold elections on the basis of the 1961 Constitution was said to be a challenge both to the United Nations and the O.A.U. Two days later, the Chairman of the Special Committee of 24 transmitted to the Security Council a resolution on Rhodesia that had been adopted by the Committee. Among other things, the resolution drew the Council's attention to "the grave situation" in the territory and "the serious implications" of the elections scheduled to be held on 7 May on the basis of a constitution that had been rejected by the majority of the people - since 1962, the Committee and the General Assembly had repeatedly called for the abrogation of this constitution.³ On April 30, 1964, the British representative expressed a "general reservation" concerning the competence of the Security Council to discuss the Rhodesian question. But Britain's reservation did not prevent the Council from discussing it. Most members of the Council were of the opinion that the British Government could and should intervene to prevent U.D.I. which the minority regime in the territory was threatening to declare. A draft resolution sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Malaysia and Jordan was submitted to the Council, calling on Britain to take "all necessary" steps to prevent U.D.I., to refuse to transfer to Rhodesia, "as at present governed", any powers or attributes of sovereignty, and to promote instead the attainment of

1. The Times, July 17, 1964.

2. The Guardian, March 9, 1965; The Times, April 1, 1965.

3. U.N. General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Official Records, Supp. No.2 (A/6002), p.85.

independence based on a democratic system of government. The draft resolution was adopted by seven votes, with four abstentions. The Netherlands, a N.A.T.O. member, voted for the resolution.¹

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London in June 1965, Sir Albert Margai, the Sierra Leonean Prime Minister, accused Britain of "duplicity" and demanded that any negotiation on Rhodesia should be based on the principle of "one man one vote". Dr. Nkrumah called for an immediate constitutional conference to determine the future of the territory and appealed to the United Kingdom to make a public pledge that the colony would not be granted independence until free elections were held, based on universal adult suffrage. The Ghanaian President also called for the release of detained African leaders and for a round table conference in preparation for the transfer of power to the Africans. If the minority government refused to release the African nationalist leaders, Nkrumah proposed that Britain suspend the Constitution and establish a provisional government in the territory. Sir Abubakar wanted a definite date set for a constitutional conference on Rhodesia before the end of the Commonwealth conference.² In a communiqué issued after the conference, other Commonwealth countries called on Britain to convene a constitutional conference at an early date, which all political leaders in Rhodesia should be allowed to attend. Another appeal was made for the immediate release of all detained or restricted African leaders as a first step towards holding this conference. Moreover, the United Kingdom was urged to suspend the 1961 Constitution and appoint an interim government in the colony, which would pave the way for free elections, if the white minority regime refused to participate.³ Britain said that it would take "full account" of the views expressed.

But unlike the Commonwealth conference of July 1964, that of June 1965 successfully pressured the British Government into a promise that, if its discussions with the Smith regime did not develop satisfactorily in the direction

1. Ibid, p.89ff.

2. A.F.P. Africa, June 25, 1965, p.4ff.

3. The Times, June 26, 1965.

of "unimpeded progress" towards majority rule in a "reasonably speedy time", it would be prepared "to consider" a constitutional conference. However, the United Kingdom left itself free to determine what constituted a "reasonably speedy time", as Wilson later indicated.¹ On July 1, Smith said that, if the British Government attempted to convene a constitutional conference, his regime would consider it an "interference" in Rhodesia's "internal affairs", saying that no one had "any false illusions" as to what that meant. Smith added that his regime would treat the Commonwealth with "the contempt it deserves".² A day after Smith's statement, the Duke of Edinburgh said at Edinburgh University that the Rhodesian problem should be solved peacefully to avoid a blood-bath. Everybody recognised that the ultimate result was inevitable; therefore, "a few years here or there" did not matter if this result could be achieved "peacefully and quietly".³ The Duke's remarks brought an immediate protest from the Kenya Government which accused him of supporting Smith's "dangerous strategy".⁴ Dr. Banda was the only African leader who expressed support for the Duke's statement.⁵

On August 7, 1965, Smith told a meeting of the Rhodesian Front Party that the territory was in a position to declare U.D.I. without disaster, and that "certain countries" had guaranteed official recognition in the event of U.D.I. Four days later, Bottomley repeated in Lagos that, if the minority regime in Rhodesia declared U.D.I., the British Government would not use force, but would take such measures as were "deemed necessary".⁶ In early September, Smith stated that independence was "imminent", and that nothing would stop it. A week later, the Smith regime appointed its "diplomatic representative" to Portugal in spite of Britain's protest to the Portuguese Government.⁷ Towards the end of September, it

1. Ibid; The Guardian, June 26, 1965.

2. The Times, July 2, 1965.

3. It is not recorded that the Duke put forward an alternative proposal in the event the result could not be achieved "peacefully and quietly". See The Daily Telegraph, July 3, 1965; The Guardian, July 5, 1965.

4. The Guardian, July 6, 1965.

5. The Nationalist, July 7, 1965.

6. The Observer, August 8, 1965; The Guardian, August 12, 1965.

7. The Times, September 2, 9 & 16, 1965; The Observer, September 12, 1965.

was announced in Salisbury that Smith would go to London for "final and conclusive" talks on the question of independence. On October 1, Smith said that, if he returned from London "empty-handed", his regime would have to consider U.D.I. He added, "It is an even bet for anybody that no matter what the British Government¹ does we shall be independent by Christmas". While Smith was preparing to leave for Britain, the Chairman of the Rhodesian Front Party, Col. Mack Knox, was touring the territory assuring the farmers that they would lose only about a quarter of their crop in the event of U.D.I.² When Smith arrived in London, the Canadian Government was reported to have informed him, through its High Commission in London, that Canada could not support a U.D.I. in Rhodesia. The then Conservative leader, Heath, stated that U.D.I. would have no legal validity. When a deadlock developed during the talks, the United States said that it fully supported Britain's position on the Rhodesian question. There were also reports that the minority regime had been informed that the American and British Governments were jointly examining the economic consequences of U.D.I. in the colony.³ On October 8, the talks ended abortively. The joint communique⁴ said that the "opposing views" could not be reconciled "despite intensive discussion". The British Government's five points over which the deadlock had developed were (1) a guarantee of unimpeded progress towards majority rule; (2) guarantee against any retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; (3) immediate improvement in the political status of the Africans; (4) progress towards the elimination of racial discrimination; and (5) evidence satisfying the United Kingdom that the basis for independence would be acceptable to all Rhodesians.

Before leaving London for Salisbury, Smith stated that the "people" of Rhodesia wanted independence and would welcome any other ideas on how to obtain it, if negotiations failed. He added that he was not convinced that U.D.I. would be followed by economic sanctions. At the Conservative Party conference in Brighton

1. The Times, October 2, 1965.

2. The Times, October 4, 1965.

3. The Times, October 6 & 8, 1965.

4. The Daily Telegraph, October 9, 1965; The Times, October 10, 1965.

in mid-October, Lord Salisbury urged the Conservatives to deplore any form of sanctions against Rhodesia. He continued:

... We are being asked by the Labour Government not only to abandon our friends; we are telling them to hand over their fate and the fate of their wives and families to the tender mercies of men who are on the whole totally unfitted to conduct any free form of government at all. 1

Lord Salisbury said that he did not approve of U.D.I., but was against any talk of sanctions against the territory. The contradiction in Salisbury's position was pointed out by Alan Haselhurst, a member of the Young Conservatives National Advisory Committee. Haselhurst observed that if "we say we are against U.D.I. but will do nothing effective against it, we are giving direct encouragement to those forces which are pressing Smith to take this drastic step".² Sir Alec Douglas-Home held a similar view: he wanted the conference to make no moves that would encourage "the reckless" or discourage further negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Home therefore requested that Salisbury withdraw his amendment. Salisbury refused, and the conference decided against him. But one can hardly overestimate the effect of this split in the Conservative Party on the Rhodesian problem. There were reports that some members of the Conservative Opposition were not prepared to support the Labour Government on the question of economic sanctions against the colony.³

On October 18, 1965, the minority regime in Rhodesia made three significant moves that left no doubt as to the imminence of U.D.I. Firstly, it rejected a British Government proposal that a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' delegation visit the territory in an attempt to resolve the dispute peacefully. Secondly, Smith said that a decision to declare U.D.I. would be made "within the next few days". Thirdly, the former Rhodesian Prime Minister, Garfield Todd, was placed under a twelve-month restriction at his farm. In 1961, Todd had formed the New Africa Party with the aim of eliminating racial discrimination and forming a non-racial government.⁴ Two days later, there were reports that Wilson had received a message

1. The Times, October 16, 1965.

2. The Times, October 16, 1965.

3. The Times, October 12 & 16, 1965.

4. The Guardian, October 19, 1965.

from Smith in which the latter was said to have proposed that a treaty be concluded between Britain and Rhodesia to guarantee the principles of the 1961 Constitution, which in effect provided for a very gradual increase in African participation in the political process of Rhodesia. This proposal had first been suggested by the Conservative leaders to Smith when he was in London, but nothing came of it.¹ Wilson replied that he preferred to fly to the territory for new discussions, to which Smith agreed. As is well known, the British Prime Minister's talks in Rhodesia both with Smith and the nationalist leaders ended unsuccessfully; and in early November 1965, U.D.I. was declared by the Smith regime.

With the declaration of U.D.I., Britain, which had maintained all along that the United Nations lacked competence to discuss the Rhodesian question, was now among those countries requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation. In addition to the United Kingdom's request for a meeting, another was received from the African Group, and yet another from twenty-two Afro-Asian states. In a letter to the President of the Security Council, the British representative stated that his Government wanted to inform the Council of the situation in Rhodesia and the measures that Britain was taking in view of U.D.I.² In their letter to the Council, the African states expressed the view that U.D.I. posed a threat to international peace and security. The letter from the twenty-two Afro-Asian states said that U.D.I. had aggravated an "already explosive situation" and was a threat to world peace. The General Assembly, in resolution 2024(XX) adopted on November 11, recommended that the Council consider the Rhodesian question "as a matter of urgency".³

Starting the discussion in the Security Council, the United Kingdom's representative said that his Government regarded U.D.I. as "illegal" and "invalid" because only the British Parliament had the authority to grant independence to the colony. Britain, he said, had brought the matter to the Council to request the "goodwill, co-operation and support" of U.N. members. In this connection, a

1. The Times, October 21, 1965.

2. U.N. General Assembly, Twenty-First Session, Official Records, Supp. No.1 (A/6301), p.29.

3. Ibid.

British draft resolution was submitted under the terms of which the Council would (1) refuse to recognise U.D.I.; (2) reiterate its call on member states not to recognise the illegal regime;¹ (3) call on U.N. members not to give aid or comfort to the Smith regime, and (4) call on member states to give Britain all necessary assistance in making effective the economic measures that had been taken by that country to bring about an end to the rebellion.²

Speaking for the African Group, the Ivorian delegate warned that a racial war would result if a "rapid solution" was not found. Accordingly, he introduced a draft resolution which (1) described the situation resulting from U.D.I. as a threat to international peace and security; (2) declared U.D.I. illegal; (3) called on the United Kingdom and all other states to take measures designed to protect the Africans in Rhodesia; (4) called on Britain to suspend the 1961 Constitution; (5) called on all states not to recognise the illegal regime and to withdraw recognition from any state that recognised the minority regime; (6) demanded that the rebellion be "immediately crushed"; (7) demanded that majority rule be established on the basis of "one man one vote"; (8) called on all states to sever all relations with the racist regime; (9) called for enforcement measures, under Articles 42 and 43 of the U.N. Charter, against the rebel regime; and (10) authorised the Secretary General to ensure the immediate implementation of the resolution.³

Faced with these two opposing resolutions, the Council turned its attention to a compromise Uruguayan-Bolivian draft which, by agreement, was given priority over the other two. Under the terms of the compromise draft, the Council would (1) determine that the situation resulting from U.D.I. was "extremely grave", that Britain should end the rebellion, and that its continuance would constitute a threat to international peace and security; (2) reaffirm its resolution 216 (1965) of November 12, 1965,⁴ and General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of December 14 1960;⁵ (3) condemn U.D.I. and regard it as being illegal; (4) call on Britain to quell

1. On November 12 the Council had adopted a resolution condemning U.D.I. and calling on member states not to recognise the Smith regime.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp.29-30.

4. See footnote 1 on p.74.

5. The famous self-determination resolution.

the rebellion; (5) call on all states to refuse to recognise the illegal regime and not to maintain any relations with it; (6) call on the United Kingdom to take immediate measures to allow the people of Rhodesia to determine their future in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV); (7) call on all states not to assist or encourage the rebellion; (8) call on Britain to enforce "urgently and with vigour" the measures that had been announced by that country; and (9) call on the O.A.U. to do all in its power to assist in the implementation of this resolution.¹ This compromise draft was adopted by ten votes, with one abstention.

It is interesting to note the close similarity between the compromise draft and that sponsored by the African Group. But should we conclude from this that the Security Council was being more responsive to the African states' demands than to those of Britain's on this question? Let us examine what has happened since the adoption of the of the Uruguayan-Bolivian compromise resolution.

On April 7, 1966, the United Kingdom requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council that afternoon to consider the presence in Beira of the oil tanker "Joanna V" with oil supply for Rhodesia. The President of the Council, the representative of Mali, delayed convening the Council by forty-eight hours, most probably as a protest against Britain's handling of the rebellion.² When the Council met on April 9, the United Kingdom, after having complained about the delay in convening the Council, introduced a draft resolution which described the situation (the presence of "Joanna V" in Beira) as a threat to peace, called on Portugal not to allow oil to be pumped through the pipeline to Rhodesia, called on all states not to permit any of their vessels to carry oil destined for the territory, called on Britain to prevent, by the use of force if necessary,³ the arrival in Beira of vessels with oil "reasonably believed" to be destined for Rhodesia, and empowered Britain to arrest the tanker "Joanna V" if it discharged oil at Beira for the rebel territory.⁴

1. Ibid., p.30

2. Ibid.

3. It is not quite easy to reconcile Britain's willingness to use force in this instance, but not when it involves removing the source of the problem.

4. Ibid.

Mali, Nigeria and Uganda attempted to amend the British draft by having the Council (1) decide that economic sanctions were a failure, (2) call on South Africa to prevent the supply of oil to Rhodesia, (3) call on Britain to take all measures, including the use of force, to prevent the supply of oil and other commodities to the colony, (4) call on all states to sever all economic and communication links with the territory, and (5) call on the United Kingdom to take all measures, including the use of force, to quell the rebellion. These amendments were rejected and the British draft adopted.¹

In May 1966, the African Group submitted a draft resolution which, among other things, (1) determined that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security, (2) called on Portugal and South Africa to sever economic and communication links with the colony, and (3) called on the United Kingdom to use air, sea and land forces to prevent supplies from reaching the rebel territory and to consult with African leaders in the territory in order to establish a government acceptable to the people of Rhodesia. This draft failed to be adopted.²

Having failed in the Security Council, the African states turned to the Committee of 24 which adopted the May draft resolution by an overwhelming majority.³ On October 22, 1966, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, which had been recommended by its Fourth Committee (Trusteeship and Non-self-governing Territories), condemning any agreement concluded between the British Government and the Smith regime that did not recognise the rights of the people of Rhodesia to self-determination and independence in accordance with resolution 1514(XV), reaffirming the obligation of the United Kingdom to transfer power to the people of Rhodesia on the basis of universal adult suffrage and noting, "with grave concern", the "talks about talks" between Britain and the rebel regime, which might jeopardise the rights of the Africans in the colony.⁴

1. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

2. Ibid.

3. The tactic, number and influence of the O.A.U. states at the U.N. and other international bodies will be considered at the end of this chapter.

4. Ibid., p. 60; U.N. Monthly Chronicle, V.III, No. 10, November 1966, pp.29-30.

However, the favourable responses of the General Assembly and the Committee of 24 were no substitute for what the O.A.U. wanted the U.N. to do, namely, to call on Britain to overthrow the Smith regime by all means, including the use of force. As is well known, only the Security Council is empowered to take mandatory decisions in this regard. And the Council, due to Britain's refusal to use force, had decided against military action. It was against this background that, at its seventh ordinary session in Addis Ababa, from October 31 to November 4, 1966, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers condemned the "talks about talks" and "strongly condemned" the United Kingdom for refusing to quell the rebellion; in November, the O.A.U. Assembly similarly condemned, "without reserve", the "talks about talks" and Britain's refusal to use force. In mid-December, the Security Council adopted a British draft resolution calling for selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. Acting under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter, the Council, for the first time, admitted that the Rhodesian crisis constituted a threat to international peace and security,¹ and called on all states not to import from the colony asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides, skins and leather, and not to export to that territory oil or oil products.²

But in spite of the fact that the Security Council had decided that the Rhodesian crisis constituted a threat to international peace and security, the use of force was excluded. And in February/March 1967, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers again "unreservedly" condemned Britain for its handling of the crisis, renewed its appeal to the nationalist movements in Rhodesia to unite in the struggle against the minority regime in that territory and called on the African members of the Security Council to continue their efforts in that U.N. organ against the Smith regime.³

Before drawing any conclusions from the O.A.U.'s attempts to topple the Smith regime through Britain and the U.N., let us treat next South Africa and Portuguese colonies in Africa, since the three issues are interrelated.

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1. There was no explanation as to why the crisis constituted a threat to international peace and security then and not before.
 2. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, V.IV, No. 1, January 1967, pp.6-7.
 3. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, pp.106-107.

South Africa and Portuguese Colonies in Africa.

South Africa's racial policy was first raised at the first session of the U.N. General Assembly when India complained that the South African Government had enacted legislation against South Africans of Indian origin, violating agreements between both countries. In 1952, thirteen countries (Afghanistan, Burma, Lebanon, Iran, U.A.R., India, Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) requested that the question of apartheid be placed on the Assembly's agenda. These two questions (the Indian complaint and the thirteen nations' request) were discussed as separate items on the Assembly's agenda until 1962, when they were combined. During the same year, the Assembly called on U.N. member states to take economic and diplomatic measures against South Africa and established a special committee of eleven members (the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa) to keep the situation under review¹ and report to the Assembly and Security Council.

As indicated earlier, at the May 1963 summit conference in Addis Ababa, the African states adopted a resolution on apartheid and racial discrimination which, in part, appealed to all states maintaining diplomatic, consular and economic relations with South Africa to sever these ties and refuse to encourage apartheid. The conference designated the Foreign Ministers of Liberia, Tunisia, Madagascar and Sierra Leone "to inform the Security Council of the explosive situation² existing in South Africa". Since May 1963, the O.A.U. has sought to pressure the South African Government and its Western supporters through international organisations. On May 28, three days after the Addis Ababa summit, Burma announced that it would not renew its annual contract for the supply of about 300,000 tons of coal from South Africa. In June, the O.A.U. states succeeded in having the Administrative Council of the I.L.O. adopt resolutions with a view to expelling South Africa from that organisation. In 1961, under pressure from the Afro-Asian countries, the I.L.O. had adopted a resolution calling on South Africa to withdraw from the organisation. This procedure was chosen because the constitution of the

1. U.N. Review of United Nations Consideration of Apartheid
(ST/PSCA/SER.A/2). p.1.

2. O.A.U. Basic Documents of the Organisation of African Unity, pp.19-20.

I.L.O. does not allow for the expulsion of members. One of the resolutions adopted in June 1963 provided for the examination of amendments concerning the competence of the organisation to act in keeping with the objective of the 1961 resolution. Another resolution called on the I.L.O.'s Director-General and a delegation from the organisation to visit U.N. Secretary-General U Thant and inform him of the I.L.O.'s "weighty preoccupation" with the question. U Thant suggested that a general policy be adopted for all U.N. affiliated agencies before action was taken against South Africa.¹

On July 11, 1963, the African Group at the U.N. requested an early meeting of the Security Council to consider South Africa's apartheid policy and its persistent refusal to comply with U.N. resolutions on the subject. On July 19, Emperor Haile Selassie sent a telegram, urging the Council to impose sanctions against South Africa for its racial policy. Three days later, President Nkrumah sent a letter along the same lines to the Council.²

During the debate on apartheid in the Council, Sierra Leone urged the Council to take "appropriate measures" to pressure the South African Government into abandoning its apartheid policy. Tunisia called on the Council to take "immediate and firm" measures in order to dispel doubts as to the U.N.'s determination to have the aims of its Charter achieved in South Africa. The Malagasy Republic told the Council that no "fiction of domestic jurisdiction" should prevent it from finding solution to the South African problem.³ The United States representative disclosed that his Government had made diplomatic representation to South Africa concerning apartheid and indicated that it would not co-operate in undertakings that would support apartheid.⁴ (The U.S. later imposed an arms embargo against South Africa). However, the United States wanted further attempts to be made in building "a bridge of communication, of discussion and persuasion" and refused to accept the view that violence was the only alternative. Brazil said that the situation in South Africa constituted a "serious threat to international peace

1. A.F.P. Africa, July 4, 1963, p.1; The Washington Post. July 26, 1963.

2. U.N. General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Official Records, Supp. No. 2 (A/5802), pp.20-21.

3. Ibid., pp.21-22.

4. Ibid., p.22.

and security", and that the Council should take "appropriate action" against South Africa. In this connection, Brazil proposed that steps be taken to stop the supply of arms to South Africa.¹ Ghana then introduced a draft resolution which, in part, called on all states to boycott South African goods, refuse to export to that country arms, military vehicles and strategic materials of military value.²

At this point, the British representative roundly condemned the policy of apartheid, describing it as "evil" and "totally impracticable". But the Briton hastened to add that his country had "special obligations" towards South Africa, which had to be considered. He called on member states to continue exerting the "maximum pressure possible" on South Africa "in whatever way they consider appropriate under the Charter" so as to dissuade that country from its racial policy.³ The United States requested a separate vote on the paragraph of the draft resolution calling on member states to boycott South African goods and refuse to export to South Africa strategic materials of military value. This paragraph was rejected, and the draft, as amended, was adopted. The British Government had already announced on August 3 that Britain would not sell arms to South Africa, which could be used to enforce apartheid, but that Britain would abide by its "commitments" to sell arms to that country for external defence.⁴

Following the debate in the Security Council, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, meeting in Dakar, adopted a resolution which, among other things, deplored the position taken by the United States, Britain and France during the Security Council debate on South Africa and expressed the hope that these countries would, "in future", support the O.A.U.'s position. A week later, Dr. Verwoerd told a Nationalist Party rally at Smithfield, Orange Free State, that South Africa would not give in to pressures. He observed that the United States and Britain had simply made "verbal attacks" on South Africa because they were aware of its economic worth.⁵

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., pp.24-25.

3. Ibid., p.25.

4. Ibid., p.26; The Times, August 4, 1963.

5. O.A.U. Basic Documents of the Organisation of African Unity, p. 34; The Sunday Telegraph, August 18, 1963.

In mid-October, The Netherlands Permanent Mission to the U.N. announced that its Government had imposed a ban on the export and transit to South Africa of arms which could be used for the suppression of the non-whites in the apartheid state. On December 3, Norway submitted a draft resolution to the Council, calling for, in part, the cessation of the supply of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms in South Africa and the establishment of an expert group to examine the situation in that country so as to determine what the U.N. could do to improve the situation in the apartheid state. The Norwegian draft was unanimously adopted on December 4, and the group of experts was appointed by Secretary-General U Thant in January 1964. But South Africa refused to co-operate, thus making it impracticable for the group to visit that country in order to conduct an on-the-spot investigation.¹ However, the group submitted a report, stressing that the basic principle for a peaceful and constructive settlement of the South African problem was that all races in that country should decide its future.²

With the Western bloc firmly opposed to the use of sanctions in respect of South Africa, the South African Government has simply tended to ignore U.N. resolutions on apartheid. But the O.A.U.'s tactic (which will be considered at the end of this chapter) has remained basically the same. And while the African states have had a measure of success in the fight against South Africa, the actions taken against the apartheid state by the U.N. and other international bodies and non-O.A.U. states have been marginal, as is well known. In this connection, on March 19, 1964, the Assembly of the World Health Organisation, exercising its powers under Article 7 of the organisation's constitution, requested that the Executive Board and the Director-General submit to the Assembly proposals with a view to suspending or excluding South Africa from W.H.O. But despite O.A.U.³ pressure, the Executive Board turned down the Assembly's request. In early June 1964, the Universal Postal Union adopted an African resolution which excluded

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1. U.N. General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Official Records, Supp. No.2 (A/5802), p.29ff.
 2. Ibid.
 3. W.H.O. Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly and the Executive Board (10th ed.), May 1969, p.307; W.H.O. Official Records, No. 144, p.48.

South Africa from the Union. In November, after the Labour Government had replaced the Conservative one, the United Kingdom announced that it would not supply arms to South Africa. On July 9, 1965, the Executive Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organisation adopted an African resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa from the organisation. Five days later, however, the I.C.A.O. Assembly rejected this resolution. When South Africa was invited to participate in the 1968 Olympics in Mexico, the O.A.U. states objected, and the International Olympics Committee withdrew the invitation.

Connected with South Africa's racial policy is the question of South-West Africa, now called Namibia. This territory was given to South Africa by the League of Nations in 1919 to be administered as a class C mandate. Under the League, South Africa was accountable to the Mandate Commission of the League. With the demise of the League, however, the Mandate Commission ceased to function. When the United Nations was founded in 1945, the Trusteeship Council was established under which the various powers placed their mandate territories in preparation for self-government or independence.

Since 1946, South Africa has refused to place Namibia under the Trusteeship Council, arguing that its international accountability for the territory was to the League and not the U.N. In 1960, the Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa appointed Ethiopia and Liberia to take legal action against South Africa at the International Court of Justice for that country's introduction of apartheid into Namibia. It took the Court six years to decide that Liberia and Ethiopia did not have any legal rights for taking action against South Africa. This was a contradiction of a previous ruling by the same Court in 1962 in which it was held that the two countries had such rights. It should be noted, in this connection, that the Australian President of the Court, who cast the deciding vote in favour of South Africa in 1966 had voted against the 1962 decision.

At the end of President Nyerere's visit to Somalia in August 1966, he and Somali President Aden Abdulla Osman issued a joint communique¹ which, in part, strongly condemned the World Court's decision on Namibia and called on "all democratic peoples" to demand that the United Nations revoke South Africa's mandate over the territory. On October 27, the General Assembly, through the

1. The Nationalist, August 26, 1966.

African Group's initiatives, adopted a resolution which, among other things, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination, freedom and independence in keeping with the U.N. Charter, terminated South Africa's mandate over the territory and placed it under direct U.N. responsibility and called on South Africa to refrain from taking any action that might in any way alter (or tend to alter) the international status of Namibia.¹

Following the Assembly's resolution, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, at its seventh ordinary session in Addis Ababa in October/November 1966, passed a resolution which, in part, welcomed "with satisfaction" the Assembly's resolution, considered South Africa's continued presence in Namibia as an "illegal military aggression", called on the various organs of the United Nations to take all steps to put into immediate effect the General Assembly's resolution and urged states that had not done so to refrain from supplying South Africa with arms, petroleum or petroleum products.²

On March 20, 1969, more than two years after the General Assembly's decision on Namibia, the Security Council called on the apartheid state to withdraw from Namibia. The U.K. and France abstained. On August 12, the Council called on South Africa to withdraw before October 4, 1969. Otherwise, the Council warned that it would decide on what "effective measures" to take "in accordance with the appropriate provision of the relevant chapters of the United Nations Charter". Significantly, the resolution (sponsored by Senegal, Algeria, Zambia, Colombia, Pakistan and Paraguay) was adopted by eleven votes to nil, with France, the United States, Britain and Finland abstaining.³ With its three major Western supporters abstaining, South Africa could hardly have been expected to heed the Council's resolution. So much for apartheid and Namibia. Let us now turn next to the question of Portuguese colonies in Africa.

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1. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Twenty-First Session, Supp. No.16 (A/6316), p.2.
 2. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions pp.106-107.
 3. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Twenty-fourth Session, Supp. No.2 (A/7602), p.76ff; Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, August 1969, p.1503.

At the May 1963 summit conference, the African states adopted a resolution on decolonisation which, in part,

Intervenes expressly with the Great Powers so that they cease, without exception, to lend direct or indirect support or assistance to all those colonialist Governments which might use such assistance to suppress national liberation movements, particularly the Portuguese Government which is conducting a real war of genocide in Africa..... 1

After continual African pressure at the U.N., the United States Government had already announced on April 10, 1962, that it had received assurances from Portugal that American arms supplied to Portuguese forces under mutual defence agreements would no longer be transferred to Angola where Portugal was faced with a rebellion.² A day or so later, the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had suggested to his Brazilian opposite number, Dr. Francisco Dantas, that Brazil might be in a position to persuade Portugal to adopt a more liberal policy towards its African colonies.³

On July 4, 1963, the Twenty-Sixth International Conference on Education in Geneva, in response to a demand by the African states, voted to exclude Portugal from its deliberations. The Communist bloc countries, non-African Arab states, Israel, Yugoslavia and India voted with the African states. When Portugal refused to withdraw from the conference, the O.A.U. states walked out. The following day, the Turkish President of the conference, Bedrettin Tuncel, instructed conference officials to bar the Portuguese delegation from entering the conference hall.⁴ On July 11, the African Group at the United Nations requested an early meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Portugal's African colonies in view of what was described as a "state of war" in some of those territories, which constituted a breach of peace and security in Africa and a threat to international peace and security. About a week later, Emperor Haile Selassie, in a telegram, appealed to the Security Council to apply "maximum pressure" on Portugal so that it would grant independence to its African colonies. On July 22, President Nkrumah sent a message to the Security Council, stating that humanity was "awaiting

1. O.A.U. Basic Documents of the Organisation of African Unity, p.17ff.

2. But in its desire to retain the Azores base, the U.S. hardly took steps to prevent such a transfer. See Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, V.I. pp. 183, 185, 190, 192-103, 270-271, 274, and 315.

3. The New York Times, April 11, 1962.

4. The New York Times, July 5, 1963; The Washington Post, July 6, 1963.

anxiously" the results of the Council's deliberations which should bring about the termination of Portuguese rule in Africa.¹

To press the fight against Portuguese colonialism in the Security Council, the O.A.U. had, in May, appointed Liberia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar and Tunisia. Opening the debate, Liberian Secretary of State, Grimes, said among other things, that the African states were not prepared to condone the perpetuation of colonialism and slavery. Africans, Grimes said, were not seeking revenge, but justice in keeping with the U.N. Charter. What Africa wanted was action by the Council to ensure greater respect for any compliance with U.N. resolutions by Portugal, even if it meant the imposition of sanctions against that country.²

The Tunisian representative observed that in 1962, the General Assembly had adopted resolutions 1809 (XVII) and 1819 (XVII) which noted that Portugal's refusal to heed the legitimate aspirations of the Angolans constituted a threat to international peace and security. The use of armed force by the Portuguese Government had provoked the African nationalists into reacting. Thus, a dangerous cycle of repression and nationalist reaction had developed. The fighting in Angola had overflowed the frontiers of that country; and in Guinea-Bissao, it threatened to spread to neighbouring countries with the Portuguese bombardment of a Senegalese village in March 1963. The Tunisian urged the Council to take "all appropriate" steps in view of the grave situation and to assume its full responsibilities under the U.N. Charter.³ The Malagasy Republic called for "prompt and effective" measures which, it said, were necessary not only for the prestige of the U.N., but were even in Portugal's interest. Madagascar called on the Council to make the "necessary choice" and support the African countries.⁴ Sierra Leone wanted the Council to have Portugal decide, "within a reasonably short time", to renounce its theory of the extension of Portugal into Africa and to recognise the right to self-determination of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissao.⁵

1. U.N. General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Official Records. Supp. No.2 (A/5802), p.9.

2. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

3. Ibid., p.10.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

Portugal's colonial policy was also severely criticised by other non-African states participating in the Council's debate. Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines later introduced a draft resolution which considered the situation in Portugal's African colonies as constituting a threat to international peace and security; decided that Portugal's policy of claiming territories under its administration as "overseas territories" and integral parts of the metropole was contrary to the Charter of the U.N. and the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council; demanded the immediate implementation by Portugal of the portion of paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1807 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, which called for the immediate recognition of the right to self-determination and independence of the peoples of territories under Portuguese administration, cessation of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces used for that purpose, the promulgation of political amnesty, the creation of conditions conducive to the free functioning of political parties, negotiation with representatives of political parties leading to the transfer of power and the granting of independence immediately thereafter; and called on all countries to refrain from giving Portugal any assistance that would be used to enforce repressive measures against the peoples of territories under its rule.¹ The representative of Madagascar then read the text of a telegram sent by the U.A.M. Heads of State who were holding a conference in Cotonou. In their telegram, the U.A.M. states² urged all members of the Security Council to support the draft resolution. After slight modifications, the draft was adopted by 8 votes to none, with, as usual, the United States, Britain and France abstaining. But although Britain and the United States abstained, they gave assurances that Portugal would not receive arms from them to repress African nationalist movements.³

Meanwhile, on July 24, 1963, the U.N. Economic and Social Council, meeting in Geneva, voted to expel Portugal from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Ethiopia and Senegal, on behalf of the African Group, had proposed the expulsion. On August 10, Portugal's neighbour, Spain, announced that its

1. Ibid., pp.12-13.

2. Ibid., p.15.

3. Ibid., pp.15-16.

territories in West Africa would be given a measure of autonomy. The territories involved were Rio Muni and Fernando Po. Spain is also said to have advised Portugal in May to show understanding for the "wind of change" that was sweeping across Africa.¹ Two days after the Spanish Government's announcement, Portuguese Premier Salazar defended his country's colonial policy. But as Salazar's speech was being broadcast, the Portuguese Secretary of State for Overseas Administration, Joachim Silva Cunha, was on his way to Guinea-Bissao to initiate a "new political administrative status" designed to grant a measure of autonomy to territories under Portuguese rule.²

On August 29, the Portuguese Government invited U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to visit Portugal for talks in connection with the Security Council's resolution. The Secretary-General informed Portugal that U.N. Under Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories Godfrey Amachree would represent him. In September, Amachree held discussions with Portuguese officials in Lisbon, which led to direct talks between representatives designated by the African Group and Portugal. The central issue of the talks was the concept of self-determination. Portugal defined self-determination in such a manner as to exclude independence for its African territories. The Portuguese expressed the view that there was more than one form of self-determination, just as there is more than one form of administration of a state. Accordingly, Portugal defined self-determination as the "agreement and consent" of a people to a certain political structure, type of state and administrative organisation.³

The African states, for obvious reasons, refused to accept this interpretation of self-determination. Hence in November, the African Group requested an early meeting of the Security Council to consider a report by the Secretary-General on the talks with Portugal.⁴

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1. The Washington Post, July 25, 1963; The New York Times, August 11, 1963,
 2. The New York Times, August 13, 1963,
 3. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Third Ordinary Session, p.19; U.N. General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Official Records, Supp. No.2 (A/5802), p.17.
 4. U.N. General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Official Records, Supp. No.2 (A/5802), p.17.

On December 3, the General Assembly, through the African Group's initiatives, requested the Council to consider immediately the question of territories under Portuguese control and to take the requisite steps to give effect to its own decisions on this question. A few days later, the Council began its consideration of the problem.¹ Speaking for the African Group, Grimes told the Council that the African states could not accept the Portuguese interpretation of "self-determination" because it did not include the choice of independence for the peoples of territories under Portuguese rule.² A joint Afro-Asian resolution was then submitted by Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines which, in part, deprecated the Portuguese Government's failure to comply with the Council's resolution of July 31, 1963 and reaffirmed the interpretation of "self-determination" as contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which states that:

all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 3

This resolution was adopted by 10 votes to none, with France abstaining.

In July 1964, when the O.A.U. states presented a resolution to exclude Portugal from the International Education Conference, the Chairman of the conference, Hans Nowotny of Austria, threatened to resign unless the conference rejected the African resolution. When the conference failed to support the Chairman's position, he resigned; and the session was suspended. Later, Nowotny was replaced by one of the Vice-Chairmen, Fouad Sawaya of Lebanon. At this point, the United States, France, Britain, Italy, West Germany, Canada, The Netherlands, Switzerland, The Vatican and twelve Latin American countries threatened to withdraw if the resolution was put to a vote. Upon the proposal of Nigeria, the conference was temporarily adjourned. By mid-July the opposing views had not been reconciled,⁴ and the conference was adjourned indefinitely. At its first meeting in Cairo in July 1964, the O.A.U. Assembly passed a resolution which condemned Portugal for its persistent refusal to recognise the right to self-determination and independence of peoples under its rule and its failure to comply with U.N. resolutions in this

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

4. Le Monde, 11,12-13, 17 July, 1964.

connection, called on nationalist movements in territories under Portuguese control to intensify their struggle against Portugal and extended the mandate of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tunisia to represent the O.A.U. at the deliberations of the Security Council on questions concerning territories administered by Portugal.¹

It was against this background that, in February/March 1965, at its fourth ordinary session in Nairobi, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers called on all states to cease military and trade relations with Portugal, requested "friendly countries" to give moral and material support to the fight against Portuguese colonialism and appealed to the rival liberation movements in territories under Portuguese rule to unite and co-ordinate their efforts in the fight against Portugal. In October, the Council called on all "freedom-loving" states to grant liberation movements in Portuguese colonies the requisite political, diplomatic and military assistance in their fight for independence.²

On November 22, Liberia, Jordan, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malaysia, Tunisia and Sierra Leone submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council, which, in part, (1) affirmed that the situation resulting from Portugal's colonial policy endangered international peace and security; (2) reaffirmed the interpretation of the principle of self-determination as contained in Security Council resolution 183 (1963); (3) called on Portugal to give immediate effect to the principle of self-determination in territories under its rule; (4) reaffirmed the demand that Portugal immediately recognise the right to self-determination and independence of peoples of territories under its administration, cease all acts of repression and withdraw its military and other forces employed for that purpose, declare an unconditional political amnesty and create conditions conducive to the free functioning of political parties and negotiate with representatives of the political parties, with a view to the transfer of power to freely elected political institutions; (5) called on all states to take the requisite measures to prevent the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms in Portugal or any of the territories under its control; and (6) called on all states to take the necessary step,

1. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Third Ordinary Session, pp. 40-41.

2. Ibid, pp. 60-61 and 83-84.

separately or collectively, to boycott Portuguese trade.¹ On November 23, Uruguay proposed a few minor modifications which were accepted. At Uruguay's request, a separate vote was taken on the section of the resolution calling for the boycott of trade with Portugal. This section was rejected by 4 votes to none, with 7 abstentions. The Council then adopted the modified resolution by 7 votes, with 4² abstentions.

Having obtained this limited response from the Security Council, the African Group turned to the General Assembly which, because of its structure and voting procedure, is much more responsive to the O.A.U.'s outputs. On December 21, the Assembly, in resolution 2107 (XX), urged all states to sever diplomatic and consular relations with Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations, close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal, prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories, refuse landing and transit facilities to all Portuguese aircraft, boycott all trade with Portugal and give peoples of territories under Portuguese administration the necessary moral and material support in their fight for independence.³

During its October/November 1966 session, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers called on all states to implement the Security Council's resolution 218 (1966) of November 23, 1965 and the General Assembly's resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965; condemned those states that continued to supply Portugal with arms, military material or the requisite equipment for the production of arms; and called on Liberia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar and Tunisia to continue pressing the case against Portugal in the Security Council.⁴

From these observations of the O.A.U.'s interaction with its various environmental components - the U.N. and non-O.A.U. states - a certain pattern emerges. While these components have appeared to be usually responsive to the O.A.U.'s outputs,

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1. U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Twentieth Year, Supp. for October, November and December 1965, p.382ff.
 2. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Twenty-First Session, Supp. No.1 (A/6301), p.28.
 3. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Twentieth Session, Annexes, V.I. Agenda Item 23, 1965, pp.83-84.
 4. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Third Ordinary Session, pp. 102-103.

the pattern of their responses has been such that, with the exception of the dissolution of the Central African Federation - to which Britain had agreed even before the inception of the O.A.U. - the Organisation's objective of eradicating colonialism and apartheid from Africa has not been attained to any major degree. Although the United Kingdom yielded to pressures for the dissolution of the Central African Federation, Rhodesia continued to be ruled by a minority regime, the explanation being that Britain was not responsible for the "internal affairs" of the territory. ¹ The potent air force of the defunct Federation was transferred to the colony because, it was claimed, "local revenues" from that territory had financed the Federation's air force. When Smith declared U.D.I. in 1965, the British Government excluded the use of force, although force, as an instrument of policy, had not been excluded in connection with other British territories up to that time. The Security Council finally imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against Rhodesia about three years after U.D.I. However, the Council did not provide for enforcement measures to prevent the breaking of sanctions, particularly through South Africa and Mozambique. In spite of the Security Council's ban on the sale of arms to South Africa in 1963, France continues to supply arms to that country. For a while, Britain made a distinction between arms for the enforcement of apartheid and those for "external defence", then the Labour Government enforced the ban during the latter part of 1964. But after their accession to power in June 1970, the Conservatives decided to lift the ban and sell arms to the Republic for "external defence".

Similarly, attempts by the O.A.U. to have the Security Council impose economic sanctions against South Africa have been completely unsuccessful. Whenever this demand has been contained in a draft resolution, the strategy has been a request by the Western bloc for a separate vote on it, resulting in its rejection not by active opposition but abstention. And the story is much the same concerning O.A.U. efforts to decolonise territories in Africa that are under Portuguese rule.

Has then the O.A.U. succeeded where the Monrovia and Casablanca states failed?

1. It is not terribly easy to reconcile this position with the British conditions for the independence of Rhodesia. We are, however, not concerned here with the legal aspects of the matter.

Our answer must be an unequivocal "No". While majority votes have been obtained against the colonial authorities in various international bodies, the trend in this direction had begun some time before the founding of the O.A.U. What the O.A.U. has contributed is some form of co-ordination in the fight against colonialism, and perhaps the keeping of such issues alive. Beyond this, it has not significantly influenced the attitude of the colonial powers involved in Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and Guinea-Bassao. It is one thing to have a majority in various international bodies, but it is quite another to bring about an implementation of decisions reached by those bodies. The actual implementation of decisions requires, in addition to majority votes, the requisite military and/or economic resources as well as the willingness to use these resources.

And we must note a further point: the actual tactic employed by the O.A.U. Like the Monrovia and Casablanca states, the Organisation has tended to try and apply pressure on South Africa, Portugal and Britain principally through international bodies. As resolution after resolution has shown, this tactic is clearly inadequate, if not counter-productive. For, in the final analysis, a resolution is useful only when implemented (and implementable). Moreover, the adoption of resolutions can become a substitute for action, giving one a false sense of accomplishment. While all units within a system may have formal equality (i.e. one state one vote and the principle of unanimity), some units are always more equal than others, and hence tend to have more influence on the actual behaviour of the system. In order to change the behaviour of the system, one must therefore concentrate on those units (and subsystems) that are roughly equal to each other. This is, of course, a simplification of a complex situation, but it does offer a crude idea of the dynamics involved. Various states, principally the Western Powers, have argued all along that military and economic sanctions are not appropriate methods to solve the problem of colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa and Guinea-Bissao. Hardly anyone doubts that these powers have the requisite military (and economic) leverage to topple the regimes in those areas. Since it is the

1. Here, I will be reminded that the two super-Powers, in spite of the resources at their disposal, have been unable to solve the Middle East crisis. This point would be well taken, except that in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the United States are committed to supporting the opposing contestants. The situation would not be the same in Southern Africa and Guinea-Bissao.

position of these Powers that economic and military sanctions are not appropriate, the O.A.U. states should perhaps concentrate their efforts on having these Powers mandated by various international bodies, particularly the U.N., to propose an appropriate method. As long as the mandate is in force, the situation should be kept under review; but resolutions and empty majority votes ought surely to be avoided. Having argued persistently against military and economic sanctions, the Western Powers could hardly reject such an approach out of hand since by doing so they would be admitting that in fact there was no alternative to force, and that their principal concern was to maintain a status quo in which colonialism and racial discrimination flourished - an unlikely admission by a bloc that claims to represent the "free world". Such an approach might break the vicious "resolution circle" in which one resolution is followed by another, effective implementation being totally absent.

We turn now to a more difficult problem, not the responses of bodies other than the O.A.U. to resolutions adopted by its members, but an inquiry into the way in which the interactions of the Organisation's various units and subsystems have brought about changes affecting its functioning.

CHAPTER VI

ACTION AND REACTION WITHIN THE O.A.U.

In this chapter, we shall attempt to determine whether or not a change in or of system has occurred in connection with the O.A.U. To this end, let us restate the preconditions making for a change in system, compared with a change of system (that is to say, the emergence of a new system). There is a change of system when (1) there is a change of the units and/or subsystems in actual or potential conflict; (2) there is a change of the units and/or subsystems in actual or potential co-operation; (3) there is a change in the means of conflict; (4) there is a change in the degree of co-operation among the various units and/or subsystems. A fulfilment of any of the foregoing conditions would be sufficient for a change of system because of the alteration in the basic arrangement of the units and/or subsystems. A change in system is one which does not alter the basic arrangements of the units and/or subsystems.

Since the formation of the O.A.U. in 1963, its member states have experienced various forms of conflict and co-operation. Have these resulted in a basic alteration of the positions of these states vis-a-vis each other? Restated, has a change in or of system occurred in respect of the O.A.U. since 1963? To attempt an answer, we examine several instances of border and political conflict and co-operation on the African continent.

Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict

The first conflict situation that the O.A.U. was faced with was the border war between Morocco and Algeria in 1963.¹

In 1845, France and Morocco signed the Treaty of Lalla-Marnia which delimited the frontier between the latter and Algeria from the coast to Teniet-el-Sassi, a distance of about 130 kilometres. The villages of Ich and Figuig were indicated as being Moroccan.² In 1899/1900, however, it became French policy to occupy as much land as possible in the area that was not delimited, in spite of Morocco's

1. In the chapter on conflict resolution, we shall treat the efforts of the O.A.U. to resolve this conflict. Here, we are concerned simply with determining whether or not the conflict resulted in a change of or in system.

2. Le Monde, 8 October, 1963.

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protest. In 1901, another agreement was concluded which gave France the right to set up guard and customs posts in the Djebel-Bechar area. In 1910, the French High Commissioner at Oujda, Varnier, established an administrative line - named after him - from Teniet-el-Sassi to Colomb-Bechar. This line (the "Varnier Line") was recognised by France in 1912, the year in which Morocco became a French protectorate. In 1928, Morocco also recognised the "Varnier Line" as the administrative and fiscal Frontier.² The only frontier agreement which the Moroccan Government now recognises as valid is the Treaty of Lalla-Marnia; it argues that France violated the 1901 treaty, and that recognition of the "Varnier Line" had been imposed on Morocco while it was a protectorate.³

When Morocco regained independence in 1956, a joint frontier commission was established to study the frontier problem; but in 1958, Morocco withdrew from this commission and recognised the Algerian Provisional Government as the only competent authority to handle questions concerning Algeria's frontier. In May 1960, the Moroccan King, Mohammed V, and Ferhat Abbas, the President of the Algerian Provisional Government, concluded an agreement under the terms of which both sides undertook to have the "colonial frontier" revised.⁴ In July 1961, King Hassan and Ferhat Abbas concluded another agreement in which it was admitted that the

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1. M. de Monbel à M. Delcassé, Tanger, 23 November 1899, "Note pour le ministre", Paris, 8 January 1900, Documents diplomatiques française (1871-1914) 1^{er} serie, Tome XVI, p.70; M. Delcassé aux représentants diplomatiques de France, Paris, 3 February 1900; M. Patenôtre à M. Delcassé, Madrid, 2 March 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Patenôtre, Paris, 5 March 1900; M. Delcassé à M. de la Martinière, Paris, 9 March 1900; M. Waldeck-Rousseau à M. Delcassé, Paris 17 March 1900; M. de la Martinière à M. Delcassé, Tanger, 9 April 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Révoil, 15 April 1900; Note du Department (très confidentiel), Paris, 2 May 1900; M. Révoil à M. Delcassé, Tanger, 3 May 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Révoil, Paris, 5 May 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Waldeck-Rousseau, Paris, 12 May 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Laferrière, Paris, 14 May 1900; M. Révoil à M. Delcassé, Tanger, 16 May 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Laferrière, Paris, 22 May 1900; M. Constans à M. Delcassé, Thérapier, 6 June 1900; M. Laferrière à M. Delcassé, El Biar, 8 June 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Waldeck-Rousseau, Paris, 10 June 1900; Le General André à M. Delcassé, Paris, 19 June 1900; M. Delcassé à M. de la Martinière, Paris, 22 November 1900; M. Delcassé à M. Waldeck-Rousseau, Paris, 7 December 1900.
 2. Protocole intervenu entre M. Delcassé, Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la République française et Si Abdelkerim ben Sliman, Ministre des Affaires étrangères et Ambassadeur plenipotentiaire de sa Majesté Chérifienne auprès du Gouvernement de la République française, portant application et execution du traité de 1845 dans la région du Sud-Quest algérien, Paris, le 20 July 1901; Le Monde, 8 October, 1963.
 3. Le Monde, 8 October, 1963.
 4. Le Monde, 2 October, 1963.

frontier inherited from France did "not involve Morocco (... pas opposables au Maroc)".¹

When Algeria attained independence in 1962, however, a dispute broke out as to which state possessed sovereignty over a number of military outposts in the Colomb-Bechar area and further to the south-west. Algeria claimed that these outposts were in its territory until Moroccan troops forcibly occupied them in early July 1962. Morocco, on the other hand, maintained that the outposts were in Moroccan territory, but had been seized by the Algerians. In July 1962, King Hassan sent envoys to Algeria for talks on the frontier question. However, the Provisional Government is reported to have indicated that nothing could be decided until after the Algerian National Assembly had been elected. In November 1962, when Col. Boumedienne visited Morocco, and March 1963, during King Hassan's visit to Algeria the matter was raised but not settled. During mid-1963, however, relations were strained when the Moroccan authorities arrested leaders of the Moroccan National Union of Popular Forces in July for an alleged plot against the Government. In Algeria, protests were made about the "ill-treatment" of these U.N.F.P. leaders by the Moroccan police. From July onwards, relations between the two countries deteriorated with charges and counter-charges of troop movements and border incursions. The Istiqlal Party in Morocco then launched an all-out campaign for implementation of the 1960 agreement; and in August, when President Ben Bella was faced with a rebellion in the Kabylie region of Algeria, he accused King Hassan of having massed troops along the frontier to support the rebels. "The soldiers of Moulay Hassan", Ben Bella alleged, "are presently ten metres from our frontier, and we know what that means. But we are not afraid of any army". On October 1, Morocco alleged that Algerian troops had penetrated Moroccan territory up to the village of Ouakda before retreating. There were also reports of troop movements on both sides.

These charges and counter-charges continued. The Algerian Charge d'Affaires in Morocco was called to the Moroccan Foreign Ministry and told of Morocco's "astonishment concerning President Ben Bella's accusations (which were) categorically

1. Le Monde, 23 October, 1963.

denied". Morocco said that it could not "but defend a natural right in demanding that Algeria settle the frontier problem and thus liquidate a colonial sequel".

On October 5, Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika and Moroccan Acting Foreign Minister Ahmed Guedira met at Oujda on the Moroccan border in an effort to settle the border problem. A communiqué issued after the talks said that "each side has affirmed its determination to put an end to everything that adversely affects good relations between the two states". In addition, the two countries reaffirmed the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and agreed "to take concrete measures to normalise relations immediately between the two fraternal states (pays frères)". Meanwhile, it was reported from Cairo that President Nasser had sent President Ben Bella a message of "full support in the present difficulties". Later, a serious clash occurred at Hassi-Beida and Tinjaub between Algerian troops and Moroccans. Both states rejected responsibility for the incident and accused each other of incursions. King Hassan sent two special envoys to President Ben Bella in an effort to avoid having the situation aggravated, but tension continued to mount, Algeria alleging that its troops had reacted "forcefully" to a Moroccan incursion, while Morocco accused Algerian troops of responsibility for the incident. Four days after the Algerian capture of Hassi-Beida and Tinjaub, President Bourguiba sent special envoys to Ben Bella and King Hassan, appealing to them to avoid bloodshed and offered his "good offices". Both leaders accepted Bourguiba's offer, but on 14 October Moroccan troops recaptured Hassi-Beida and Tinjaub. The war was on.

Ben Bella sent a delegation to King Hassan in order to resolve the conflict, and proposed that both sides withdraw their troops to positions occupied before October 14, the date on which Morocco occupied Hassi-Beida and Tinjaub. Hassan

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1. Le Monde, 2,3, 6-7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13-14, 15, 16 and 17 October, 1963.
 2. For other sources on this conflict, see A.S. Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundaries: A Factual Background", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.I, No. 3, September 1963, pp.313-326; I.W. Zaitman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.III, No. 2, 1965, pp.155-173; G. Spillmann, "A propos de la frontière algéro-marocaine", Afrique et l'Asie,³ trim, 1966, pp.2-14; A. Bouteflika, "Document sur le conflit frontalier algéro-marocaine", Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, politiques et économiques, March 1967, pp.107-127; J.J. "Reflections sur le différend algéro-marocaine", Revue de défense nationale, 20th year, February 1964, pp.226-241.

found this unacceptable, arguing that the opposing troops should withdraw to positions held before the Algerian attack on Hassi-Beida and Tinjaub on October 8. The opposing views were irreconcilable, and fighting continued. Bourguiba again called on both sides to stop hostilities and proposed that a conference of foreign ministers be held on October 28 in Tunis. Offers of mediation also came from Emperor Haile Selassie, Dr. Nkrumah, U Thant, Premier Bitar of Syria, the Arab League and others. Bitar's offer was, however, immediately nullified when the Syrian Baath Party sent a message to the Algerian National Liberation Front "strongly (deploring) the reactionary and imperialist aggression which has been premeditated and ordered by the reactionaries who govern Morocco". In consequence, the Moroccan Government recalled its Ambassador to Syria. In Cairo, Ben Barka, then leader of l'Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, the Moroccan opposition party, attacked the Government, alleging that "the Moroccan Monarchy is engaged in an imperialist war of aggression against the Algerian Republic. The criminal hands that are in power in Morocco are armed, financed and led only by imperialists". Ben Barka indicated that the imperialism he was referring to was French. The Mauritanian President, Ould Daddah, expressed the hope that a "sense of unity and reason will prevail and a dialogue resumed in keeping with the Addis Ababa (O.A.U.) Charter, which condemns the recourse to violence to obtain claims".

On October 19, the Arab League deplored the conflict and called for an immediate cease-fire and a peaceful settlement of the dispute. A day later, the League's Council adopted an Egyptian draft resolution calling for (1) withdrawal of the opposing forces to positions occupied before the conflict began; (2) an end to hostile press and radio propaganda; (3) the setting up of a mediation committee composed of the U.A.R., Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, the Chairman of the Council's session, Nasir al Hani, and the Secretary General, Hassouna; and (4) the granting to the committee of the requisite facilities by Algeria and Morocco to enable it to carry out its task.

1. Le Monde, 13-14, 17 and 18 October, 1963.

2. Le Monde, 18, 19, and 23 October, 1963.

3. Le Monde, 22 and 22 October, 1963.

On the same day that the Arab League adopted the Egyptian draft resolution, an Algerian helicopter, with Egyptian officers on board, landed on Moroccan territory; and the Egyptians were detained for alleged espionage activities. An Egyptian demand for their release was rejected by the Moroccan Government,¹ which announced that it would not accept the Arab League's resolution, because it called on Morocco to evacuate its own territory. The following day, President Nasser said that his country deplored "the aggression against Algeria and the Algerian people."² On October 27, it was reported that Cuban ships were unloading Russian tanks at Oran, and that arms were also being unloaded from an Egyptian ship at the same port. In Cairo, the newspaper "Al Ahram" disclosed that the U.A.R. had sent a tank unit to Algeria, and that Egyptian warships were helping to protect the Algerian coast. On October 31, Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and recalled its Ambassador to the U.A.R.³

Meanwhile, Emperor Haile Selassie arrived in Morocco on October 19 for an official visit, accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Ketema Yifru and the Provisional Secretary-General of the O.A.U., Dr. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy. Algeria announced that it had requested an emergency session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers. On October 20, Yifru flew to Algiers for talks and returned with his Algerian opposite number, M. Bouteflika. The following day, the Emperor and the two Foreign Ministers flew to Algiers where the Ethiopian Monarch proposed a meeting between Ban Bella and King Hassan on neutral territory. After an initial disagreement between the opposing sides about where to meet, Emperor Haile Selassie proposed that the two leaders meet in Libya. This proposal was accepted. However, King Idriss of Libya informed his Ethiopian colleague that, because of "faute d'espace", Libya could not accommodate the Heads of State. The Mali President, Modibo Keita, then proposed that the Emperor and the Algerian and Moroccan leaders meet in Bamako. The opposing sides⁴ accepted this proposal, and the talks in Bamako ended in an agreement under the terms of which hostilities were ceased.⁵ In mid-November, the O.A.U. Council of

1. Le Monde, 22 and 23 October, 1963.

2. Le Monde, 22 and 24 October, 1963.

3. Le Monde, 1 and 2 November, 1963.

4. Le Monde, 26, 27, 28 and 29 October, 1963.

5. The terms of the agreement will be mentioned in Chapter VII.

Ministers met in Addis Ababa and formed an ad hoc Commission to handle the Algerian-Moroccan dispute. It consisted of Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Sudan, Senegal and Tanzania. Morocco and Algeria were requested to refrain from actions that were likely to jeopardise the Commission's success.¹ But it was at the Arab meeting in Cairo in January 1964, that Hassan, Nasser and Ben Bella met in connection with the conflict. During the same month, the five Egyptian officers detained by the Moroccans in October 1963 were released, and the Egyptian contingent sent to Algeria during the border conflict was withdrawn. In February, it was announced that the Hassi-Beida and Oum-el-Achar areas would be evacuated, that the combatants would withdraw to a distance of seven kilometers from the respective positions they had occupied on October 1, and that there would be an exchange of prisoners.

Ethiopian-Somali Dispute.

The Somali flag has five stars, each representing what the Somalis consider to be a "homeland". In 1960, two of these "homelands", Italian Somalia and British Somaliland, became independent and united to form the Republic of Somalia. When Somalia attained independence, its boundary with Ethiopia was based on a "provisional administrative" line that had been drawn in 1950 by Britain in consultation with Ethiopia and Italy. Attempts by Italy and Ethiopia (and the United Nations) to have the boundary delimited before Somalia's independence had ended abortively because of the irreconcilable views held by both sides.² Since attaining independence, the Somali Republic has been concerned about the other "homelands". These are the Ougaden and Haud areas of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Territory of the Afars and Issas (formerly French Somaliland). Naturally, Somalia's interest in these areas has not been viewed with favour by its neighbours. Somalia's claim to the Ougaden and Haud region of Ethiopia has led to several border clashes between the two countries, involving heavy casualties and destruction of property on both sides.

1. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, p. 15. The O.A.U.'s role in this dispute will be discussed more fully in Chapter VII.

2. For background accounts of the dispute, see Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism, Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1963; John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, London; Pall Mall Press, 1964; Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "The Background of the Ethiopian-Somalian Border Dispute", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.II, No. 2, 1964, pp.189-219.

In June 1963, following the Addis Ababa summit conference, Somali President Abdullah Osman sent a message to Emperor Haile Selassie saying that he would:

always keep the memory of the interviews which were held between Your Majesty and myself, and which were based on a mutual understanding and showed a common desire for the complete normalisation of the relations between our two countries. On our part, every action will be directed to that end. 1

In July, however, Ethiopia concluded a mutual defence pact with Kenya, which came into force on December 27 when it was ratified by both countries.

On January 16, 1964, the Ethiopian Government alleged that Somali aircraft had violated Ethiopian airspace on three successive occasions and warned that "necessary action" would be taken if the violations continued. On the same day, a joint Ethiopian-Kenya memorandum was submitted to the O.A.U. Secretariat denying Somali charges that the Ethiopian defence agreement with Kenya was aimed at Somalia. The two countries stated in their memorandum that their agreement was defensive and was not directed at any state, that it was in conformity with the U.N. and O.A.U. Charters, and that it was open to any state. Under the terms of this defence agreement, each state undertook to come to the other's assistance in case of external aggression.²

During the latter part of January, the Somali Embassy in Rome issued a statement accusing Ethiopia of "territorial violation and armed aggression". It was alleged that three Ethiopian planes and troops had attacked the Somali frontier posts of Gura, Djome and el-Maghed. The statement said that Somali planes flew to the border with Ethiopia, but did not violate Ethiopian airspace. The Embassy announced that the Somali Government was considering measures "to safeguard territorial integrity and guarantee national security". In Mogadishu, the Somali Foreign Ministry called a meeting of heads of diplomatic mission to warn that "Ethiopian intransigence can have dangerous consequences for peace and stability in this part of Africa."³

1. A.F.P. Africa, June 6, 1963, p.20.

2. A.F.P. Africa, January 20, 1964, pp.8 and 18.

3. A.F.P. Africa, January 23, 1964, pp.12-13.

In February, a serious border clash between the two countries occurred in which a number of soldiers on both sides were killed. U.N. Secretary General U Thant cabled to both sides that it was:

with the deepest concern that I have learned of the armed clashes involving troops of Ethiopia and Somalia and of the consequent deterioration of relations between the two countries. In the light of these circumstances I wish to convey my most earnest appeal for restoration of peace in the troubled area. The immediate cessation of hostility by both countries would be a normal demonstration of their adherence to the principle of resolving international disputes by peaceful means, a principle which is common to the U.N. and to the O.A.U. 1

Ethiopia agreed to a cease-fire, but demanded that Somalia discontinue its "territorial expansion". Somalia also expressed its willingness to cease hostilities, but called on the Security Council to reaffirm its "territorial integrity". Dr. Nkrumah wanted the dispute to be solved within a "forum of African unity". President Ibrahim Abboud of the Sudan appealed to both sides, "in the name of African unity", to peacefully settle their dispute. Moroccan King Hassan offered his "good offices" to help resolve the conflict. Soviet Premier Khrushchev advised both sides that the border conflict was not in their interests, while the United States expressed its "grave concern" and called for peace in the area. 2

Following these and other appeals, both sides ordered their forces to cease-fire. On February 15, at its second extraordinary session in Dar-es-Salaam, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers called on both sides to refrain from all hostile activities, take the requisite measures to end the campaigns against each other by the various communications media and to negotiate their dispute in keeping with the O.A.U. Charter. The Council also called on all African states with diplomatic or consular missions in both countries to assist in implementing the cease-fire. 3 On February 17, however, hostilities were renewed with each side accusing the other of having violated the cease-fire. Somali Premier Abdi Shermarke warned that his Government would appeal to the estimated 150,000 Somali nomads in the disputed region to "rise up" if Ethiopia continued its "aggressive policies". 4 Ethiopian Foreign

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1. A.F.P. Africa, February 13, 1964, p.7.
 2. The Washington Post, February 13, 1964; A.F.P. Africa, February 13, 1964, p.8ff.
 3. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, pp.19-20.
 4. A.F.P. Africa, February 17, 1964, p.12, February 20, 1964, p.4ff; The New York Times, February 18, 1964.

Minister Ketema Yifru said that, although his Government would never cede any territory in the Ougaden region, it was prepared to discuss with Somalia joint economic programmes for mutual development.

It was against this background that the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, at its second ordinary session in Lagos, from February 24 to 29, 1964, requested that both sides maintain the cease-fire, open direct negotiation as soon as possible in order to reach a peaceful solution to the dispute and make every effort to fully implement this resolution and report on the results of their negotiation to the O.A.U.

¹
Assembly. On March 24, in keeping with the Council's call for a peaceful negotiation of the dispute, Somali and Ethiopian delegations met in Khartoum under the Chairmanship of Sudanese President Abboud who told the meeting that Africans could settle their disputes by finding "African solutions". The Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Yifru, said that the conference was a "first lap" to further negotiations, while the Somali Foreign Minister, Abdullah Issa, expressed his country's desire to conclude "an agreement" with Ethiopia, which would not be a victory for either side, but a victory for Africa.²

The Khartoum meeting ended on March 30 with Ethiopia and Somalia agreeing to maintain a cease-fire and withdraw their forces to between 6 and 10 miles from the border. It was also agreed that a joint commission, consisting of representatives of both countries, would be appointed to ensure the withdrawal of forces, that the propaganda campaign would cease, and that direct talks would be resumed before the next O.A.U. summit. The Dar-es-Salaam and Lagos resolutions of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers were reaffirmed.³ In early April it was announced that the cease-fire had become effective, and that the opposing troops had withdrawn from the demilitarised zone established by the Khartoum agreement; and on May 30, the joint commission set up under the terms of the Khartoum agreement announced that its assignment had been completed. The dispute was therefore removed from the O.A.U. Assembly's agenda and left for bilateral negotiations.

1. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, p.27.

2. A.F.P. Africa, March 26, 1964, p.17.

3. A.F.P. Africa, April 2, 1964, p.28.

In June 1964, Ethiopia reaffirmed its mutual defence treaty with Kenya. Less than a year later, in March 1965, Radio Mogadishu announced that on February 19 a serious clash had occurred between Somali and Ethiopian troops in the Ougaden region, resulting in the deaths of four Somali and twenty-five Ethiopian soldiers. On March 23, the Somali Foreign Ministry announced that Somalia had requested the O.A.U. to appoint a commission to investigate the "grave situation" on its border with Ethiopia. Four days later, Somalia announced that it had proposed to Ethiopia that a joint commission of the two countries be established to study means of implementing the Khartoum agreement. In addition, the Somali Government wanted neutral observers in the demilitarised zone. Ethiopia agreed to the formation of a joint commission, but did not feel that neutral observers were necessary. ² Early in August 1965, the Somali Government requested O.A.U. Secretary-General Telli to restrain Ethiopia from its "hostile propaganda" against Somali. In November, the Somali Ministry of Information issued a statement to the effect that it was:

completely impossible for the Somali Government and the people of the Somali Republic to abandon the work they have been undertaking, which is that of liberating the Somali territories which are occupied forcibly by the aliens, and of restoring their dignity and freedom to the inhabitants of these Somali lands. ³

In June 1966, the Ethiopian Government complained to M. Telli that the Somali radio and press had continued the propaganda campaign against Ethiopia in contravention of the Khartoum agreement. In July, Ethiopia and Kenya concluded an agreement on joint military measures against "shifta" (Somali) raiders. Somalia ⁴ condemned the agreement, describing it as "aggressive and unjustified". On February 12, 1967, the Somali National Assembly passed a motion, calling on the Government to recognise with immediate effect, "Somali liberation fronts" in neighbouring territories and to give full support to these "liberation movements". In March, tension between Ethiopia and Somalia increased considerably when the Territory of the Afars and Issas was preparing to vote on March 19 to decide

1. Daily Nation, June 13, 1964.

2. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, March 1965, pp.256-257.

3. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, November 1965, p.396. A.F.P. Africa, August 6, 1965, p.29 and November 10, 1965, p.24.

4. A.F.P. Africa, July 19, 1966, p.5.

whether it wanted independence or continued French rule. Both Somalia and Ethiopia massed troops along their borders with the Territory, and the Somalis also formed a "Home Guard". It was believed that, in the event the Territory chose independence, Ethiopia would invade it to protect its railway link with the port of Djibouti through which about half of Ethiopia's foreign trade flows. In the referendum, the people of the Territory voted to maintain their links with France and thus prevented Ethiopia and Somalia from coming to blows.

Following these events, Emperor Haile Selassie and the Somali Prime Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, agreed, at an O.A.U. summit conference in September 1967 in Kinshasa, to meet at a later date, after preparatory work by their ministers, to settle their border dispute. On September 19, a Somali delegation arrived in Addis Ababa for exploratory talks. At the end of the talks, a communiqué was issued which stated, among other things, that the two states had agreed to set up a joint military commission to deal with complaints concerning violation of the Khartoum agreement, pledged to abide by previous agreements providing for an end to hostile propaganda, and agreed to take measures designed to remove conditions that adversely affected relations between the two states and to continue their exploratory talks at a later date in Mogadishu.¹ On December 1, Ethiopia and Somalia announced that they had discussed their border dispute in a "brotherly and cordial atmosphere" during the latter part of November.

In February 1968, the talks were resumed in Mogadishu. But apart from a most-favoured-nation trade agreement signed in March 1969, the two states have thus far not fully settled their border dispute. It should be added, however, that since the talks between Haile Selassie and Egal in September 1967, relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have been rather cordial. After the military coup in Somalia in October 1969, following the assassination of President Shermarke, the new Somali Government assured its neighbours that the "good neighbour" policy would be continued.

Kenya-Somali Dispute

Kenya is the other country with which Somalia has had a border dispute. The area involved, as was indicated earlier, is the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.

1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, September 1967, p.859.

In 1891, Britain and Italy concluded a treaty which recognised this area to be within Britain's sphere of influence in East Africa.¹ The situation remained unchanged until 1962 when Somalia and Somali leaders in the District requested that Britain decide on the future of the District before granting Kenya a constitution in preparation for independence. The British Government sent a special commission to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory. The commission reported that a majority of the people in the District chose to secede from Kenya and unite with Somalia. Secession was of course strongly opposed by the two major political parties in Kenya, the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union.

When Britain failed to allow the District to secede, Somalia severed diplomatic relations in March 1963. In early June, the Somali Foreign Minister, Abdullah Issa, arrived in Nairobi to congratulate President (then Chief Minister) Kenyatta for his electoral victory in the May general elections on behalf of the Somali President, Abdullah Osman. Kenyatta is reported to have said:

We hope that we can find a solution to the problem (of the N.F.D.). Both Somalis and Kenyans are interested in the wider affair of federation. We feel that when we have federated, the problem of boundaries, . . . will not matter much. 2

As has been indicated, Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a mutual defence pact in July 1963, which came into force in December. Towards the end of August, talks in Rome between Britain and Kenya on the one hand and Somalia on the other ended abortively because the Somalis insisted on self-determination for the N.F.D., a position which neither Britain nor Kenya was prepared to accept.³ In November, Abdullah Issa said that his country had decided to accept Soviet military aid because of the "unacceptable conditions" imposed by the United States. The Russian aid, Issa indicated, would amount to about \$30,000,000 which would be used to expand and modernise Somalia's army and to build an air force.⁴ The import of the Somali leaders' statement could certainly not have been lost on the Kenya Government.

1. For background accounts, see Touval, op.cit.; Drysdale, op.cit.; A.A.Castagno, "The Somali-Kenya Controversy: Implications for the Future", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.II, No.2, 1964, pp.165-188.

2. Uganda Argus, June 5, 1963.

3. The Times, August 30, 1963.

4. Uganda Argus, November 13, 1963.

In December, a wave of violence and killing by secessionists in the N.F.D. caused the Kenya Government to close its entire border with Somalia. At its second extraordinary session in Dar-es-Salaam on February 15, 1964, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers adopted a resolution calling on Somalia and Kenya to settle their border dispute peacefully and to refrain from actions that would aggravate the dispute while a peaceful solution was being sought.¹ Despite the Council's appeal, border incidents continued, "shiftas" conducting guerrilla activities against Kenyan security forces and officials in the N.F.D. Hence, towards the end of February, the Council called on both countries to open direct negotiation as soon as possible to peacefully settle their dispute and refrain from activities that might jeopardise the chance of a peaceful settlement.² In December 1965, Nyerere arranged a meeting between the Somali and Kenya Presidents in Arusha. The meeting was abortive, "shifta" activities continued, and in June 1966 Kenya severed trade relations with Somalia. In May 1967, however, the Somali Government announced that it was prepared to resume talks with the Government of Kenya without "prior conditions". It said that its policy in connection with the N.F.D. had "always been" to comply with O.A.U. decisions, calling on both sides to hold talks to find a peaceful solution to the border dispute.³

At the September 1967 summit conference in Kinshasa, the O.A.U. Assembly called on the two states to peacefully settle their dispute, and each signed a declaration agreeing to the resumption of talks. The conference selected Kaunda to mediate between the two countries.⁴ During the latter part of October, Kenyatta and the Prime Minister of Somalia, Mohammed Egal, met in Arusha, Tanzania where, under the Chairmanship of President Kaunda, they signed a memorandum of understanding, in which both countries agreed to "exert all efforts" to maintain good relations in keeping with the O.A.U. Charter and reaffirmed their adherence to the "Kinshasa Declaration".⁵ The two parties also agreed that their border dispute was not in the

1. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, p.20

2. Ibid., p.28.

3. A.F.P. Africa, May 2, 1967, p.8.

4. O.A.U. Report of the Administrative Secretary General: Review of Activities of the O.A.U. from 1963 to 1968, CN/212 (Part I), p.57.

5. See p.34.

interests of their peoples. Both undertook to prevent the destruction of life and property along their common border, to discontinue hostile propaganda against each other, and to encourage propaganda that would improve and strengthen relations between them; they undertook to suspend all emergency regulations imposed as a result of the border dispute, to resume diplomatic relations, to consider ways of encouraging economic and trade relations, and to appoint a committee - composed of Kenya, Somalia and Zambia - which would meet periodically to review the implementation of the points contained in the memorandum and consider measures for handling disputes between the two countries.¹

In a broadcast to the Somali people after the Arusha meeting, Egal said that his Government had two points in mind in pursuing a "good neighbour" policy:

Firstly, to make clear beyond all doubt that the people and Government of the Somali Republic had no intention whatsoever of expanding into, or snatching, territories from neighbouring people. Secondly, that the Government (intends) to prove that Somali inhabitants of the Somali territories under alien rule were responsible people who stood by themselves, fighting for self-determination and independence on their initiative and of their own free will. 2

Two days after the Arusha talks, the Government of Kenya announced that it would relax all emergency measures taken in the N.F.D.

So successful were the Arusha talks that the O.A.U. Secretary General could say in his report that Dr. Kaunda's mission "was crowned with great success and ensured the complete normalisation of relations between Somalia and Kenya".³ In mid-January 1968, Kenya lifted the trade restrictions that it had imposed against Somalia, and the latter reciprocated. On January 31, Kenya announced that it would establish diplomatic relations with Somalia at ambassadorial level, and on 21 February the new Somali Ambassador to Kenya, Abdul Ahmed, arrived in Nairobi. In February 1969, Egal said in Nairobi:

About 18 months ago, we started a venture because of the confidence we had in President Kenyatta. Our two countries are living today like good neighbours and we hope that further contacts will cement co-operation which will grow in the future. 4

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1. East African Standard, October 30, 1967.
 2. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, October 1967, p.881.
 3. O.A.U. Report of the Administrative Secretary General: Review of Activities of the O.A.U. from 1963 to 1968, CM/212 (Part I), p.57.
 4. A.F.P. Africa, February 28, 1969, p.3.

As has been said, the new Somali Government reaffirmed this "good neighbour" policy after the military coup of October 1969.

Congo-Kinshasa Crisis

As is well known, Congolese independence was followed by chaos, the secession of Katanga, the intervention of the U.N. and the assassination of Lumumba. This crisis divided the African states.¹ After the downfall of the Tshombe regime in Katanga, and that of Gizanga's in Kivu, Congo-Kinshasa ceased to be a source of tension on the African continent; but when Tshombe returned from exile in Spain in June 1964 and became Prime Minister of the Congo the following month, tension developed within the O.A.U.² Less than a week after Tshombe became Premier of the Congo, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers met in Cairo to prepare for the Assembly's meeting. The question arose as to whether Tshombe's presence at the summit conference would be a disruptive factor. King Hassan asked: "How can it be imagined that I will sit at the same conference table or attend the same banquet with someone who was a representative of rebellion and secession? How can I, Hassan II, observe a minute's silence in memory of the African heroes, while one of their assassins is among us?" Malagasy President Tsiranana, taking a different position, said that he (Tsiranana) was "a democratic" who respected "the internal affairs of other states". The Malagasy leader enquired: "Are those who criticise Tshombe sure that they themselves have done nothing to be reproached about?" "Where the sinister Tshombe sits", Algerian President Ben Bella said, "Ben Bella will not".³ President Nkrumah also announced that he would not participate in the same conference with Tshombe. Since Morocco, Ghana and Algeria would not attend the summit conference because of the Congolese Premier, there was no reason to believe that other states would follow suit. Faced with this situation, the Council appealed to President

1. For a more comprehensive account of the crisis, see Repe Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964; Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, London: Oxford University Press, 1965; The Organisation of African Unity and the Congo Crisis 1964-1965, (C. Hoskyns, ed.), I.P.I. Study No.8, Dar es Salaam, 1969; Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

2. For an interesting account of how Tshombe returned to the Congo and became Prime Minister, see The New York Times, July 25, 1964.

3. Le Monde, 16 and 17 July, 1964.

Kasavubu not to bring his Prime Minister to the summit meeting, whereupon Kasavubu¹ decided to stay away himself. This led Tshombe to denounce African leaders who, as he put it, had not understood that his country "is sovereign and independent". But he promised to continue the "African policy" of M. Adoula, and announced that "our Angola brothers" would find him "always beside them" in their² fight for independence against Portugal.

One of the major criticisms levelled against Tshombe was his use of white mercenaries, including whites from Rhodesia and South Africa, to quell a rebellion that had started in Kivu in May 1964 and later spread to Northern Katanga. Relations with Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi deteriorated, with Congo-Kinshasa accusing its neighbours of supporting the Congolese rebels. On August 14, 1964, President Massambat-Debat announced that an important arms traffic between Kinshasa and Brazzaville had been discovered, and accused Tshombe of having been responsible for this traffic. M. Massambat-Debat alleged that "Tshombe, manoeuvred by the Americans and Belgians, wishes to instigate a revolt in our country..." The Congo-Brazzaville leader displayed weapons of American and Belgian markings, which he claimed had been seized. Tshombe, in turn, warned the Brazzaville Government that he would take "extreme measures" unless that Government discontinued its assistance to the rebels. A spokesman for Tshombe added that "if (we) really wanted to take Brazzaville, it would take only two hours. We have all the means to do so, and it would be ridiculous for us to waste our time organising a plot. We do not wish to attack the sister Republic on the other side of the river. We hope that the Government of Brazzaville will understand this and cease its subversive manoeuvres against the Congo, manoeuvres supported by the Chinese Communists". In reply, the Brazzaville Foreign Ministry issued a statement which said that if Tshombe became "the Hitler of Africa, after having been its traitor, the peace-loving people of Congo-Brazzaville would rise to the occasion courageously and would take counter-measures". Burundi announced that it would no longer allow American and Belgian refugees from the Congo to enter its territory, and that this measure would be

1. The New York Times, July 16 and 17, 1964.

2. The New York Times, July 17, 1964.

applied to the citizens of any country that gave military aid to the Congo and Rwanda, as such aid constituted a "menace" to Burundi.¹

In the meantime, Tshombe alleged that Mali had issued a diplomatic passport to a certain Col. Pakassa who was reported to have been directing the rebellion from Congo-Brazzaville. Later, President Keita sent a special envoy, M. Dialate, for talks with Tshombe. After the Tshombe-Dialate talks, the Congolese Government issued a statement to the effect that "the Malian Government assures... M. Tshombe of its total support", and that Keita had told the Congolese rebels not to count on his support. In a counter-statement issued in Bamako, Mali "categorically denies what it believes to be an unqualified calumny". The Malian Government said that no special message had been sent to Tshombe, and that it would not support a policy which "day after day, turns its back on Africa". The "revolutionaries" were assured that Mali would never give up its "active sympathy" for the "Congolese patriots", while Tshombe obtained foreign troops. Tshombe, the Malian statement continued, had given assurances during his visit to Bamako that he would support anti-colonialism, and had outlined a platform of national reconciliation, which called for the release of Gizanga and other "nationalists" and an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Lumumba as well as the prosecution of those implicated.² Although Gizanga had been released, Tshombe had not yet fulfilled his promise.

Shortly thereafter, Congo-Kinshasa announced that citizens of Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi and Mali would be expelled from its territory. The citizens of these countries were immediately rounded up and sent by ferry to Brazzaville. Meanwhile, the Tshombe Government announced that it had requested troops from Liberia, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Nigeria and Senegal. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mennen Williams, stated that his country would contribute towards the maintenance of non-Congolese forces in Congo-Kinshasa. Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast proposed that the O.A.U. set up a special committee to investigate the Congolese situation.³

On August 22, 1964, Presidents Keita and Ben Bella requested an extraordinary

1. Le Monde, 16-17 and 18-19 August, 1964.

2. Le Monde, 10-17, 18 and 19 August, 1964.

3. Le Monde, 26 August, 1964.

session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers to discuss the Congo problem; and on the same day, a South African Air Force plane landed in Kinshasa with food and medical supplies which Dr. Verwoerd said had been requested by the Congolese Government. Two days later, thirty Belgian, French and other Europeans arrived in the Congo, stating that they were mercenaries, although the Tshombe Government had announced the same day that it had "no intention" of employing white mercenaries to fight the rebels. Meanwhile, a certain Alistair Wicks, a former Katanga mercenary, was reported to be recruiting mercenaries in Rhodesia; and another agent, Patrick O'Malley, was reported to be on a similar mission in South Africa. By the latter part of August, more than 200 white mercenaries had arrived at the Kamina air base. On September 2, a Col. Topor-Staszak said in Cape Town that he was there to obtain support for a mobile medical unit for the Congolese Army. Three days later, the O.A.U. Council met in Addis Ababa for an emergency session. ¹

Before leaving for Ethiopia M. Tshombe, who was also Foreign Minister of the Congo, announced that he would send all South African mercenaries home because his Government had "not appealed to South Africans to restore order" in the Congo. In Addis Ababa, Tshombe told the O.A.U. Council that his Government would do away with all white mercenaries provided these could be replaced by troops from other African states. Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania proposed an immediate cease-fire. Kenya's Foreign Minister, Murumbi, proposed that this be followed by the withdrawal of all mercenaries and foreign military personnel, and that the O.A.U. should establish a peace-keeping force in the Congo, which would co-operate with the Congolese central Government in bringing about a general amnesty for all political prisoners, maintaining law and order, disarming "various fighting groups" and training troops. ² The Ghanaian Foreign Minister, Kojo Botsio, proposed that a cease-fire be followed by the "neutralisation" of all Congolese troops, that a conference of all Congolese political parties should be convened under O.A.U. auspices, and that a provisional government should be formed with a view to organising general elections under O.A.U. supervision. ³ In the end, the Council appealed to the Congolese Government to

1. Le Monde, 20 August, 1964.

2. The New York Times, September 8, 1964.

3. The New York Times, September 7, 1964.

discontinue the recruitment of mercenaries for action in the Congo and to expel those already there; requested that hostilities cease so that national reconciliation could be brought about; set up an ad hoc Commission (composed of the Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Somalia, the U.A.R., Guinea, Tunisia and Upper Volta, under the Chairmanship of President Kenyatta) to assist the Congolese Central Government in restoring national reconciliation and to normalise relations between Congo-Kinshasa and its neighbours, Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi; appealed to all states not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo; and requested all O.A.U. member states to refrain from actions that would aggravate the situation in the Congo or worsen relations between the Congo and its neighbours.¹ Meanwhile, the rebels proclaimed a "People's Republic of the Congo" in Kisangani (then Stanleyville) with Christopher Gbenye as President. M. Gbenye was Minister of Interior under Prime Minister Lumumba.

On September 11, 1964, the ad hoc Commission made an immediate appeal to all the fighting groups in the Congo for a cease-fire. During its September meeting in Nairobi, the Commission was unsuccessful in its attempts to get the opposing parties together because M. Tshombe refused to sit at the same table with representatives of the Kisangani regime. To pressure Tshombe into being a little more responsive to the Commission's requests, a special delegation was sent to the United States to cut off arms supply to his troops.² As the Chairman of the Commission, President Kenyatta, put it:

We find that while the Congo is supplied with materials of destruction, the peace we intend to make in the Congo cannot be made. We are (therefore) trying to persuade our friends and those interested in the Congo to refrain from supplying war materials to the Congolese.³

At the time of President Kenyatta's statement, the United States was reported to have had about 35 military planes in the Congo along with Cuban pilots and more than a hundred paratroopers who were described as "guards" for the aircraft. In addition, the Americans provided training and military advisers for the troops of the central Government.⁴ The U.S. Government's reaction to President Kenyatta's

1. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, pp.51-52.

2. O.A.U. The Second Report of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo to the Administrative Secretary-General, p.1ff.

3. The New York Times, September 23, 1964.

4. The New York Times, September 23, 1964 and January 18, 1965.

remarks was that it would meet with the Commission's delegation, provided the Congolese Government was prepared to take part in such talks. The decision to send a delegation to Washington to cut off the supply of arms to the Congolese Government was described by President Tubman as "blatantly illegal, immoral and a travesty of the O.A.U. and its Charter".¹

The Commission also heard charges and counter-charges from Congo-Kinshasa on the one hand, and Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville on the other. M. Tshombe accused the two states of "actively" training, supplying arms to and harbouring those fighting against his Government.² Not surprisingly, these charges were denied by the Foreign Ministers of both Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi, who stated that refugees from Congo-Kinshasa were allowed to reside in their countries on "humanitarian grounds" and were not permitted to engage in activities leading to the overthrow of the Congo-Kinshasa Government. The Congo-Brazzaville Foreign Minister, M. Ganao, then said that, in order to have normal relations with Tshombe's Government, his Government wanted the former to discontinue its "slanderous allegations" by radio and press against Congo-Brazzaville, repatriate all Congo-Brazzaville nationals in Congo-Kinshasa,³ reopen the Fulbert Youlou question and extradite M. Collas who was alleged to have been involved in a "conspiracy" in August 1964 against the Brazzaville Government.⁴ The Burundi Foreign Minister, M. Joseph Mbazumutima, said that the Congo-Kinshasa Government should apply the principle of non-alignment stipulated in the O.A.U. Charter, and that national reconciliation and political stability in the Congo were a prerequisite for the normalisation of relations between his Government and that of Tshombe's.⁵

After the airing of these views, the Commission got the three countries to agree to co-operate fully in the implementation of the section of the Council of Ministers' resolution of September 10, 1964, which called on all O.A.U. member

1. Liberian Star, September 25, 1964.

2. O.A.U. The Second Report of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo to the Administrative Secretary-General, p.4

3. A military coup had deposed President Youlou in 1963. He was jailed, but later escaped to Congo-Kinshasa.

4. Ibid., p.5.

5. Ibid.

states to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation in the Congo or worsen its relations with its neighbours. The three countries invited the Commission to visit them and pledged to do everything possible so as to enable it to make the requisite investigation, leading to the fulfilment of its mandate.¹ The Kisangani representatives, who appeared separately before the Commission, stated three conditions for national reconciliation. Firstly, they called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign mercenaries and war materiel from the Congo. They emphasised that the continuation of "external interference" in the Congo would prolong the crisis. Secondly, they expressed the view that the problem of the Congo war was essentially political, and that any solution to this problem was contingent on a political solution being found. In this connection, they proposed that free elections be held, supervised by the Commission, so that a "popular government" could be formed. Before the holding of free elections, however, an "acceptable" provisional government had to be formed. President Kasavubu, whom the Kisangani regime recognised as the only legal authority, was to be free in choosing a leader for the provisional government after consulting with the "existing shades" of political opinion in the country. Finally, the Kisangani representatives wanted the Commission to visit the Congo as soon as possible for fear that delay might deprive the Commission of the opportunity to meet leading opponents of the Tshombe Government whose lives were said to be in danger.² The Commission decided to visit the two Congos and Burundi in early October 1964, but the trip was later cancelled because of the intensification of fighting in Congo-Kinshasa.

It was against this background that, when Tshombe wanted to attend the conference of non-aligned states in Cairo in October 1964, he was told that his presence would be inopportune, as the ad hoc Commission had not completed its assignment. Nevertheless, Tshombe went to Cairo, but was not allowed to participate in the conference. When Congolese gendarmes were placed around the U.A.R. and Algerian Embassies in Kinshasa, Tshombe was put under house arrest. Later, through Tubman's initiative, the Congolese gendarmes were withdrawn from the Embassies and Tshombe was allowed to leave Cairo. Upon his return to Kinshasa, Tshombe made a

1. Ibid., p.6.

2. Ibid., pp.6-7.

bitter attack against the Arabs for their support of UGbenye's regime and said that he would not compromise with that regime. Despite the O.A.U.'S request that all white mercenaries be sent home, Tshombe continued to make use of them. These mercenaries so successfully headed the drive against the Kisangani regime that towards the end of October 1964, Tshombe's troops were threatening Kisangani itself, bringing a warning from UGbenye that the safety of Belgians and Americans in his area could no longer be guaranteed. The U.S. and Belgian Governments asked President Kenyatta to intervene.

In November 1964, the Kisangani regime charged that U.S. planes were being used against it and repeated the warning about the safety of Americans and Belgians in its territory. President Kenyatta then arranged a meeting with M. Telli, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Attwood, and M. Thomas Kanza, the Foreign Minister of the Kisangani regime. During the talks, however, there were reports that Belgian paratroopers had been transported by U.S. planes to Ascension Island and then to the Kamina air base in the Congo. In a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Belgian Government drew the Council's attention to what was described as the danger threatening almost a thousand persons of 18 nationalities, who were being held as hostages by the Kisangani regime. All efforts to negotiate their release had failed, and the Belgian Government had taken "preliminary measures", in consultation with the Congolese Government, to evacuate them if this became necessary. ¹ Ambassador Attwood broke off the talks with President Kenyatta, M. Telli and the Kisangani representative on the grounds that the terms of the UGbenye regime were unacceptable. Shortly thereafter, the Belgian paratroopers were landed in Kisangani, and Tshombe sent a letter to U. Thant informing him that the Congolese Government had asked the United States and Belgium for "necessary ² assistance" to evacuate the hostages held in Kisangani.

The landing of the paratroopers touched off severe criticisms from most Afro-Asian states and the Communist bloc. On December 1, 1964, twenty-one Afro-Asian states and Yugoslavia requested that the Security Council consider the Congo

1. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Twentieth Session, Supp. No.2 (A/6002), pp.56-57.

2. Ibid., p.57.

situation as a matter of urgency. On December 9, Tshombe also requested that the Council meet to urgently consider the crisis.¹ At its fourth extraordinary session in New York in December, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers appealed to all states not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo so as to enable the O.A.U. to bring about national reconciliation, called on the two Congos and Burundi to co-operate with the ad hoc Commission in the implementation of its mandate, expressed disapproval of the American-Belgian military intervention in the Congo and requested that the Security Council condemn the intervention, recommend an African solution to the crisis and call on all states to co-operate with the O.A.U. in its efforts to solve the Congolese problem.²

There were reports that the Kisangani regime was receiving military aid from the U.A.R. and Algeria through the Sudan. On December 23, President Nasser said that his country did not "conceal but openly say(s)" that it had sent arms to the Congo, and would continue to do so. In a letter to the Security Council, copies of which were sent to Telli and more than twenty other African states, Tshombe described the action of the two countries as a "veritable declaration of war".³ Ben Bella admitted that his country was "helping the Congolese insurgents. In doing so, we hope to fulfil our duty to the Congo and Africa". The Algerian leader added that the Congo crisis "requires a political solution, not a military one... But any solution must fulfil three conditions to be valid: (1) exclude Tshombe; (2) obtain the agreement of the insurgents...; and (3) place the problem within an African framework, that of the O.A.U."⁴

During the Security Council debate on the Congo, the Foreign Minister of Mali, M. Dushman Ba, made the bitterest attack against the American-Belgian military intervention in the Congolese civil war. He said, in part:

The timing of the events shows that the freeing of the hostages was only a pretext for a criminal undertaking planned long before. The objective of the imperialist aggressors in that part of Africa was none other than

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1. Ibid., pp.57-58.
 2. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, p.55.
 3. Le Monde, 29 December, 1964.
 4. Le Monde, 6 January, 1965.

the fall of Stanleyville (Kisangani), the stronghold of the popular resistance to foreign domination. If, as the aggressors assert, the sole purpose (of the intervention) was to save human lives, how can it be explained that the United States and Belgian troops..... concentrated their action on (Kisangani) alone when everyone knows that other Europeans who resided in nearby localities were by rebound exposed to the danger of reprisals as a result of the fall of (Kisangani)...1

The press, Ousman Ba continued, acting under "imperialist orders", had often referred to cannibalism in the Congo in "giant headlines". Although cannibalism in the Congo should be condemned - "supposing that it ever existed" - it would be nothing compared with "the fullscale cannibalism that was involved in the destruction of human lives in the massacres committed by the mercenaries supported by the United States and Belgian paratroopers". Since there was "so much" talk about civilisation, the Malian Foreign Minister wanted to recall an event in the history of civilisation:

After twenty centuries of history, the way Herod murdered the children of Judea continues to move civilised mankind. What shall we say of those who, with cynicism and premeditation, slaughtered the African national hero, Patrice Lumumba; of those who were responsible for the death of Dag Hammarskjöld; of those, elsewhere, who did not hesitate to carry out the dastardly assassination of John Kennedy? Yes, they are the same imperialist forces of reaction, obscurantism, racism and, in short, of warmongering which silenced the great voice of John Kennedy, the fighter for freedom. 2

Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku, told the Council that his Government had attempted to prevent the matter from being brought to the U.N. and had proposed, instead, that it be handled by the O.A.U. If reason had prevailed, Wachuku said, the O.A.U. would have found a solution to the Congo crisis. Unfortunately, however, there was a "vocal minority" within the O.A.U. which had "arrogated to itself" the leadership of Africa.³ The Kenyan Foreign Minister, Murumbi, retorted that Wachuku's reference to a "vocal minority" was a "political mirage" because the Nigerian position had been "overwhelmingly repudiated" by the O.A.U. Council of Ministers in New York on 18 December 1964; the Foreign Minister of Congo-Brazzaville, M. Charles-David Ganao, said that Wachuku had participated in the Council's debate "solely" to play his role as "valet of imperialism and neo-colonialism".⁴

At the end of the debate, the Ivorian Foreign Minister, M. Arsene Usher,

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1. U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Nineteenth Year, S/PV.1171, pp.9-10.
 2. Ibid., p.10.
 3. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Twentieth Session, Supp. No.2 (A/6002), p.69.
 4. Ibid., p.77.

introduced a draft resolution which, among other things, called on all states not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congo, and appealed for a cease-fire in keeping with the resolution adopted by the O.A.U. Council of Ministers on 10 September, 1964. The resolution also demanded that the mercenaries be sent away from the Congo as a matter of urgency, called on the O.A.U. to continue in its efforts to assist the Congolese Government in bringing about a national reconciliation, and requested all states to help the O.A.U. in the attainment of its objectives in the Congo. This draft, with a minor modification, was adopted by 10 votes to none, France abstaining.¹

Meanwhile, it was reported that the United States and Belgium were trying to persuade Tshombe to adopt policies to reduce his unpopularity among the African leaders. He was advised not only to include in his cabinet men who were more acceptable to other African states, but also to grant an amnesty to rebels who were not charged with acts punishable under Congolese criminal code, to guarantee to all opposition parties the freedom to participate in the campaign for the general elections that were tentatively scheduled for February 1965, and to renew his request for troops from other African states to assist in quelling the rebellion. Tshombe resisted, and is reported as having told the Americans and Belgians that President Kasavubu was against a broadening of the cabinet before the general elections.

On January 14, 1965, Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote had talks with Gbenye at Mbale, Tanzania. A statement issued after the talks said that M. Gbenye had described the situation in the Congo to the three Presidents, and had expressed support for the O.A.U.'s call for the withdrawal of mercenaries, indicating his willingness to meet the ad hoc Commission on the Congo "to explain the cause and purpose" of the Congolese civil war. The three East African leaders "welcomed and sympathised" with M. Gbenye's statement, and President Kenyatta, Chairman of the ad hoc Commission, promised to put the question raised by Gbenye before the Commission.³ Nyerere said later that he was "very highly impressed by M. Gbenye.

1. Ibid., p.80ff.

2. The New York Times, December 23, 1964; The Washington Post, December 29, 1964.

3. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, January 1965, p.220.

He is as responsible as any African leader that I have met. He is committed to the same objectives of African freedom, African dignity and the O.A.U. as everyone else is...."¹

Not surprisingly, Tshombe issued a statement through the Congolese Embassy in Paris to the effect that his Government "remains firmly decided to continue exploring the chances of reconciliation" but that it would not accept "outside proposals" as to whom it should negotiate with, when those proposed "are already guilty of massacres, robberies, rape, vandalism and genocide against the Congolese people". Tshombe called on the "African interventionist Governments" to discontinue their military aid to the "rebels", adding that "the way to true national reconciliation was through the legal Government (of the Congo)".²

At the third session of the ad hoc Commission, towards the end of January, the Chairman indicated that his appeal for national reconciliation in the Congo had not been heeded because of the presence of white mercenaries in that country and proposed that a sub-committee be appointed to visit the two Congos and Burundi.³ The representative of Upper Volta wanted the Commission to meet the "legitimate" Government of the Congo, while the Guinean representative said that Tshombe's refusal to meet with the "nationalists" had made the Commission's task very delicate and expressed the view that the Commission's presence in the Congo would not alter the situation.⁴ Ghana was not opposed "in principle" to the sending of a sub-committee to the three Central African states, but felt that there should be advance preparation. In this connection, it proposed that representatives of the Congolese central Government and the "revolutionary leaders" meet with the Commission.⁵ Nigeria was not "altogether against" the Ghanaian proposal, but wanted the Commission to call on all O.A.U. members not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo and to respect the O.A.U. and Security Council resolutions on the Congo.⁶

1. Ibid.; The Nationalist, January 15, 1965.

2. Le Monde, 20 January, 1965.

3. O.A.U. Report of the Administrative Secretary-General: Political Matters, Part II (Nairobi, February 1965), pp.62-63.

4. Ibid., p.65.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p.66.

The Chairman then proposed that the sub-committee to the Congo consist of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana. The Guinean representative "completely and categorically" refused to have his country included in the sub-committee. However, the Chairman insisted, and the representative of Guinea acquiesced, but refused to accept the principle. The Ghanaian delegate also wanted to withdraw his country from the sub-committee. Again, the Chairman insisted, and Ghana accepted. The Commission then invited representatives of the Congolese central Government and the Kisangani regime to meet with it in Nairobi on February 12, 1965.¹

At the ad hoc Commission's meeting of February 13, the Gbenye regime submitted a six-point plan for national reconciliation in the Congo.² Firstly, it called for the immediate release of Antoine Gizenga and other political prisoners. Secondly, all American and Belgian armed forces and mercenaries were to leave the Congo. Thirdly, the Commission was requested to send a special delegation to Katanga to enquire into what was described as "deplorable" American and Belgian activities that were said to be aimed at bringing about a new Katanga secession. Fourthly, it was proposed that a special commission be formed to apply sanctions against those who were involved in the assassination of Lumumba as well as Maurice Mpolo, Joseph Okito and other nationalist leaders. Fifthly, the Kisangani regime, calling itself the "Revolutionary Government", proposed to enlarge itself to include "Congolese brothers" from regions that were "not yet free", but who enjoyed the "confidence" of the people. Finally, the "Revolutionary Government" undertook to organise elections in six months, following the enlargement of itself. Brushing aside the six-point plan of the "revolutionaries", the representatives of the of the central Government expressed the view that their Government was the "legal" one in the Congo and must crush the rebellion. They felt that national reconciliation was not possible before the end of the rebellion.³ At the Commission's meeting of February 25-26, the opposing sides were still far afield and refused to move to middle grounds. The representative of the Tshombe Government said that, as the O.A.U. Council of Ministers had recognised his Government as the legal one in the Congo, it would never sit at

1. Ibid., pp.67 and 73.

2. O.A.U. The Second Report of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo to the Administrative Secretary-General, pp.10-11.

3. Ibid., p.11.

the same table with the Kisangani regime. His Government, he continued, had a rebellion on its hands, which it intended to crush.¹ The representative of the "Revolutionary Government" also stated that his leaders would never sit at the same conference table with delegates of the Tshombe Government which he said was "illegal" and accused the leaders of the central Government of having assassinated Lumumba² and employed white mercenaries to kill Congolese.

As a result of the irreconcilable positions taken by both sides, the Commission was unable to resolve the conflict. Nor was there any success in improving relations between the Congo and its neighbours, Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville. In fact, Congo-Kinshasa's relations with Uganda also deteriorated when Congolese Air Force planes violated Uganda's airspace and bombed a school and customs post in February 1965. In a bitter attack on the Congolese and American Governments, Dr. Obote alleged that the planes involved were of American make, and that they were "being flown by mercenaries hired by the Congolese Government with American knowledge". Obote added that "if the Government of the United States (thinks) that (it) can rule the whole world violating territorial integrity and... attacking nations without provocation, then we must all resolve... that America is not a democracy, that it is being ruled by gangsters, that America is one element in the forum of nations prepared to disturb world peace". Late in March 1965, Ugandan and Congolese troops clashed along their common border when the latter advanced to within about five miles of Ugandan territory allegedly in pursuit of Congolese rebels. In early April 1965, Tanzania issued a warning that it would "vigourously repel" any attacks or violation of its territory by the Congo, and that it would aid any country which was a victim of Congo-Kinshasa's "imperialist-inspired machinations". In May, Tshombe sent a delegation to Obote, offering compensation for the damage done by Congolese bombers on Ugandan territory and indicating the Congo's desire to re-establish diplomatic and trade relations with Uganda. Dr. Obote wanted the Congo to "establish an effective administration across the border" before the resumption of diplomatic relations. In addition, Obote told the Congolese delegation that the recruitment of white South African and Rhodesian mercenaries by the Congo was "a

1. Ibid., p.10.

2. Ibid.

betrayal of African interests, including those of the Congo".

The civil war in the Congo continued until Tshombe's troops gained the advantage. But the Congo's relations with its neighbours remained strained until Tshombe's dismissal as Prime Minister on October 12, 1965. Relations between the two Congos then improved rapidly, and diplomatic relations were resumed. Towards the end of October, the Uganda Government announced that its border with Congo-Kinshasa, which had been closed since February, would be reopened. After General Mobutu's coup on November 25, Burundi recognised the new Government and resumed diplomatic relations with the Congo in January 1966. In August, the two countries and Rwanda concluded a mutual security pact in Kinshasa. Diplomatic relations with the U.A.R. and Algeria, broken off in 1964, were resumed in 1967. However, from mid-1967 onwards, relations between the Congo and its neighbours deteriorated.

In July 1967, a white mercenary-led mutiny threatened the Government of General Mobutu. The O.A.U. Assembly, at its fourth conference in September 1967 in Kinshasa, demanded that the mercenaries leave the Congo "immediately" and, in the event the mercenaries refused to do so, called on O.A.U. members to give the Congolese Government their "unreserved support and all the assistance in their power". A Committee was established to find "ways and means" of handling the mercenary problem. On October 6, the International Red Cross announced in Geneva that the mercenaries had agreed to be evacuated from the Congo. However, on October 31, the Congolese Government announced that fighting had broken out near Bukavu, the mercenary stronghold, between Congolese soldiers and the mercenaries. In early November, the Congo announced that its troops had captured Bukavu, and that the mercenaries were fleeing to Rwanda.

Meanwhile, there were reports of another band of mercenaries invading the Congo from Angola. The Congo lodged a complaint against Portugal with the Security Council and announced that its troops had the situation under control. At this point, General Mobutu demanded the extradition to the Congo of those mercenaries who had fled to Rwanda. The Rwandan President, Kayibanda, maintained, however, that the mercenaries be evacuated from Africa, as had been decided by the O.A.U.

1. Daily Nation, (Nairobi), February 15, March 29, April 8 and May 12, 1965.

In view of this disagreement, Sudanese President Azhari, who was Chairman of the O.A.U. Special Committee on the Congo, requested that Rwanda should not permit the repatriation of the mercenaries until his Committee had discussed the conditions for doing so. The Committee later met and adopted a resolution which, in part, called for the establishment of a special commission of inquiry to investigate the motives behind the activities of the mercenaries in Africa, particularly in the Congo; the payment of compensation to the Congo by the governments and organisations of the mercenaries for the material damage and political and moral injuries inflicted on the Congolese; and written guarantees from the mercenaries and their respective governments that they would never return to Africa or in any way participate in subversive activities designed to endanger the peace, security and stability of African states, or prolong foreign rule in Africa.

A few days after the Committee's decision, the French and Belgian Governments, some of whose nationals were among the mercenaries, stated that they would not accept responsibility for the activities of the mercenaries. General Mobutu insisted that the mercenaries not be allowed to leave Rwanda until compensation had been paid. Later, the Special Committee decided that the mercenaries be sent to the Congo for trial. But President Kayibanda maintained that his Government would abide by the O.A.U. Assembly's decision that the mercenaries be sent to their countries of origin. The Congo therefore severed diplomatic relations with Rwanda.

In early 1968, following the announcement by Chad, Congo-Kinshasa and Central African Republic that the three countries had formed a Union of Central African States and the Central African Republic's withdrawal later from the Union, tension developed between Congo-Kinshasa and Chad on the one hand and the Central African Republic on the other. When Pierre Muléla¹, a former Congolese rebel, took advantage of General Mobutu's amnesty and returned to Congo-Kinshasa from Congo-Brazzaville in 1968, he was executed; and this too led to deterioration of relations between the two Congos. Relations between the two countries were so embittered that, by November 1969, Congo-Brazzaville was describing General Mobutu as a "Hitler" and alleging that he had designs on Congo-Brazzaville. While denying the allegation, the

1. This dispute will be treated more fully later in this Chapter.

General said that if his country wanted to occupy Brazzaville the entire operation¹ "would not take us two hours". Although attempts have been made within the framework of O.C.A.M. to normalise relations between the two states, occasional verbal bouts are still engaged in.

Dahomey-Niger Dispute

During the October 1963 military coup in Dahomey which deposed President Maga, three Niger nationals residing in Dahomey were killed. The Niger Government protested, but Dahomey delayed its reply, probably because of the instability in the country at the time. Then there were rumours in Niamey to the effect that Dahomey was preparing to lay claim to the island of Lété² in the middle of the Niger River which forms the boundary between the two countries. Sovereignty over this island has never been fully determined: it is inhabited by permanent settlers from Dahomey and Nigerien nomads who periodically come there. On November 21, a Dahomean murdered his Nigerien wife and committed suicide. Nigerien youths demonstrated in Niamey and ransacked the homes of Dahomeans residing in the city. During the same month, the Niger Government began repatriating some of its Dahomean civil servants; and on 21 December, it announced that it would repatriate all of its Dahomean employees. There were some 16,000 of them. Dahomey retaliated by closing its border and blocking, at Cotonou, the flow of goods destined for Niger. President Diouri of Niger called on his people to "close ranks"³ in order to defeat all attempts at "subversion".

Meanwhile, press and radio attacks by both sides were begun and intensified. The two countries also mobilised troops along their common border. Later, the Niger Government informed the Government of Dahomey, through a representative of the French Embassy in Niamey, M. Cabouat, of its readiness to send a delegation⁴ to the border for talks on January 2, 1964; and a communiqué issued after the talks said that the meeting had taken place in "a cordial atmosphere". The four major proposals put forward by Niger were that (1) there should be free circulation of

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1. Afrique Nouvelle, 27 November - 3 December, 1969.
 2. Afrique Nouvelle, 20 - 28 November, 1964.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Afrique Nouvelle, 17 - 23 January, 1964.

goods and people between the two countries, (2) the negotiations should be limited to the two parties in the first instance, and then before an African commission, (3) the opposing troops should be withdrawn from the border, and (4) both sides should discontinue the radio and press attacks. Later Niger sent the Archbishop of Niamey, Mgr. Berlier, to Dahomean President Soglo for talks.¹ Shortly thereafter, a new Government was elected in Dahomey with M. Apithy as President and M. Justin Ahomadegbe as Vice President and Head of Government. After the elections, M. Ahomadegbe stated that his country was certain that the O.A.U. or U.A.M. would find a solution to the Dahomey-Niger dispute. However, M. Ahomadegbe expressed the view that the solution lay in "the integral and exclusive return of the Lété Island to Dahomey".²

In July 1964, the Dahomean President, Apithy, called on Niger to co-operate with Dahomey in the development of the two countries' "meagre, but complementary, resources" and "form but one country". Apithy said that language, geography and culture "have condemned us to live together", and that the overthrow of M. Maga's Government in Dahomey had been "misunderstood" in Niger as being directed against Niger and "a group". Maga had been overthrown because "the people wanted to get rid of a regime that was preventing them from moving ahead".³ During a speech before the Dahomey National Assembly in November 1964, Justin Ahomadegbe accused Niger of having "organised and led" subversion against Dahomey with the aid of "foreign powers". Ahomadegbe added that a contingent of Nigerien troops had been seen on Dahomean territory in October 1964. While expressing his country's willingness to meet Dahomey in any African or international forum, Nigerien President Diiori, in turn, alleged that "facts and documents exist which prove that, without perhaps giving its open support, Dahomey does not oppose the use of its territory for subversion against Niger".⁴

In mid-January 1965, Presidents Houphouët-Boigny, Diiori and Yameogo and Vice President Ahomadegbe met in the Ivory Coast in an attempt to restore closer relations between Dahomey and other Entente states, particularly Niger. At the end of the

1. Ibid.

2. Afrique Nouvelle, 14 - 20 February, 1964.

3. Afrique Nouvelle, 17-23 July, 1964.

4. Le Monde, 18 November, 1964.

meeting, it was announced that the four leaders had agreed "on all points examined". Upon returning to Cotonou, Ahomadegbe said: "We are convinced that the populations of Dahomey and Niger will have free access to the island of Lété". After further discussions at the ministerial level, Diiori and Ahomadegbe met at the border on June 15 to formally restore normal relations between their two countries.¹ The question of sovereignty over Lété Island has, however, not yet been fully resolved.

Rwanda-Burundi Dispute

Before October 1960, when a government was formed by the Parmehutu Party, the Watutsis, who are a minority of the Rwanda population, constituted the ruling elite of that country.² This change brought the Bahutus to control of the political system. With this change, tension developed within the country, and by 1963, about 200,000 Watusis had fled from Rwanda to neighbouring states for fear of their safety. From their bases in exile, the Watusis attempted to dislodge the Bahutus from power. On 23 November, 1963, Burundi border authorities intercepted a group of armed Watusis who were attempting to cross the border into Rwanda. In an effort to prevent its territory from being used as a base for raids against Rwanda, the Burundi Government requested that the U.N. consider the stationing of an international police force along the Rwanda-Burundi border.³ In December, a band of armed Watusis invaded from Burundi and got to within fifteen miles of Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, before being repulsed. This touched off reprisal massacres of Watusis residing in Rwanda. Accounts of the number killed varied from a few hundred to many thousands. Towards the end of December, U Thant sent his special representative in the Congo, M. Max Dorsinville of Haiti, to Rwanda on a fact-finding mission. M. Dorsinville reported that a number of Watusis had "no doubt" been killed but that accounts of killings had been "greatly exaggerated".⁴

1. Le Monde, 21 January, 1965.

2. For a comprehensive account of the crisis, see Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, London: Pall Mall Press, 1970, especially Chapters 1-9; Jacques Maquet, "Rwand et Burundi: Evolutions divergentes ou paralleles?", Afrique Contemporaine, No.25, May-June 1966, pp.21-23.

3. Le Monde, 1, 2 and 24 December, 1963.

4. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, February 1964, p.23.

The Rwandan Government protested to the Government of Burundi about the December invasion, but the latter rejected this protest. Burundi appealed to the U.N. and the O.A.U. to intervene so as to end "provocations" by Rwanda. Both Organisations called on the two countries to settle their dispute peacefully. In February 1964, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers appointed a Special Commission (consisting of Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon) to examine the refugee problem in Africa.

In early June, Rwandan Foreign Minister Lazare Mpakaniye alleged that the Mulelist movement had its headquarters in Bujumbura, the Burundi capital, and that it was directed by the terrorists who attacked his country in December. He continued:

The present collusion between the various movements in (Bujumbura) today proves to the world the truth of Rwanda's assertions at the time of the events of December 1963... through its complicity with the terrorists on Rwanda's borders, Burundi... is a centre of subversion against its neighbours... In the present circumstances, the Rwanda Republic wishes to affirm its solidarity with the great Congolese nation and hopes that this criminal subversion will not harm its economic revival. 1

In July, the O.A.U. Council recommended, among other things, that member states which had refugee problems should start (or continue) talks in order to solve these problems. In mid-August, Radio Bujumbura announced that Burundi had informed the U.N. and the O.A.U. that its relations with Rwanda were "very tense, Rwanda having once again violated the Burundi border.... (Rwandan) soldiers... crossed the border... on August 10, penetrated 15 kilometers into Burundi and massacred people in the streets". Burundi called on these Organisations to "take note of this fresh Rwandan aggression" and protested "energetically against these acts of brigandage..." Rwanda alleged that refugees in Burundi were preparing to attack, but the Burundi Government "categorically (rejected)" this allegation "as devoid of any foundation..". Burundi called on its neighbours: "to put an end to these excesses, which dangerously compromise peace in Africa and the achievement of African unity". In September, Burundi again complained to the O.A.U. that Rwandan troops had entered its territory and "massacred the peaceful inhabitants of two areas after setting fire to their homes!"

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1. Radio Kigali quoted in African Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul., June 1-30, 1964, p.91.
 2. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions of Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions, pp.29 and 41-42.

The Burundi Government said that it was prepared "to take any action it considers appropriate to deal with these acts of brigandage" and warned of "the regrettable consequences liable to result from the situation created in Burundi... by Rwandan nationals". Towards the end of 1964, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the Lutheran World Federation began moving some of the refugees to the Mwesi Highlands in Tanzania for re-settlement, in keeping with an agreement concluded between the High Commission and the Tanzanian Government. The situation on the border between the two countries was calm during 1965; in early 1966, however, Burundi again complained of border violations and the killing of Burundi citizens by armed bands (including Burundi refugees in Rwanda). The Rwandan Government replied that it had sent three warnings to the Burundi Government that Burundi nationals, who had fled their country following the "massacre" of Hutus, were preparing to return home by force. Rwanda protested against "tendentious" statements over Radio Bujumbura which made the world believe that Rwandans were attacking Burundi. In November 1966, the O.A.U. Assembly elected General Mobutu to mediate between the two countries. During the same month, the Rwandan Government alleged that Burundi was training and arming terrorists who raided Rwandan territory "with such ferocity that it amounted to war".¹

Through the mediation of President Mobutu, tension was eased between Rwanda and Burundi. As was stated earlier, the two countries and Congo-Kinshasa concluded a mutual security pact in August 1966. After a military coup in Burundi deposed King Ntare V on November 28, Rwanda recognised the new Government formed by Captain Michel Micombero and congratulated it for having liberated the people of Burundi from the "retrograde myth of a feudal monarchy". In addition, Rwanda assured the new government of its co-operation.²

Nkrumah and the Ghana-Guinea Dispute

When Dr. Nkrumah was deposed in a military coup in February 1966, relations between Ghana and Guinea deteriorated because of the latter's attitude towards the coup. Although Guinea was not alone in condemning the coup, it took the most

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1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul., August 1-31 1964, p.130; September 1-30 1964, p.146; December 1-31 1964, p.204; January 1-31 1966, p.443; November 1-30 1966, p.657.
 2. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul., November 1-30 1966, p.659.

uncompromising line. The Political Bureau of the Union Sudanese (the then ruling party in Mali) declared its "unswerving support" for Dr. Nkrumah and alleged that events in Ghana were "within the framework of the general offensive launched by imperialism to compromise the independence and sovereignty of our small states". In Congo-Brazzaville, the ruling Mouvement nationale de la revolution (M.N.R.) called on the people of Congo-Brazzaville to be "vigilant" against the "imperialist intrigues" that were said to be responsible for the downfall of Nkrumah. A communiqué issued by the ruling Arab Socialist Union in Cairo described the coup as an "imperialist conspiracy against the independence of the African continent with a view to maintaining it under foreign influence". The Union reaffirmed its confidence in the people of Ghana "who will continue to fight against all forms of imperialism, in spite of this accidental setback". The Algerian Foreign Minister, Bouteflika, said that his country had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Ghana, but added that "it is more than ever indispensable that the Africans should be conscious of the danger which menaces (them) and that, to confront it, they must close ranks and reinforce their unity". But it was President Touré who took the toughest line; he accused Britain of having instigated the coup "with the complicity of all European Governments". Touré continued:"... "But if (the British) think that they have succeeded, they are grossly mistaken. They have not drawn the lessons from history. We solemnly declare this to them and with more vigour than (the B.B.C.): the criminals who are responsible for the coup d'etat in Ghana will pay dearly in time". Touré called on his countrymen to consider themselves "in a state of war... it is in Guinea that we will arrest the criminal hand of imperialism which strangles Africa". "If a conference of African Heads of State were convened tomorrow", Touré declared, "comrade Kwame Nkrumah would speak for Guinea because Nkrumah is not just a simple African, but a universal man". Nkrumah, Touré continued, "can be considered as Head of State of Guinea and Secretary- General of the Democratic Party of Guinea".¹ Meanwhile Nkrumah settled down in Conakry and, for a time, was allowed to engage in radio war against the military in Accra.

During the sixth ordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Guinea,

1. Le Monde, 18 November, 1964.

Mali, Kenya and Tanzania walked out in protest against the seating of the delegation representing the new Ghanaian Military Government. On March 7, President Touré and Dr. Nkrumah, who had travelled to Guinea from China and the Soviet Union, went to Bamako for talks with President Keita. The result of the talks was not made public, but the Malian Foreign Minister, Ousman Ba, said in Paris, on the same day, that Mali would give the deposed President "total and resolute support".¹ On March 8, Touré announced that "very soon", Ghanians and Guineans, with the backing of "other African people", would crush the "military rebellion" in Ghana. In a special broadcast to Ghana, Nkrumah said that he would return "very soon". The Military Government in Ghana protested to the O.A.U. about Guinea's "interference" in Ghana's internal affairs and closed down the Ghanaian Embassy in Conakry. On March 10, Touré announced that he would mobilise 300,000 members of the Guinea Democratic Party (P.D.G.) and send troops to Ghana, "with the least possible delay", to end the military regime and re-install Nkrumah.²

While Ghana's relations with Guinea were severely strained by the downfall of Dr. Nkrumah, those with its immediate neighbours were considerably improved by that fact. Goodwill missions were sent to neighbouring and other African states to express regrets for the "wrongs and injustices" committed against them by the Nkrumah Government.³ On March 16, President Houphouët-Boigny warned President Touré that France would intervene if Guinea attempted to invade Ghana through the Ivory Coast, as the Guinean leader had threatened. Five days later, Conakry Radio stated that President Touré had no intention of attacking the "fraternal people of Ghana", and that military preparations in Guinea were designed to face a "probable imperialist aggression". About a week afterwards, the Guinean leader challenged General Ankrah to hold a referendum, supervised by the O.A.U., so that Ghanaians could choose between him and Dr. Nkrumah.⁴

During the latter part of April, the Government of Ghana told the Security Council that, while it did not object to Dr. Nkrumah being granted asylum in Guinea,

1. A.F.P. Africa, March 8, 1966, p.19ff.; The Times, March 8, 1966.

2. A.F.P. Africa, March 11, 1966, p.8.

3. A.F.P. Africa, March 18, 1966, pp.8 and 16.

4. A.F.P. Africa, March 18, 1966, p.8ff.

it protested strongly against his being allowed "to use Guinea as a base and staging-post for subversion against Ghana". Guinea's actions, Ghana charged, were "hostile" and were "likely to constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security". To this, Guinea replied that the Ghanaian complaint deserved to be ignored because the accusation contained in it was "a pure figment of the imagination".¹

Meanwhile, the position of the Military Government in Accra was being strengthened by recognition from important states in Africa and elsewhere. The United States extended recognition only a week after the coup, as opposed to the lapse of several weeks before American recognition of other previous military regimes in Africa. In mid-March, the Ghanaian Embassy in Moscow announced that the Soviet Government would maintain "normal relations" with the Military Government in Ghana.² On March 23, it was announced in Abidjan that the Ivory Coast and Ghana had decided on joint security measures. The level of tension was such that President Tubman sent special envoys to Presidents Touré and Houphouët-Boigny in an effort to lower tension.³ On April 7, a summit conference of the Entente issued a communiqué in support of General Ankrah's Government. Six days later, however, President Houphouët-Boigny said that President Touré had merely engaged in "some boastful talk", but that there was no tension between the two countries. He added that the Ivory Coast would not be used as a base for subversive activities against Guinea, and that he had forbidden further meetings of the National Liberation Front of Guinea, which had been formed during the latter part of March by Guinean refugees residing in the Ivory Coast.⁴ On April 27, the Senegalese Government announced that it would oppose any attempt to use its territory as a base for subversion against "an African Head of State" and would not tolerate the formation of the Conseil National de Liberation de Guinea. Guinean refugees in Senegal were threatened with expulsion if they continued their activities against President Touré. A day later, President Houphouët-Boigny warned that his country did not "wish to be considered as a base for subversion".⁵

1. U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Twenty-First Year, Supp. for April May and June 1966, pp.55-57 and 58.

2. The New York Times, March 5, 1966; A.F.P. Africa, March 18, 1966, p.17.

3. West Africa, April 2, 1966, p.393.

4. Afrique Nouvelle, 15-11 May, 1966; Le Monde, 6, 7 and 9 April, 1966.

5. Afrique Nouvelle, 5-11 May, 1966.

Late in October 1966, the Guinean ministerial delegation to the seventh ordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers was arrested in Accra when its plane landed there en route to Addis Ababa. The Ghanaian Government announced that the Guineans, including the then Foreign Minister, Dr. Beavogui, would be released when Ghanaians said to be detained in Guinea were released. Liberian Secretary of State Grimes, who was on the same plane, had initially tried unsuccessfully to secure the release of the Guineans. As Beavogui and his delegation were travelling aboard a PANAM plane, the American Ambassador to Guinea, Robinson McIlvaine, was put under house arrest because, Guinea charged, "The American Government is entirely responsible for the arrest of the (Guinean) delegation", since it was aboard an American plane that the arrest was made. P.D.G. members were exhorted to demonstrate against "the machinations of American imperialism and its puppets in Accra". When the Americans protested, the ban imposed on Ambassador McIlvaine was partially lifted. After the United States intimated that its aid to Guinea could not be administered with the restrictions on American diplomats in Conakry, Guinea expelled more than sixty Peace Corps workers. President Touré declared: "The United States is preparing for another Vietnam. Already the economic blackmail has begun and the (American) aid to Guinea has been reduced. We say thanks to (our) American contributors and to the Government of that country: keep your aid, we need only our liberty and our dignity". President Boumedienne sent a message of sympathy to President Touré, while Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika called in the Ghanaian Charge d'Affaires in Algiers to demand "the immediate and unconditional release of the Guineans". The Egyptian Government instructed its Embassy in Accra to secure the release of the Guineans. But where Grimes had been unsuccessful (he is known for his quiet and effective diplomacy, being occasionally referred to by some of his colleagues of the francophone states as "Mr. Cool-le Monsieur Tranquille") neither Algerian demands nor Egyptian persuasion had any chance of success. After the intervention of an O.A.U. "Wiseman Committee", consisting of Emperor Haile Selassie, Presidents Tubman, Nasser, Nyerere and Keita, the Guineans were released. Two days after the release of the Guinean Foreign Minister and his delegation, the Government of Guinea announced that Ghanaians residing in Guinea were free to leave

whenever they so desired. President Touré was reported to have offered his personal plane to Ghanaians who wished to leave, but could not obtain seats on regular commercial flights.¹

Although the political hostages were released, the war of words did not cease immediately, and Dr. Nkrumah was allowed to continue his periodic broadcast to Ghana over Radio Conakry. These have now been discontinued, but relations between the two countries have remained severely strained, principally because of Dr. Nkrumah's continued presence in Guinea and the refusal of Guinea to repay the £10 million lent by Ghana in 1958.

The Union of Central African States.

In February 1968, Chad, Congo-Kinshasa and the Central African Republic announced the formation of a Union of Central African States which was declared open to other Central African countries. President Mobutu, who was the spokesman,² indicated that the new organisation would be primarily an economic one. On 2 April, the Charter of the Union was signed in Fort Lamy. On 22 April, President Tombalbaye said in Bangui that Chad and the Central African Republic had withdrawn from the Central African Customs and Economic Union (U.D.E.A.C.), which consisted of the two countries, Cameroon, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville.

Towards the end of 1968, however, relations between Congo-Kinshasa and the Central African Republic began to deteriorate. On November 24, the latter did not send a representative to the celebration of General Mobutu's third year in power. Later, Air Congo was not permitted to land in the Central African Republic, and Congo-Kinshasa in turn banned Air Afrique aircraft from landing on Congolese territory. On December 3, Radio Kinshasa charged that the deterioration in relations between the two countries was due to the "machinations" of the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Charge of Co-operation, M. Yvon Bourges, who, it said, had told officials of the Central African Republic that French aid to their country would be discontinued unless they withdrew from the newly formed Union. President Mobutu told a public gathering in Kinshasa on December 19 that, during the tension between the two Congos over the Muléle affair, the Congolese Military Attaché in

1. A.F.P. Africa, November 8, 1966, pp.18-19.

2. A.F.P. Africa, February 6, 1968, p.10ff.

Paris, Col. Crespin Mussambay, had been advised that, in the event of a military clash between the two countries, "France would not hesitate for a minute to make its choice". The Congolese President said that President Bokassa was alleging that the Central African Republic was in danger, and that foreign troops had been massed along its frontier. "The Congo", Mobutu declared, "does not wish evil for anyone, but it is no longer afraid of anyone and fears no threats. The Congo, thanks to its Army, has the military means to resist anyone in Central Africa". A spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry later said that General Mobutu had made reference to "inexact facts".¹

On December 20, Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko expanded on General Mobutu's accusation in Brussels. M. Bomboko said that certain members of General de Gaulle's "entourage", particularly M. Foccart, were "au courant" of a "plot" to overthrow General Mobutu's Government and had pressured the Central African Republic to withdraw from the Union of Central African States.² Bomboko stated that in March 1968, M. Foccart went to Bangui and told President Bokassa that his country should not associate with Congo-Kinshasa because General Mobutu was about to be assassinated. Later, when tension developed between the two Congos over the execution of Pierre Muléle³ in Congo-Kinshasa, General Degant (head of the French security services) reminded the Congo-Kinshasa Military Attaché in Paris, Col. Mussambay, of the defence agreement between France and Congo-Brazzaville and added that France would have to aid its former colony in case of an armed conflict between the two countries. Finally, President Bokassa received M. Bourges in Bangui and was invited to visit President de Gaulle. From then on, Bomboko said, Bokassa "pretended" that the Congolese Government wanted to depose him. The Congolese Foreign Minister hastened to add, however, that he was not accusing the Élysée or the French Foreign Ministry of plotting against his country, but that it was "the entourage which seems to be playing an evil role in Central Africa".

Meanwhile, tension continued to mount between Congo-Kinshasa and the Central

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1. Le Monde, 21 December, 1968.
 2. Le Monde, 5, 10 and 11 December, 1968; Afrique Nouvelle, 2-8 January, 1969.
 3. In response to a general amnesty by General Mobutu's Government, Muléle returned to Congo-Kinshasa from exile in Congo-Brazzaville, but was executed, in spite of protest from the Brazzaville Government.

African Republic. On December 6, 1968, the Congolese authorities seized two barges and a training ship of the Central African merchant marine on the Congo River, claiming that the training ship had been obtained from the Congo, but had not been paid for. Shortly thereafter, President Bokassa announced that his country would withdraw from the Union of Central African States and rejoin the Central African Customs and Economic Union (U.D.E.A.C.). The Central African leader alleged that the Union of Central African States represented "blackmail and disorder", whereupon President Tombalbaye referred to General Bokassa as a "zealot" and "false brother" who had "illegally" come to power by means of a military coup.¹ General Bokassa, in turn, accused President Tombalbaye of having been responsible for the death of the first Premier of the Central African Republic, M. Barthelemy Boganda. General Bokassa alleged that the Chadian leader had had a bomb placed aboard the plane in which M. Boganda was travelling. Of course, Radio Chad rejected this allegation.² On December 10, 1968, General Mobutu said in Fort Lamy that a number of Congolese residing in the Central African Republic had been "massacred" and intimated that his country would take counter-measures if the Central African Republic blockaded Chad. A week later, President Bokassa stated in Paris that the Congo-Kinshasa had mobilised about 700 troops along its border with the Central African Republic. On January 1, 1969, Chad imposed customs duties on imports from the U.D.E.A.C., and the Central African Republic closed its border with Chad on the same day. On January 10, President Mobutu, during a visit to Chad, threatened the Central African Republic with reprisals unless it lifted the embargo on goods destined for Chad. A few days later, M. Bourges went to Kinshasa with a personal message from President de Gaulle to General Mobutu. On January 24, the Central African Republic severed diplomatic relations with the Congo. In mid-February, General Bokassa reopened his country's border with Chad.

Before leaving Kinshasa for a trip to Europe, including France, in March 1969, General Mobutu said that he believed that, with his receipt of General de Gaulle's

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1. Le Monde, 11 December, 1968; A.F.P. Africa, 17 December, 1968, p.5 and December 24, 1968, p.5.
 2. Le Monde, 21 December, 1968, 7 and 28 January, 1969; Afrique Nouvelle, 16-22 January, 1969.

letter delivered by M. Bourges, the "misunderstanding" between the two countries had been cleared up. The Congolese President added that all that was required was "the meeting of the two friends since General de Gaulle and I are (the leaders) of the two greatest francophone countries". After his talks with de Gaulle, Mobutu said that "there is not a single misunderstanding between France and my country; my presence here proves it".¹ But it took many months before relations between Congo-Kinshasa and Chad on the one hand and the Central African Republic on the other could be normalised. Through President Ahidjo's initiative, Presidents Mobutu, Bokassa and Tombalbaye were reconciled in Yaounde' during the celebration of Cameroon's independence in January 1970.²

The Nigerian Civil War

The remote and immediate causes of the Nigerian civil war have been fully treated in other studies.³ In this section let us examine the reaction of the U.A.U. and other African states to this conflict. On 1 June, 1967, President Nyerere told the National Executive of the ruling T.A.N.U. party that Tanzania deeply regretted the breaking up of Nigeria and hoped that it was still possible for the Nigerians to agree on some form of unity. Tanzania was a firm believer in unity and did not believe that a fragmented Africa could do as much for its people as a united one. However, Dr. Nyerere added, Tanzania also believed firmly that:

unity can only be achieved through agreement and not by conquest or coercion. Let us by all means encourage the people of Nigeria to maintain their unity. But under no circumstances should we encourage a civil war in Nigeria.

Eastern Nigeria is not a Katanga.. It is not a bunch of foreign capitalists there who, fearing the upsurge of radical nationalism in the rest of Nigeria, are using an African puppet to dismember Nigeria in order to protect their investments.

Nor is this a case of a feudalist tribal minority coercing or fooling a contented and unwilling Ibo majority into breaking away from the rest of Nigeria. Neither is it a case of a slave-owning Eastern Nigeria resisting an imminent emancipation decree by a Northern Nigeria Lincoln.

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1. Le Monde, 15 and 29 March, 1969.
 2. Afrique Nouvelle, 22-28 January, 1970; West Africa, January 24, 1970, p.120.
 3. For a background account of the crisis, see S.K. Panter-Brick (ed.), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War, London: Athlone Press, 1970; J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1958; A.A. Nwankwo & S.U. Ifejika, The Making of a Nation: Biafra, London: Hurst, 1969; R. Niven, The War of Nigerian Unity 1967-1970, London: Evans, 1970.

It (the problem of unity in Nigeria) has virtually been the case of the Eastern Nigerians pleading with the rest, and particularly with the North, to accept them as fellow Nigerians with similar obligations and rights throughout Nigeria. 1

On 3 June, Col. Ojukwu declared a state of emergency in Biafra and ordered total mobilisation. Nine days later, General Gowon said in Lagos that his decision to quell "Ojukwu's rebellion" was "irrevocable". On June 19, Dr. Kaunda sent his Foreign Minister, Kapwepwa, to discuss the Nigerian situation with the leaders of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda and called for a peaceful settlement of the Nigerian crisis; and the following month, Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta, Kaunda and Obote met in Nairobi and called on both sides in the crisis to settle their dispute by peaceful means. In this connection, they offered their "good offices" to the Nigerian Government. The East and Central African leaders said that their appeal was made on "humanitarian grounds and in recognition of the fact that resort to violence stood little or no chance of yielding mutually acceptable results"; and foreign states were requested to refrain from doing anything that would aggravate the situation or prejudice a peaceful settlement. The four Presidents emphasised that they had no intention of interfering in Nigeria's internal affairs; however, they felt that the Nigerian crisis had "serious implications" not only for Nigeria, but also for the African continent and the world. On August 11, the Zambian High Commissioner to Nigeria said in Lusaka that African leaders should not "sit on the fence and wait for the (Nigerian) situation to deteriorate to such an extent where it cannot be arrested". But at the O.A.U. summit conference in Kinshasa in September, the Nigerian Federal Government refused to have the civil war discussed by the Organisation. However, after the items on the agenda had been discussed, the O.A.U. Assembly adopted a resolution (sponsored by Liberia, Ethiopia, Niger, Uganda, Zambia, Ghana, Congo-Kinshasa, Cameroon and Sierra Leone) which solemnly

1. The Standard (Tanzania), June 2, 1967.
2. Gowon was promoted to the rank of Major-General by the Supreme Military Council effective as of June 1, 1967.
3. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, June 1967, p.796.
4. The Standard (Tanzania), June 20 and 26, 1967.
5. The East African Standard, July 10, 1967; The Nationalist, July 10, 1967.
6. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, August 1967, p.843.

reaffirmed the Organisation's adherence to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It condemned secession in any O.A.U. member state, recognised the Nigerian civil war as "internal", and expressed trust and confidence in the Nigerian Federal Government. It also placed the services of the Assembly at the disposal of the Nigerian Federal Government and called for the sending of a consultative mission of six heads of state to General Gowon to assure him of the Organisation's "desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria".¹ A Consultative Committee on Nigeria was formed, consisting of Haile Selassie, Tubman, Diori, Ahidjo, Mobutu and General Ankrah, the Head of the Ghanaian Military Government. When the Committee visited Lagos in November 1967, Tubman and Mobutu were absent, but General Gowon told the Committee that the two important conditions for an end to the civil war were the renunciation of secession and the acceptance of the division of Nigeria into twelve states. At the end of the Committee's Lagos meeting, a communique was issued which called on "the secessionists" to renounce secession and accept the administrative structure of Nigeria as stipulated in the Federal Government's Decree No. 14 of 1967. The Committee mandated General Ankrah to convey the results of the Kinshasa summit conference and the Committee's Lagos meeting to Col. Ojukwu.²

On April 13, 1968, Tanzania became the first country to recognise Biafra; whereupon Nigeria immediately severed diplomatic relations with Tanzania. President Houphouet-Boigny described Dr. Nyerere's decision as an "act of great political courage and high humanitarian consideration". The Malagasy President, Tsiranana, condemned it. So too did the Malian President, Keita, who warned that support for Biafra would "encourage the disintegration of Africa".³ On April 21, Dr. Kaunda accused the Soviet Union and Britain of "fighting side by side in helping to slaughter the people of the Eastern Region" and warned the Nigerian Federal Government that force could not solve the problem.⁴ Early in May 1968, the Gabonese

1. Nigerian Government, Report on the O.A.U. Consultative Mission to Nigeria, pp.1-2.

2. Ibid., pp.11-12.

3. Le Monde, 23 April, 1968; Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, April 1-30, 1968, p.1044.

4. The Nationalist, April 22, 1968.

President, Bongo, said that "(We) can no longer continue to sit by passively and watch genocide in Nigeria and the massacre of 10 million individuals". "It is a Utopia", Bongo continued, "that Nigeria, with 50 million inhabitants, can continue in its actual form. The Federal Government must grant sovereignty to the 14 (states) which it intends to create. Following this, these states could establish among themselves some form of economic co-operation". A few days after M. Bongo's statement, Gabon announced that it had recognised Biafra, accusing Federal Nigeria of "a veritable genocide with the object of annihilating Biafra and the Ibo people".¹

Before returning home from a visit to France, President Houphouet-Boigny told a press conference that he wanted to "declare my indignation regarding the inexplicable indifference, the sinful indifference, of the world to the massacre of which Biafra has been the theatre for more than ten months...One must... consider the problem between the Federation of Nigeria and Biafra in its true and only aspect, the human aspect, and find a human solution to it..."² In mid-May, the Ivory Coast recognised Biafra, followed by Zambia on May 20.

Meanwhile, preliminary talks between both sides in early May, under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat, led to the Kampala talks during the latter part of May. The Kampala meeting was, however, abortive because both sides disagreed on the conditions for peace negotiation; Nigeria wanted Biafra to renounce secession before a cease-fire, while the latter insisted on an unconditional armistice. The Dutch Government then announced that it would suspend the delivery of arms to the Nigerian Federal Government, and that other governments would be requested to take a similar action until the cessation of hostilities. The Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Pierre Harmel, later announced that Belgium had also suspended the shipment of arms to Federal Nigeria.³ Although Britain attempted to bring about an end to the civil war, its continued supply of arms to Federal Nigeria hardly placed it in a very favourable position to influence the behaviour of Biafra.

In July 1968, Nigerian and Biafran officials, including Gowon and Ujukwu, had preliminary talks in Niamey under the auspices of the O.A.U. Consultative Committee

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1. Le Monde, 7 and 10 May, 1968.
 2. Le Monde, 10 May, 1968.
 3. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, June 1-30, 1968, p.1099; West Africa, July 13, 1968, p.821.

on Nigeria. It was agreed that formal peace negotiations would be held in Addis Ababa on or before August 5. But attempts by the Committee to have both sides agree on a corridor for relief supplies were abortive because of failure to agree on where the corridor should be. At the end of July, the French Government said that "the bloodshed and suffering which the people of Biafra have endured for more than a year demonstrate their desire to assert themselves as a people", and that the conflict should be resolved "on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination". Not surprisingly, the Biafrans warmly welcomed the French statement, while the Federal Government accused France of "intrusion into (Nigeria's) internal affairs".¹

On August 5, 1968, Nigerian and Biafran representatives met in Addis Ababa for formal peace talks. Again, the fate of the negotiation hinged on "the unity and territorial integrity" of Nigeria. The Federal delegation proposed, in part, that both sides issue a joint declaration, agreeing to maintain the unity of Federal Nigeria; the Biafran representatives wanted Biafra accepted as a "sovereign and independent state". An unbreakable deadlock developed. On August 16, a joint statement was issued by the I.C.R.C., UNICEF, the World Council of Churches and Caritas to the effect that the civil war was the greatest emergency handled since World War II. Eight days later, representatives of Federal Nigeria and Biafra again met in Addis Ababa. This time, the shipment of relief supplies to Biafra was the central issue, and again the talks were abortive. In September, President Touré expressed his country's support for "Nigerian unity".² On September 9, General de Gaulle said that he was not sure whether the replacement of colonisation by federation was "always very good". France had:

aided Biafra to the limits of her possibilities. She has not taken the step, which ... would be decisive: the recognition of the Biafran Republic. For, (France) thinks that the leadership of Africa is above all a matter for the Africans. Already... there are East and West African States which have recognised Biafra. Others appear to be inclined towards this. For France, the decision which has not been taken, cannot be excluded for the future. ³

At its Algiers meeting in September 1968, the O.A.U. Assembly called on Biafra to renounce secession and "co-operate with the Federal authorities in order to

1. Le Monde, 1 August, 1968; West Africa, 10 August, 1968, p.937.

2. Le Monde, 10 September, 1968.

3. Le Monde, 11 September, 1968.

restore peace and unity in Nigeria". It requested that U.N. and O.A.U. members refrain from taking any measures "detrimental to the unity, territorial integrity and peace of Nigeria"; urged that relief supplies be allowed to get through; and called on the Federal Nigerian Government to declare a general amnesty and ensure the safety of all Nigerians so as to restore confidence.¹ President Tsiranana said that his country would not recognise Biafra because "we believe that African unity is possible first of all with the unity of each (African) state".² On September 26, Col. Ojukwu indicated that Biafra would continue to fight. Late in November 1968, President Bongo told a press conference in Paris that "(if) Biafra is conquered, Communism would be installed in the whole of Nigeria and Communist subversion would extend to neighbouring countries".³ In December, the Government of the newly-independent Equatorial Guinea refused to allow Red Cross planes to fly diesel oil into Biafra, in spite of assurances from the Red Cross that the oil was being used exclusively for the distribution of relief supplies. The Red Cross therefore temporarily transferred its relief operations to Dahomey in January 1969.

In a speech at Oxford University on February 16, 1969, the former Nigerian President, Azikiwe, referred to the O.A.U.'s role in the Nigerian-Biafran war as that of "another international debating society" and proposed that the U.N. Security Council set up an ad hoc Committee to end the war. The Committee was to consider such things as a total arms embargo, an armistice and the formation of an international "peace corps". The Committee would also make recommendations as to how both sides could be brought together for peace talks.⁴ The "peace corps" was to administer the war zones, demobilise the opposing troops and conduct a plebiscite to determine whether the people wanted a united or divided Nigeria. The Security Council was to assist in providing a census and convening a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution. Elections were to be supervised by the "peace corps" and the armed forces, and civilian rule was to be re-established. Dr. Azikiwe called on Federal Nigeria and Biafra to agree on a modus vivendi of a "confederal type" which would be

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1. West Africa, September 21, 1968, p.1117.
 2. Le Monde, 12 and 21 September, 1968.
 3. Le Monde, 1-2 December, 1968.
 4. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, February 1969, p.1326.

enforced by the Security Council. On February 17, the Federal Government rejected Dr. Azikiwe's proposal, saying that it was "basically the same as those put forward by the secessionist leaders" at previous peace conferences. "Well-meaning Ibo leaders" were urged to persuade "the secessionist leaders" to agree to a cessation of hostilities by renouncing secession.¹

When Houphouet-Boigny visited France in February 1969, General de Gaulle told him: "You are the champion of a great, just and noble cause, that of Biafra, for which we will support you without reservation". In mid-March, President Ahidjo of the Cameroon condemned the activities of "extra-African states" in connection with the Nigerian civil war. "What we find scandalous", Ahidjo added, "is that those states that are speaking about self-determination for Biafra have been insensitive to what is happening in South Africa, or in Namibia where Europeans, or foreign minorities dominate the populations, and that those states which speak about humanity vis-a-vis Biafra continue to supply arms which are used to massacre Africans". The Cameroonian leader said that it was "a bad thing to encourage secession", and that "the solution (to the problem) is a compromise respecting the integrity of Nigeria with more or less large autonomous units".²

In March 1969, the Ethiopian Government announced that the O.A.U. Consultative Committee on Nigeria would meet in Monrovia in another attempt to end the civil war; and on 16 April, Radio Biafra announced that General Ojukwu had accepted an invitation from President Tubman to send representatives to the Monrovia meeting. A Biafran statement described Tubman's initiative as "a step in the right direction since... the Committee's previous efforts had been doomed to failure because it had been inhibited by the partisan and un-African attitude of the O.A.U., which had acted as if there were only one side to the dispute".³ In his address to the meeting, the Liberian leader said, among other things, that a cessation of hostilities depended "mainly upon the willingness and attitude of the parties involved in the conflict".⁴ Radio Biafra announced on April 19 that the Biafran delegation had proposed, in part,

1. Ibid.

2. Le Monde, 22 February, 18 and 19 March, 1969.

3. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, April 1969, p.1382.

4. Ibid.

an immediate cease-fire so as to make possible a "meaningful negotiation" between the opposing sides. On the same day, Radio Nigeria said that the Federal Government had proposed that the policing of the East Central State (Biafra), after the cessation of hostilities, be by a predominantly Ibo force, that Ibos "are not to be treated" as "defeated persons", that Ibos "have the same rights in Nigeria" as all other Nigerians, but that secession must be renounced and peace concluded only within the context of a united Nigeria.¹ After three days of negotiation, the opposing sides could not agree on the terms for ending hostilities. In a statement issued after the meeting, the Consultative Committee said that it had proposed that both sides accept "in the supreme interests of Africa, a united Nigeria, which ensures all forms of security to all its citizens". A Cease-fire was to have been agreed upon and peace talks started within the context of this agreement.² The Biafrans later stated that they would have been willing to accept the Committee's proposal "in principle" if the words "united Nigeria" had been replaced by "a solution". In addition, Biafran officials said that they were not prepared to accept "the blanket O.A.U. concept" of Nigeria's territorial integrity, without discussion as to what this meant.³

During the latter part of May 1969, Captain von Rosen, a Swede, led Biafran air raids on Federal airfields. Although the Swedish Government disassociated itself from the activities of von Rosen, the planes used by him and his pilots were the MF-1-9-B aircraft which the Swedish Air Force uses for training and reconnaissance. They were reported to have been purchased in Sweden by a French company and taken to France where they were specially equipped for action against Federal Nigerian airfields.⁴ In July, the Swedish Government classified the MF-1-9-B aircraft as a war plane, requiring special permission for export; but early in September, it was reported that more of these aircraft had been flown to Biafra.

Meanwhile, at the invitation of Dr. Tubman, General Gowon and Dr. Azikiwe visited Monrovia in August for talks on the Nigerian conflict. A communique issued after the talks said that Gowon had briefed Tubman on the developments of the

1. Ibid., pp.1382-1383.

2. Ibid., p.1383.

3. Ibid.

4. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, May 1-31, 1969, p.1412.

Nigerian civil war, that the Liberian President had expressed his "continued concern" about the conflict, and that the two Heads of State had renewed their determination to bring about a resolution of the conflict. ¹ Upon his return home, Gowon said that "many things" about Nigeria had been discussed. In London, Azikiwe told a press conference on August 28 that the atmosphere was right for a "just and honourable settlement" of the civil war. The former Nigerian President expressed the view that the chances for peace were high "if those who rule Biafra would forget their puny selves and think of the children, the aged and the infirm and the people of Biafra." ²

On August 29, Radio Biafra denounced Dr. Azikiwe and alleged that his trip to Lagos and Monrovia had been "engineered by the British Government and financed by Shell-BP". A week later, Dr. Azikiwe returned to Nigeria and called on the Biafrans to join him "in reaffirming our faith in one Nigeria that is indivisible and perpetual." ³ In September, the O.A.U. Assembly called on both sides "to agree to preserve, in the overriding interests of Africa, the unity of Nigeria" and to cease hostilities and start negotiations. While Radio Nigeria referred to the Assembly's appeal as demonstrating the O.A.U.'s "impartiality and ability to recognise and pursue what is good for Africa", Radio Biafra objected to the clause concerning the preservation of Nigerian unity. Zambian Vice President Kapwepwe said that the use of the word "unity" in the Assembly's resolution was "premature", arguing that one should not "talk about unity before finding a formula for it". ⁴ On October 15, Radio Paris reported that General Ojukwu had informed Gabonese President Bongo of his willingness to start peace talks with General Gowon without preconditions. On October 20, Radio Nigeria rejected the proposal on the grounds that if the Biafrans were "seriously interested" in peace talks, they would have contacted the O.A.U. and not President Bongo, "an imperialist stooge with whom the Federal Government has no links". ⁵ Succeeding attempts by African as well as non-African leaders to bring about a

1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, August 1969, p.1498.

2. Ibid.

3. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, August 1969, p.1499 and September 1969, p.1530.

4. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, September 1969, p.1518.

5. Ibid., p.1560.

cessation of hostilities failed until Biafra collapsed in January 1970.

Having treated the various forms of border and political conflict and co-operation in Africa, we now return to the question asked earlier in this chapter: Has there been a change in or of system in respect of the O.A.U.? Has there been a change of the basic units and/or subsystems in actual and/or potential conflict and co-operation? While the foregoing accounts do not include all of the changes that have occurred in connection with the O.A.U., it is clear that they resulted in basic re-arrangements of the units of the Organisation in potential - if not actual - conflict as well as those in actual and potential co-operation, and brought about changes in the means of conducting conflicts. To suggest that these re-arrangements are permanent and static would be quite inaccurate. The case studies have shown us how fluid the interactions among the various countries are, co-operating or friendly states of one year - if not month - being arch-enemies of the next. Moreover, some countries have gone through a full circle in their interactions with each other, going from actual or potential co-operation to actual or potential conflict, and back to actual or potential co-operation. But even with this constant state of flux, as it were, there have been - and continue to be - basic re-arrangements of the units in potential (and actual) conflict, as well as those in potential and actual co-operation. Within a few months of the O.A.U.'s inception, Algeria and Morocco came to blows over their border dispute; and although the two countries have at least changed the means of conflict from tanks, guns and jets to negotiation, this dispute has not yet been fully settled; the same holds for the Ethiopian-Somali and Somali-Kenya disputes. The point to note here is that these states resorted to the use of force in their conflict interactions in contravention of a stipulation in the O.A.U. Charter to the contrary. And as these border disputes have not yet been fully settled, the possibility of a resumption of armed conflict cannot be completely ruled out, since a precedence for this has already been established. That is to say, the means of conducting conflict, as far as interactions between these member states are concerned, may not necessarily be the same as that stipulated in the Charter of the O.A.U.

In 1963, Morocco claimed sovereignty over Mauritania, but this claim has now

been allowed to die quietly; and both countries now maintain friendly relations. When Fulbert Youlou was deposed in 1963, relations between the two Congos passed from friendly interaction to conflict; Brazzaville-Kinshasa relations have still not been normalised to the pre-coup d'etat level in 1963. With the Watusi refugee problem fairly under control and coups in both countries, Rwanda and Burundi have discontinued their verbal bouts and are now on friendly terms. After the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah in 1966, relations between Ghana and Guinea deteriorated, while those between the former and the Ivory Coast and its Entente partners have passed from hostility to friendly interaction. During the Nigerian civil war, relations between Nigeria on the one hand and Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia on the other passed from friendly interaction to hostility; the situation has now been improved. Niger and Dahomey have gone a full circle in their relations (from co-operation to conflict, and back to co-operation) in connection with the island of Lété.

These changes have not simply been changes in the O.A.U., leaving the basic relationships between its members unaffected. On the contrary, as we have seen, they have subjected the Organisation to a state of flux in terms of the interactions between its member states. In terms of our model, a system in which interactions are characterised by such flux must have the requisite regulative mechanism to prevent or neutralise tensions that threaten its social or task functions. And this brings us to another point: the O.A.U.'s handling of conflict, a topic reserved for the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

From time to time a system may be faced with conflict situations; and in order to continue effectively as a going and growing concern, it must be in a position to resolve any conflict that threatens to have a dysfunctional feedback effect on itself. How has the O.A.U. handled conflict interactions among its members? Is the O.A.U. becoming more or less relevant in this area? Before answering these questions, let us recapitulate Professor Etzioni's model on conflict resolution. A conflict is resolved either by "encapsulation" or by "pacification". When the opposing sides in a conflict agree on certain rules (the "capsule") in their conflict interaction, the conflict becomes "encapsulated"; certain methods of conducting the conflict are legitimised, while others are prohibited. As is evident, "encapsulation" may provide only partial resolution; however, it limits the expression of conflict within mutually accepted boundaries. In the case of "pacification", the disputants are required to discontinue their conflict interaction, but are not limited or bound by any "capsule". Hence, the mode of resuming the conflict - should the need arise - is unpredictable. We may add, for our purpose, that how a particular system resolves conflicts depends, at least in part, on the type of system it is. If a system is a status quo one, seeking to prevent change, conflict is more likely to be resolved by "pacification", since this mode of resolution excludes conflict and would therefore appear to pose fewer problems in terms of change. However, "pacification" tends to reduce the system's adaptive ability because its regulative mechanism is designed to handle only conflicts that can be completely resolved and not those that admit of only partial resolution. If, on the other hand, a system is a dynamic one, conflict tends to be resolved either by "pacification" or by "encapsulation", depending on the particular conflict because the system's regulative mechanism is flexible. Changes, resulting from conflict, are not seen, as such, as threatening the existence of the system, but are tested against the system's basic principles and are accepted or rejected, depending on the interpretation of these principles at the particular time and not on any preconceived notion about the need to maintain the status quo.

Having made this analytical distinction between "pacification" and "encapsulation" let us now assess the O.A.U.'s attempts at conflict resolution. To do this, we shall concentrate on the conflict situations treated in the preceding chapter. According to Article III paragraph 4 of the O.A.U. Charter, the member states of the Organisation "solemnly affirm and declare their adherence" to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. To this end, the Charter provides for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which came into being in 1964 when a special protocol, defining its composition and conditions of service, was approved by the O.A.U. Assembly.

As we have seen, about five months after the founding of the O.A.U., the Algerian-Moroccan border war broke out. Upon the initiatives of Emperor Haile Selassie and President Keita, the opposing sides concluded the Bamako Agreement under the terms of which they agreed to a cease-fire, to establish a demilitarised zone, to call for a special session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers to set up a commission to resolve the conflict, to discontinue all public and press attacks on each other and to observe the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and of the peaceful settlement of disputes. In mid-November 1963, the O.A.U. Council appointed an ad hoc Commission to resolve the conflict; and in February 1964, an agreement establishing a demilitarised zone was concluded. It was announced that Hassi-Beida and Oum-el-Achar would be evacuated, that the opposing forces would withdraw to a distance of seven kilometers from the respective positions they had occupied on October 1, 1963, and that there would be an exchange of prisoners. The Bamako Agreement, which was later adopted by the O.A.U., "encapsulated" the Algerian-Moroccan conflict by prohibiting the use of force and hostile propaganda as modes of conducting the conflict interaction, and thereby limiting the expression of conflict to peaceful means. In his report, the O.A.U. Provisional Administrative Secretary-General, Dr. Gebre-Egzy, wrote that the ad hoc Commission was receiving:

the loyal co-operation of the Government of Morocco and Algeria in the fulfilment of its mission. While the settlement of the dispute remains under active consideration, it is gratifying to note that... the two Parties have faithfully carried out their pledge to observe a cease-fire, and the dispute is no longer as explosive as it was in November. 1

1. O.A.U. Report of the Provisional Administrative Secretary-General (September 1963 - February 1964), p.2.

When the Algerian Government nationalised the mining deposits at Tindouf (an area in the disputed zone) in early May 1966, Morocco protested to Algeria and brought the matter to the O.A.U.'s attention. On May 23, Morocco accused Algeria of violating the cease-fire agreement by sending troops to Markala, a village in the demilitarised zone. But instead of sending troops to the area, Morocco called for an emergency meeting of the ad hoc Commission to consider the problem. When the Commission met in Addis Ababa in July 1966, M. Telli appealed to both sides to settle their dispute so as to provide the African continent with "an inspiration and a model" for conflict resolution. But neither from this meeting nor from subsequent ones did a final settlement emerge. However, the disputants have avoided getting on the warpath since 1963, a strong indication that the "capsule" is holding well.

Since the Algerian-Moroccan experience, "encapsulation" has been used successfully in at least two additional conflict situations: the Ethiopian-Somali and Somali-Kenya border disputes. Under the terms of the Khartoum Agreement of March 1964, which ended the Somali-Ethiopian conflict of that year, the combatants agreed, among other things, to maintain a cease-fire, to withdraw their forces to between 6 and 10 miles from their common border, to discontinue hostile propaganda against each other and to resume direct talks before the next O.A.U. summit. In early April 1964, both sides announced that the cease-fire had become effective, and that their troops had withdrawn from the demilitarised zone established by the Khartoum Agreement. On May 30, the joint Ethiopian-Somali Commission, set up under the terms of the Agreement, announced that its assignment had been completed. The dispute was therefore removed from the agenda of the O.A.U. Assembly and left for bilateral negotiations. As has been indicated in Chapter VI, each side, from time to time, accused the other of having violated the Khartoum Agreement. But since 1967, when Emperor Haile Selassie and Somali Premier Egal came to an understanding at the O.A.U. summit conference in Kinshasa, the conflict interaction between the two countries has been limited to peaceful means. Concerning the Somali-Kenya dispute, the O.A.U. succeeded, after at least three attempts, in bringing both sides to the conference table in October 1967. The result of the talks, which were held in

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Arusha, was a Memorandum of Understanding which "encapsulated" the dispute.

1. For the terms of the Memorandum, see pp.133-134 supra.

In the Guinea-Ghana-Ivorian dispute over the downfall of Dr. Nkrumah, the O.A.U. was successful only in bringing about some form of "pacification" by persuading Ghana to release the Guinean ministerial delegation arrested at Accra air port, and Guinea, the Ghanaians said to have been detained in Guinea. The dispute has not been formally "encapsulated" or "pacified"; but through the initiative of Tubman, the level of tension has been lowered.

While the O.A.U. has had some success in resolving inter-state conflicts in Africa, its attempts to resolve intra-state conflicts have, on the whole, been unsuccessful. The principal variable here is that, while states in conflict inter se have generally been prepared to submit their conflicts to the O.A.U. for resolution, they have been very sensitive about having their internal conflicts resolved by the Organisation. The opposing states in a conflict situation have usually been willing to accept the "encapsulation" or "pacification" of their conflict. Hence, the requisite supportive inputs and intakes have usually been introduced to resolve conflicts of this nature. But whenever conflict has been limited to a particular country, the government involved has tended to want only one mode of resolution - "pacification"; in this case, the crushing of the opposing side. After the East African army mutinies in early 1964, British troops were called in to bring the situation under control. Later, the O.A.U., in compliance with a request from President Nyerere, decided to have Nigerian troops replace those of the British. Shortly thereafter, the Nigerian Premier, Balewa, criticised the tendency of African states to request foreign troops to settle their internal conflicts and called on the O.A.U. to devise "ways and means" of conflict resolution without foreign assistance ¹ "with its complicating consequences". In an editorial on whether or not the O.A.U. should devise means of resolving African conflicts, the Dakar-based weekly "Afrique Nouvelle" observed:

The question of an African peace-keeping force involves a passionate debate: whether this force could intervene in an internal uprising that deposes an established Government, or whether it should intervene only in case of an inter-state conflict.

If one examines the various African constitutions, one sees that it is proclaimed everywhere that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that the first principle of power is 'government by the people and for the people'.

1. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, February 1964, p.21.

It is therefore out of the question, in principle, that when the people demand a change of regime, a foreign army could intervene to prevent this.....1

The O.A.U.'s approach to "pacification" has, of course, not always been the same as that of the particular government affected by the dispute. As we have seen, in the Congolese civil war the Tshombe Government wanted to defeat the "revolutionaries" in Kisangani, while the O.A.U. ad hoc Committee on the Congo was more interested in bringing about reconciliation, even to the point of attempting to cut off the supply of arms to Tshombe's troops. Tshombe therefore simply ignored the Commission and, with Western support, continued his war against the Kisangani regime until it was defeated on the battlefield.

As one of the O.A.U.'s objectives is "to defend (the) sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence" of its member states, it has tended to use this aim as a basis for resolving the internal conflicts of its members; the effect has been to reduce the O.A.U. to a status quo system in handling conflicts of this nature. But, as in the Nigerian civil war, not all sides in a conflict situation are always prepared to accept the principle of the territorial integrity of the state as it exists. And the O.A.U.'s insistence on this principle prejudiced its mediatory utility as far as Biafra was concerned, in spite of the fact that this particular conflict (like the Congolese civil war) generated tension within the Organisation. If the O.A.U. is to be effective in preventing such tension among its members, its regulative mechanism must be made more flexible in the resolution of all conflicts both inter- and intra-state. In this connection, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and of the territorial integrity of these states, may need to be modified so that an intra-state conflict can remain an "internal affair" as long as it does not result in tension within the O.A.U. Once tension is generated by an intra-state conflict, the particular conflict should no longer be regarded as an "internal affair", but as an intra-O.A.U. one, allowing the Organisation to resolve it either by "encapsulation" or "pacification", depending on the particular conflict. The assumption here, of course, is that the tension generated cannot be neutralised without a resolution of the particular conflict. Moreover, in order to bring about a "pacification" or "encapsulation" of an intra-state conflict, the O.A.U. must maintain a sufficiently neutral mediatory or

1. Afrique Nouvelle, 21 ~~and~~ 27 February, 1964. The translation is mine.

conciliatory role. It is not usual for both sides to a conflict to accept the mediation of a third party who is firmly committed to one side.

It should be noted, of course, that not all inter- or intra-state conflicts in Africa are resolved within the framework of the O.A.U. Indeed, conflicts involving Entente and O.C.A.M. members tend to be resolved by those subsystems with, at times, direct action by France. In the Dahomey-Niger dispute of 1963/64, the French Embassy in Niamey and the Governments of the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta mediated. When President Leon M'ba of Gabon was deposed by the army in February 1964, France intervened militarily to re-install him. During the quarrel between the two Congos over the execution of Pierre Muléle in Congo-Kinshasa in 1968, France reminded the Kinshasa Government of the Franco-Congo-Brazzaville defence agreement. The import of this reminder was certainly not lost on General Mobutu's Government. When tension developed between Congo-Kinshasa and Chad on the one hand and the Central African Republic on the other over the formation of the proposed Union of Central African States, O.C.A.M. and the French Government intervened to reduce the level of tension. There is still a French contingent in Chad participating in military operations against rebels. It should be added, in this connection, that France has security agreements with many of its former African territories.

Another subsystem of the O.A.U. in which conflict tends to be resolved is the O.E.R.S., composed of Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Mauritania. In this organisation, Mauritanian President Ould Daddah has generally taken the initiative in reducing the level of tension. In mid-November 1965, the President of the Guinean National Assembly M. Leon Maka, accused the Governments of France, the Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta of complicity in a plot to overthrow President Toure. M. Maka said that it was "established, without possible discussion, that, during the month of July 1965, Houphouet-Boigny gathered around himself in Paris... his handymen, namely Haman Diori, Maurice Yameogo (and) Moise Tshombe". It was during this meeting, Maka alleged, that "the third plot against Guinea" was engineered. M. Maka continued, "contacts were made with MM. Triboulet and Jacquinot, both of whom are ministers in the French Government". Others said to have been implicated in the "plot" were the former Guinean Minister of Education, Jean Faraguay, the former Minister of Information, Camara Bengali and a certain Mamadou Touré, who was said

to be the "chef de la subversion". "These accusations are so grave" President Yameogo declared, "that they harm the Organisation of African Unity". Meanwhile, Guinea lodged a formal complaint with the O.A.U. against the Ivory Coast (which denied the charge), closed its Embassy in Paris and asked the French Government to close its Embassy in Conakry. Not surprisingly, all the governments accused of this "plot" denied it.¹ By mid-1966, President Touré had included Senegal among those countries seeking to depose him. The Senegalese Government denied Touré's allegation and announced that bilateral co-operation between the two countries would be discontinued.² In January 1967, Guinea announced that it had suspended relations with the Inter-State Committee for the Development of the Senegal River (now the O.E.R.S.) until other members pledged not to allow foreign powers to interfere with the "brotherly relations" of the organisation. Touré said that he could not co-operate with Senghor as long as the latter's attitude was determined not by "the defence of African and Senegalese interests, but by French policy towards African countries". The Guinean leader added that whenever his country's relations with France were "excellent", its relations with Senegal were also "excellent"; but each time Franco-Guinean relations were "bad", Senegal "immediately aligns herself with the French position!"³

Relations between the two countries continued to be strained until September 1967, when President Ould Daddah took the initiative to reconcile the differences between them. During his speech at the eighth annual conference of the P.D.G. (the Guinea Democratic Party) in September/October, President Touré stated, in part, that his country was prepared to resume co-operation with Senegal and the Senegal River Inter-State Committee. By November, Presidents Touré and Senghor had been sufficiently reconciled to attend the summit conference of the Inter-State Committee in Bamako where they met privately, during the conference, to settle their dispute.⁴ Upon his return home after the summit conference, Touré sent a telegram to his Senegalese colleague, assuring him of his "warm and fraternal sentiments" and his desire to work for political, economic and cultural co-operation between "our two nations, our two

1. Le Monde, 17, 18 and 24 November, 1965.
2. Africa Research Bulletin, Pol., Soc. and Cul. Series, June 1966. p.568.
3. Africa Research Bulletin, Eco., Financial and Tech. Series, January 15-February 14, 1967, pp.669-670.
4. Le Monde, 16 May, 1967; Afrique Nouvelle, 5-11 October and 9-15 November, 1967.

states and our two parties".¹ In his reply, President Senghor said that he was happy to have friendly relations re-established with the Guinean leader and expressed his willingness to discuss "questions of interest" to their two countries.² Meanwhile, steps were also taken to normalise relations with France. But relations with the Ivory Coast remained strained.

After the November 1968 coup that deposed President Keita, the O.E.R.S. became somewhat dysfunctional as a result of strained relations between Guinea and Mali. Again, President Ould Daddah sought to normalise relations. Towards the end of July 1969, he made a brief visit to Guinea where he and President Touré issued a joint communiqué in which they reaffirmed their adherence to the treaty of the O.E.R.S. and expressed the hope that the organisation would continue to function.³ On the same day that the Mauritanian President left for Conakry, his Foreign Minister, M. Hamdi Ould Mouknass, received the Senegalese Foreign Minister, M. Karim Gaye, in Nouakchott for talks on the functioning of the O.E.R.S. A joint communiqué issued after the talks said that the two states remained firmly attached to the organisation and would work towards "its consolidation".⁴ Co-incident with the official visit of the Senegalese Foreign Minister to Mauritania was the "private visit" of his Guinean counterpart, M. Saifoulaye Diallo, to the same country.⁵ In September 1969, relations between Guinea and Mali began to improve. When Guinea announced on September 2 that one of its gun boats had been attacked by Portuguese forces on August 27 near Guinea-Bissau, Mali declared its solidarity with Guinea; and President Touré sent a message of thanks to the Malian Head of State, Lt. Traore. Later, Lt. Traore stated that the people of Mali were "proud to say that the misunderstanding and manifestations of intolerance that had marred our relations with our neighbours have now disappeared, thus clearing the way for loyal and sincere co-operation".⁶

1. Afrique Nouvelle, 16-22 November, 1967.

2. Ibid.

3. Afrique Nouvelle, 31 July - 6 August and 7 - 13 August, 1969.

4. Afrique Nouvelle, 7 - 13 August, 1969.

5. Afrique Nouvelle, 14 - 20 August, 1969.

6. Afrique Nouvelle, 2 - 8 October, 1969.

In October, Touré sent his Minister for Upper Guinea, M. Barry Sorrey, to Bamako with a special message for Lt. Traore. Radio Mali reported that, during M. Sorrey's visit, "concrete measures" were taken. The existing relations between the two countries were said to have been reaffirmed and recommendations, "tending to reinforce the O.E.R.S. and the O.A.U.", adopted.¹

Although the O.A.U. has not been as successful in resolving intra-state conflicts as it has been in inter-state ones, its lack of success in the former does not necessarily detract from its utility as an organisation capable of resolving intra-state conflicts. The governments of member states are, understandably, determined to show that they exercise effective control in their respective countries. Hence, there has been a tendency to prevent the Organisation from mustering supportive inputs and intakes that would result in anything other than "pacification". What does - and will continue to - detract from the Organisation's ability to resolve conflict is the tendency to have disputes resolved within the various subsystems and, at times, with supportive inputs from certain environmental components. This is particularly so in connection with O.C.A.M. and France. And as the subsystems (and environmental components) become more and more relevant in a particular area, the system itself becomes less so. Restated, one can say that as the various African sub-groupings and certain non-O.A.U. states have become more and more relevant in conflict resolution, the O.A.U. itself has become less so. As will be demonstrated in Part III, this is particularly true in economic matters.

1. Afrique Nouvelle, 30 October - 5 November and 6-12 November, 1969.

PART III

THE ECONOMIC SPHERE OF INTERACTION

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

On the African continent, the hope of being able to pool resources for economic development has been principally responsible for the formation of various sub-regional groupings. In fact, one of the objectives of the O.A.U. is to bring about such economic co-operation among its members; in practice, however, the African states have relied not on the O.A.U., but on its various informal subsystems and on the Economic Commission for Africa in matters relating to economic and trade co-operation. In this chapter, we will treat two of the more successful sub-regional groupings in Africa: the East African Community and the Central African Customs and Economic Union. Both of these sub-regional groupings have their roots in the pre-independence era and, in spite of some difficulties, have continued to function. Our concern here is not to assess economic developments in these sub-regional groupings as such, (this has already been done in other studies),¹ but to examine how their members have tried to maintain them and the implication this has for the O.A.U.

East African Economic Co-operation

The combined population of the thirteen countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Madagascar, Mauritius, Zambia, Somalia, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho) in the E.C.A.'s proposed Economic Community of Eastern Africa is about 70 million; and the area is approximately 2.4 million square miles. The G.N.P. is estimated at more than \$4 billion. In the entire area, however, the only truly functional economic organisation is the East African Community which consists of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Community has its roots in the colonial period when the three countries were under British rule. As far back as 1917, Kenya and Uganda began trading freely in domestically produced goods and merged their customs authorities. Two years later, the East African Currency Board was established with

1. See, for example, B. van Arkadie, et.al., "The East African Economies", in The Economies of Africa (ed. P. Robson and D.A. Lury) London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969, pp.316-383; Philip Ndegwa, The Common Market and Development in East Africa, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1965; Joseph S. Nye Jnr., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration, London, Oxford University Press, 1966; D. Walker, Economic Growth in East Africa (an Inaugural Lecture delivered at University of Exeter, October 18 1963); Peter Robson, "Economic Integration in Equatorial Africa" in African Integration and Disintegration, (ed. A. Hazelwood), London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.46ff; also J. de Dreux -Brézé, Le Problème du Regroupement en Afrique Equatoriale, Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1968.

headquarters in London. In 1923, after Tanzania (Tanganyika) had become a mandated territory under British administration, it was agreed that local products be freely exchanged among the three countries. In 1927, foreign imported commodities were added to the list with the agreement that the customs revenue collected on such commodities be credited to the consuming partner. The East African High Commission was established in 1947/1948, and Tanzania's customs department was merged with the others in 1949. In 1961, the High Commission was transformed into the East African Common Services Organisation. Over the years, the economic interaction among the three countries increased so that, by the early 1960's, they had adopted common external tariffs and integrated transport, communications and banking. Of the three member states, Kenya gained the most from industrial development because of the lack of a comprehensive development plan, because of the concentration of white settlers in Kenya, and because a majority of import-substitution industries were in Nairobi. A. F. Ewing asserts that ¹, of the 474 companies registered in East Africa by 1958, 404 were in Kenya. In addition, the headquarters of the Common Services were also in Kenya.

In theoretical terms, units will continue to interact regularly within a system (or subsystem) provided they are - or believe they are - in a position to influence the behaviour of the system. Restated in terms of an economic union, the member countries of a union will continue to co-operate within its framework, provided they are - or believe they are - receiving benefits from the union that are at least concomitant with their contributions. Hence in 1961, Tanzania (Tanganyika) withdrew from the East African Navy, formed in 1950 to replace the Kenya Royal Volunteer Service, because it was based at Mombasa, limiting its effectiveness as far as Tanzania was concerned and because of the problems involved in defence co-operation between an independent Tanzania and Kenya which was then a colony. When one considers the fact that Tanzania did not also withdraw from the Common Services and customs union, then one may also conclude that Tanzania's withdrawal from the East African Navy was partly designed to show its dissatisfaction with the imbalance in the various spheres of interaction, particularly the economic sphere. But Tanzania was not alone;

1. Industry in Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p.107.

in 1963, Uganda withdrew from the East African Tourist Travel Association on the grounds that its share of the tourist revenue was far too small. Early in April 1964, there were rumours that Tanzania was about to withdraw from the Common Services and Common Market. Shortly thereafter, Presidents Nyerere, Obote and Kenyatta met in Nairobi for talks on "problems concerning the East African area"; and, upon returning to Kampala, Obote said that the meeting had been convened to discuss Tanzania's proposals to redress its trade deficit with its partners. The Uganda leader stated that the decision had been taken in January 1964 to form a special committee which would examine the problems of the Common Market. In March 1964, Tanzania had put forward "certain proposals", and the April talks in Nairobi had been held to see whether the Tanzanian proposals had been modified or withdrawn. Without specifying what these proposals were, Obote expressed the view that the Common Market idea would be "disturbed" by them. However, Obote said, the East African Authority had appointed a special Ministerial Committee to examine the problems concerning the Common Market.¹

On April 15, 1964, K.A.N.U. Senators alleged that Tanzania was going ahead with plans to introduce its own currency, and that this was one of the reasons why federation had been delayed.² The Senators advised President Kenyatta to be "careful, otherwise promises made to him by (Tanzania) might be mere lip service". A day or so later, the Special Ministerial Committee set up to examine the trade imbalance in the Common Market met in Dar-es-Salaam and announced that "positive measures" had been agreed on to redress the trade imbalance. Talks were later held in Kampala during which the three countries agreed to directly approach four firms that had branches in surplus and deficit countries. These firms were East African Tobacco Co., Bata Shoe Co., East African Breweries and British Standard Portland Cement. The representative of East African Tobacco said that his firm had already sent some machinery to Dar-es-Salaam, and that by July 1964, it would be producing about 90% of Tanzania's cigarettes; the remaining 10% he said, would consist of brands which could not be economically manufactured at more than one plant for the East African market. East African Tobacco agreed, however, that if the question arose in the future as to the

1. Daily Nation (Nairobi), April 13, 1964.

2. For a background account of the proposed federation and the controversy, see Nye, Jnr., op., cit.

manufacturing of additional special brands which could be manufactured only in one of the three countries, it would "consider very seriously" whether these could be produced in Tanzania.¹ Bata said that it had followed a policy of specialising at its plants so as to avoid duplication. In this connection, the firm stated that it was expanding into another specialised line of shoe production in Dar-es-Salaam; and this plant was expected to be in production by the end of 1964. The firm had also negotiated for a site in Uganda. East African Breweries, which owns Kilimanjaro Breweries in Tanzania, agreed to substantially increase its production in that country.² Concerning the production of cement, British Standard Portland had already spent about 300,000 pounds sterling on its Tanzanian branch, with approximately 1,350,000 pounds more to spend; initial trials were expected in early 1966, and production scheduled for April/June. Although a representative of the firm could not be interviewed, in the time available, by the Ministers of the three countries in Kampala, the Tanzanian Minister of Commerce and Industry said that he would approach Portland Cement so that the completion date could be advanced to 1965. As there were a number of unconnected breweries and cement firms in the Kenya-Uganda trade, direct action could not be taken concerning the trading of the commodities between the two countries.³

It was also agreed at Kampala that each country be allocated certain industries. Tanzania was given exclusive right to assemble and manufacture landrovers and a type of lorry and truck that Tanzania was supposed to specify. Although no one country was to have a monopoly of the entire East African market for lorries and trucks, Tanzania was to have a protected portion of the market, and was to submit, "within a reasonable time", an economically viable project for its partners' consideration. In the meantime, no other country was to establish an industry for assembling trucks and lorries before a final decision was reached. Tanzania was also given exclusive rights to manufacture motor vehicle tyres and tubes and to assemble and manufacture

1. Governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, "The Kampala Agreement for Correcting Trade Imbalances in East Africa", in Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania, (ed. Hadley E. Smith), Dar-es-Salaam, Institute of Public Administration, 1966, pp.288-289.

2. Ibid., p.289.

3. Ibid., p.289-290.

radios; and arrangements were to be made to safeguard the interests of existing radio firms, provided they purchased from Tanzania those parts that were being manufactured in that country. Uganda was given sole rights to manufacture nitrogenous fertilizers and bicycles, and bicycle assembly firms were to purchase the parts from Uganda that were being made in that country. Kenya was given exclusive rights in the manufacturing of electric light bulbs and was to consult with existing firms manufacturing neon and fluorescent tubes and, if necessary, was to apply for the scheduling of this industry.¹ A quota system, to be administered by a special Ministerial Committee, was to be imposed either through import or export licenses or both to control trade among the three countries; the Committee was to determine which system would be operative in connection with specific products. Each country was to impose a quota on its trade with another, which was equivalent to its trade deficit in the previous year with the latter. The quota was to be modified, taking into account the effects on allocated industries, current and suspended quotas and increase in exports from the surplus country to the one in deficit. It was agreed that a country which had a favourable balance of trade within the Common Market should not normally apply for quota.

In January 1965, the three countries confirmed the Kampala Agreement. However, the agreement was not implemented. In May 1965, Kenya and Tanzania clashed in the Central Legislative Assembly of the Common Services and Common Market. The Tanzanian Minister of Industries, Mineral Reserves and Power, Jeremiah Kasambala, said that his country's trade deficit with Kenya for 1963 was more than 7,000,000 pounds sterling; for the same period, Kenya had a trade surplus of about 3,000,000 pounds with Uganda. Kasambala told the Assembly that the Kampala Agreement could benefit all member states of the economic union. Kenya and Uganda, he claimed, could not do without Tanzania, while the latter could do without its partners. The Tanzanian Minister called for rectification of the trade imbalances within the union if disintegration was to be avoided. Tanzanian Minister of Health, Derek Bryceson, expressed the view that the three countries should either federate or face disintegration; although Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had common financial problems,

1. Ibid., pp.291-292.

2. Ibid., p.292.

these could not be solved because there was no central political authority to do so. Tanzania's Labour Minister, Michael Kamaliza, said that it had been a "great shock" for him to hear that Kenya was prepared to break the Kampala Agreement. While Tanzania welcomed foreign investment, Kamaliza said, it did so with the "overriding consideration" that the investors should not be allowed to exploit its people; those investors who wanted to exploit a country's people should invest in Kenya. The Tanzanian Minister said that, in the absence of political federation, he could not see any future for the East African Common Services Organisation. The three countries had been treated as a single political unit under colonial rule; now, however, they had different policies "some progressive, some unprogressive". Tanzania wanted federation, Kamaliza claimed, not because it had anything to gain, but because of its interest in the unity of Africa. He appealed to Kenya and Uganda to reconsider their position on the federation issue.¹

Kenya Minister of Labour, Mwendwa, denied that foreign investors were allowed to exploit the people of Kenya. If any country exploited its workers, Mwendwa said, "then it is Tanzania". The Kenya Minister claimed that there were "confidential reasons" why federation had been delayed. But, he added, Kenya "can stand on (its) own feet without federation". "If anyone thinks that Kenya cannot stand on (its) own feet, let him go to school to be corrected". Another Kenya representative, John Keen, expressed the view that the Common Services Organisation could function without political federation as it had done before; whereupon the Zanzibar Minister of Education, Ali Hassan, said that "some people" seemed to have forgotten the time when armed violence had to be employed to win freedom. The "imperialists", Hassan claimed, were once interested in federating the countries of East Africa when they felt that that area would be used as a "dumping ground" for their products. Having realised that this was no longer so, they were doing all they could "to sabotage federation".²

In June 1965, the Tanzanian Finance Minister Paul Bomaní announced that the three countries were planning to have separate currencies and central banks. The

1. The Nationalist, May 20, 1965.

2. Ibid., Daily Nation (Nairobi), May 20, 1965.

Minister said that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania had agreed to continue co-operating as closely as possible in monetary matters. Among other things, it was agreed that the three countries would continue to be members of the sterling area, that the new currencies would be issued at parity with the East African pound, and that they would be freely convertible.¹

The announcement on the breaking up of the East African currency prompted some commercial and industrial leaders in Kenya to describe the Tanzanian decision as a "retrogressive measure" which would "badly damage" the Common Market. The Kenya Assistant Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Mwai Kibaki, observed, in part, that Tanzania's decision to break up the East African currency "has been a serious blow to progress towards a political union - but not a fatal blow".²

To these observations, Mr. Bomani replied that his country took "serious exception to certain statements which have been made in Nairobi over the past few days", and that Tanzania refuted, "in the strongest possible terms", the allegation that it was deliberately bringing about a breaking up of the East African monetary area. The Tanzanian Finance Minister said that, since 1960, the East African states had given "careful study" to the problems involved in setting up a central banking system which would replace the East African Currency Board.³ In this connection, Bomani continued, Kenya and Uganda had supported Tanzania's initiative in inviting an official of the West German Bank, Erwin Blumenthal, to examine the monetary system of East Africa. In his study, Blumenthal had proposed, inter alia, that a two-tier central banking system be established which would consist of an East African central bank and state banks in each of the three countries, and that the common currency for the area be retained. While Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were considering the Blumenthal recommendations, they had issued a statement in June 1963 to the effect that they intended to federate before the end of that year. As a result, it was agreed that the proposed East African Central Bank should come into being the same time as political federation.

1. The Nationalist, June 11, 1965.

2. Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 12 and 13, 1965.

3. The East African Currency Board was established in 1919 and was transferred from London to Nairobi in 1960.

Federation failed to materialise, and in July 1964, the I.M.F. was asked to make a further study. Bomani said that Tanzania's position during the discussions had been that "it is customary for a sovereign government to control its monetary and banking system and to regulate the general level of activity in the economy through its own central bank". The setting up of a central bank for East Africa, "with its implications in regard to monetary and economic policy", the Tanzanian official indicated, "would bring into being an exceptionally complicated and delicate financial mechanism and economic regulator. Its most sensitive parts, namely the continued sharing of foreign exchange reserves and the inter-relationship in the structure of prices and interest rates, would be subject to a wide and divergent range of economic pressures and would... be a focal point for political criticism and scrutiny". Tanzania had therefore maintained that "the most careful consideration" should be given "the pre-conditions" that had to be met, if the proposed East African Central Bank was to function effectively. In this connection, it should be noted that the economic mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which was sent to Kenya to study that country's economy in the early 1960's observed in its report, among other things, that:

the establishment of a central bank, whatever its functions, assumes the existence of a central political authority.... Experience has shown..... that it has not always been possible to resolve conflicting interests and approaches into an agreed general policy. The difficulty of evolving a single monetary policy in harmony with the individual economic objectives of separate governments would allow little scope for a central bank to function.... 2

During a debate in the Tanzanian National Assembly, Mbogo (M.P.) claimed that Tanzania had been "turned by Kenya into (a) mere market for their manufactured goods. Even with regards to the East African Common Services, our country is an underdog. All head offices of the Organisation are in Nairobi. All important industrial and commercial establishments have their headquarters in Nairobi. Indeed, I can only say that we are tired of exploitation. More so especially as accusations have been made against us by those who exploit us". Mbogo called on the Government to reconsider the country's position in the Common Services Organisation. Commending the Government's decision to introduce Tanzania's own currency, he expressed the view

1. The Nationalist, June 14, 1965.

2. I.B.R.D., The Economic Development of Kenya, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, p.260.

that "this was long overdue. Indeed, this should be the beginning of the adjustment of many other anomalies which prevail in our country". Another M.P., A. Faraji, urged the various government departments and every Tanzanian to purchase goods made in Tanzania. Richard Wambura, a junior minister in Vice President Kawawa's office, said that Kenya was using the decision to establish separate central banks as "a scapegoat" to blame Tanzania. "For quite a long time", Wambura added, "we have sacrificed our development in favour of unity.... And now Kenya wants to reverse matters and blame us; perhaps because they think they can continue to fool Tanzania". Mhavile, another M.P., claimed that "Kenya took things for granted and thought they could exist without us. Now that they have realised they cannot, they level unfounded accusations against us...." He proposed that those who imported from Kenya and Uganda Japanese products that had been banned should have their firms closed down. Ludanamia, M.P., alleged that some Kenya leaders had accused Tanzania because they were "under the influence of external forces" which had encouraged them to do so.¹

In mid-June 1965, Tanzania imposed a total ban on all Japanese goods re-exported from Kenya and Uganda. Tanzania had already imposed import restrictions on certain Japanese products, principally piece goods and synthetic fibres, which had amounted to about 75% of Japan's exports to Tanzania in 1964. Tanzania's trade deficit with Japan in 1964 totalled about 4,700,000 pounds sterling; and, Tanzania argued, the trading of Japanese products within the Common Market was very high, mainly because of bulk purchasing in Kenya. Tanzanian Minister of Commerce and Co-operatives Babu said that his country had decided to do all it could to reduce its trade deficit with Kenya. Concerning the restrictions imposed on Japanese products, Babu stated that these had become necessary because of Japan's reluctance to negotiate trade agreements with Tanzania. Although it was not Tanzania's policy to balance its trade with every country on a pound-for-pound basis, the Tanzanian Minister continued, "we must be on the look-out for serious balance of payments difficulties with certain countries, particularly those which do not help us in our efforts to industrialise our economy".²

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1. The Nationalist, June 15 and 16, 1965.
 2. Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 16 and 17, 1965.

Two days after Babu's statement, Tanzania announced that it had imposed restrictions on imports from Kenya, Uganda and elsewhere; such commodities as biscuits, sweets, under-clothes, chillies and spices, ice-cream, soap, detergents, insecticides, nails, wire and knitwear could only be imported into Tanzania with special license. A Tanzanian Government spokesman said that his country was not banning Kenya and Uganda products, but that these products would be allowed only if they were "economically necessary". A few days after the Tanzanian announcement, a seminar of East African Students' Unions in Kampala called on the political leaders of the area to "submerge their personal ambitions" and work for East African unity. The students said that they hoped that the decision to break up the East African currency was not final.¹

On June 22, 1965, Kenya Finance Minister James Gichuru said that the "time has come when we must make sure that the other two partners in the Common Services understand that we cannot be pushed around any longer; and I am afraid that if things go on the way they are going now, it will mean (that) we will break-up everything...." Gichuru claimed that if the Common Services were dismantled, Tanzania and Uganda "will suffer a little more than we shall...." The Kenya Minister added that "(we) are determined... that we are not going to be dictated to by Chou En-lai or whomever the dictator may be".²

The level of tension rose to such a point that rumours circulated to the effect that the East African Common Services Organisation and Common Market were about to be dissolved. Early in July 1965, Presidents Kenyatta and Nyerere denied these rumours. In mid-July, the latter said that the "failure of East Africa to federate (was) "a great shame". However, if Tanzania's partners preferred "a looser form of co-operation", Dr. Nyerere pledged his country's "full co-operation". The Tanzanian leader said that he wanted "to dispel some of the rubbish which is being allowed to circulate in East Africa these days". For years, Nyerere stated, Tanzania had "argued patiently... that as long as we fail to federate, it is inevitable for the East African States to have separate currencies and to make some adjustments in the working of the Common Market. This provokes some silly people in East Africa...

1. Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 19 and 22, 1965.

2. Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 24, 1965.

into accusing Tanzania of taking orders from China and endangering East African unity". Nyerere said that he had "often examined the list of accusers" and had been "left with the strong impression that it does not consist of people who are or have been particularly enthusiastic about East African unity". Continuing, Dr. Nyerere claimed that the list consisted "mainly of foreigners and opportunists who will today be for federation and tomorrow against it, depending on their personal interests rather than the interests of East Africa as a whole". The Tanzanian President said that blackmail was not a "healthy basis of co-operation" and called on East Africans to "learn to examine each of our present and future fields of co-operation on its own merits" and to "outgrow the habit of blackmail".¹

In a speech before the East African Assembly on August 10 1965, Dr. Nyerere said, inter alia, that although there had been differences of opinion within the Common Market, there was "no reason at all to believe that East African Co-operation is about to collapse". Economic co-operation among the three East African countries had never been without difficulties. Although the difficulties that were being experienced by the Common Market were not the first, they were occurring "in a different political context than earlier ones". Formerly, there was an "ultimate (political) authority" which could settle disputes among the partners and enforce any decision arrived at. With independence, this political authority had been replaced by the East African Authority whose decisions had to be made unanimously. As each government of the area was faced with the pressing needs of its particular country, "each member (of the Authority) can look at the interests of East Africa as a whole only to the extent that these do not conflict fundamentally with the requirements of his own nation's needs". The differences that had resulted from separate colonial experiences, in part, meant that each country would have "different priorities of action, and, to some extent, a different approach to the problem before it". As a result, it was inevitable that there should be "genuine clashes of interests, with one nation feeling a positive need to take steps which the others cannot approve...." The common tariff arrangements and the free inter-state trade, Dr. Nyerere said, had prevented Tanzania from purchasing goods in the cheapest market

1. The Nationalist, July 16, 1965.

and protecting its own "infant industries" against competition from "long established and large-scale firms in Kenya and - to some extent - Uganda". While this situation had not been brought about by the "evil machinations" of Tanzania's partners, it had meant that that country's development had been hindered. When it became clear that immediate political federation was not forthcoming, Tanzania had pressed for some form of "East African action". Unfortunately, the Tanzanian leader added, the corrective action that had been agreed upon had not been ratified. Tanzania had therefore imposed "temporary quotas" on the imports of certain Kenya products "with the sole aim of promoting their production locally", an action which was in accordance with the agreement concluded at Kampala.

Upon the initiative of Alli Kisseka (Uganda), the East African Assembly adopted a resolution which, in part, thanked Nyerere for his speech and called on the Authority to appoint a committee to review the working of the Common Services and enquire into other areas of East African co-operation. Shortly after the Assembly's resolution, the three East African leaders met in Nairobi to discuss the Common Services. After the meeting, an official of the Common Services said that the talks had been held "in an atmosphere of frank, friendly cordiality". Upon his return home, Nyerere said that he and his colleagues had reviewed, "not politely, but seriously", the decision to maintain the Common Services and Common Market. At another meeting in late August/early September 1965, the Authority decided to appoint a Special Committee to review the working of the Common Services and Common Market and prepare a draft agreement. A joint communiqué issued after the talks said that there had been "a frank review of the current problems facing the Common Market and the Common Services".

In mid-September 1965, the three East African countries agreed on the following terms of reference for the Special Committee: (1) How the Common Market could be maintained and strengthened and the principles on which it could be controlled and regulated; (2) the arrangements necessary for the operation of the Common Market after the introduction of separate currencies; (3) how the Common Services could be continued; (4) whether new services could be provided; (5) how the Common Services

1. The Nationalist, August 11, 1965.

2. The Nationalist, August 18, 21 and September 2, 1965.

should be financed; (6) the extent to which the separate Services could be headquartered in different member countries; and (7) the legal, administrative and constitutional arrangements that would be necessary to promote effective co-operation among the three countries in view of the foregoing points.¹ In November 1965, the Authority selected Kjilb Phillips of Denmark to be the independent Chairman of the Special Committee.

Meanwhile, in October/November 1965, the E.C.A. convened in Lusaka a meeting of the countries of East Africa. Principally, the conference called for the progressive elimination of internal barriers to trade within ten years and the formation of a customs union; the establishment of a programme for sub-regional or multi-national industries which were to have immediate free access to the sub-regional or multi-national markets and some form of protection; and free access to sub-regional or multi-national markets of agricultural products. An Interim Council of Ministers was set up to draw up a treaty and handle other matters of co-operation, pending the ratification and coming into force of the treaty. Those countries participating were Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Rwanda, Zambia, Somalia and Malawi. In addition to these ten states, Uganda, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho were also eligible for participation.²

Although the Economic Community of Eastern Africa, as envisaged by the Lusaka conference, has not yet been formed, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, in June 1967, signed a draft treaty prepared by the Phillips Committee, which provided for an East African Community. In early December, President Nyerere opened the headquarters of the Community in Arusha. The aim of the Community is to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the three states so that "there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities the benefits whereof shall be equitably shared". To this end, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania agreed, in part, to establish common customs and excise tariffs, abolish trade restrictions within the Community, set up, as a long-term objective, a common agricultural policy, establish an East African Development Bank,

1. The Nationalist, September 17, 1965.
2. U.N.E.C.A., Economic Co-operation and Integration in Africa: Three Case Studies, ST/ECA/109. pp.10-11.

harmonise their monetary policies, consult each other in the event of a disequilibrium in their balance of payments, continue operating the Common Services and co-ordinate economic planning.¹

Under the terms of Articles 12 and 13 of the Treaty, each member state may impose quantitative restrictions or prohibitions against the import of goods from its partners in so far as may be necessary to comply with its contractual and other agreements with third parties. Each country has the right to impose quantitative restrictions or prohibitions against the agricultural products of its partners, which are basic staple foods or major export crops. In addition, quantitative restrictions or prohibitions may be imposed in the event a member state encountered balance of payments problems provided such action does not contravene its obligations under GATT or the rules of the I.M.F., the restrictions imposed on foreign goods are inadequate to solve the problems, the restrictions do not operate more unfavourably against member states, the Common Market Council is first consulted and any action taken is kept under review. The Treaty also provides for a "transfer tax" to promote new industrial development in those member states that are less developed. A member which has a deficit in its total trade in manufactured goods with its partners may impose transfer taxes on such imports. However, a transfer tax may be imposed on manufactured goods only if, at the time of the tax, similar goods are being made in the state taking such action or "are reasonably expected" to be made in that state within three months after the imposition of the tax. Moreover, every transfer tax is to be revoked fifteen years after the coming into force of the Treaty.²

The institutions of the East African Community are the Authority, the Legislative Assembly, the Common Market Council, the Common Market Tribunal, the Communications Council, the Finance Council, the Economic, Consultative and Planning Council, the Research and Social Council and the Secretariat. In July 1968, the Development Bank, provided for in the Treaty, became operational, with headquarters in Kampala. Two branches of the Community's Common Services have been removed from Nairobi and re-located in Dar-es-Salaam and Kampala; Harbours in Dar-es-Salaam and Posts and Telecommunications in Kampala.

1. Article 2, The Treaty for East African Co-operation, 1967.

2. Article 20.

Intra-East African Community trade has increased from more than 25 million pounds sterling in 1961 to about 33 million pounds in 1969, a not too inconsiderable amount.¹ While Kenya continues to enjoy a favourable balance of trade with its partners, the "transfer tax" system, the re-location of Posts and Telecommunications and Harbours, and the fact that the Community's Development Bank and Secretariat are in Kampala and Arusha respectively have been helpful measures - supportive intakes - which have reduced the level of tension in the various fields of interactions involving the three countries. Thus, faced with tension produced by the failure to federate and the trade, developmental and other imbalances within the Common Market and Common Services, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania introduced measures designed to maintain their subsystems. In this connection, when a particular function is performed both at the system and subsystem levels, the units interacting within the subsystem are more likely to make the requisite sacrifices for the introduction of supportive intakes and inputs, provided the benefits derived from continued interaction within the subsystem are greater than those obtained at the system level. Restated in terms of the East African Community, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were prepared to make sacrifices to maintain their Community because it offers benefits which are not available to them within the framework of the O.A.U. (or any other sub-regional grouping). Granted, the argument over the imbalances and the subsequent compromise reached to correct these imbalances were not stated in these terms. But if the three countries had had a better alternative within the framework of the O.A.U., the need to maintain the Community would have been minimal, if not nil. This is, however, not the same thing as saying that in the absence of an alternative at the system level, the units interacting within a particular subsystem will continue to do so under any conditions. As we shall see presently in the case of the Central African Customs and Economic Union, even in the absence of an alternative at the system level, a unit(s) is likely to discontinue interacting within its subsystem (or its system, for that matter) if it feels that its contribution towards the maintenance of the particular subsystem is more than the benefits it derives from it, and that the situation is not likely to improve. The point here, however, is that, other things being equal, when a system fails to perform an intended function, its

1. For data on the direction of trade during this period see Appendix D.

units tend to reinforce old subsystems or form new ones to perform this function.

Central African Customs and Economic Union (U.D.E.A.C.)

Like the East African Community, the Central African Customs and Economic Union also has its roots in the colonial period. In June 1959, Chad, the Central African Republic, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville concluded a treaty establishing a customs union (Union Douanière Equatoriale) so as to continue the economic interaction that had existed among them since the creation of French Equatorial Africa forty-nine years earlier. Also in 1959, l'Agence Transequatoriale des Communications (A.T.E.C.) was formed to ensure the proper management of ports in Congo-Brazzaville and the Central African Republic, the Congo-Ocean railway and other navigable waterways. In 1965, A.T.E.C. was also given the responsibility of maintaining common land routes like those between the Central African Republic and Chad, and Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville.

In February 1964, the U.D.E. states and Cameroon concluded a preliminary agreement to establish a Central African Customs and Economic Union. Early in December 1964, the five states signed a Treaty setting up the U.D.E.A.C. to be effective as of January 1966. The Treaty called for "a balanced development and diversification of the economies of.... Member States within a framework that will allow for increase in inter-state exchanges and amelioration of the conditions of (the) populations (of the U.D.E.A.C.)". In this connection, the member states agreed to harmonise their various fiscal policies, establish an investment code so as to offer similar conditions to investors, harmonise their development plans and transport and to co-operate in industrial matters. Article 27 provides for the free movement of persons, goods, property, services and capital within the Union. Under the terms of Article 33, goods imported into a member state for consumption and subsequently transferred to another member state are exempted from all export duties and taxes in the country of destination. However, in case of commercial transactions during a transitory period, which was not to exceed three years from the date the Treaty came into force, the country into which the goods were imported was to repay to the country in which the goods were actually consumed the duties and taxes recorded.

1. Articles 42-58, Treaty on Creating a Central African Customs and Economic Union, December 8, 1964.

A Solidarity Fund that was set up within the framework of Union Douanière Equatoriale (which consisted of Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic and Gabon) has been continued by the U.D.E.A.C. For the period 1960-1965, Chad contributed an average of CFA252, 333,333 per annum, but received an average of CFA712,000,000; the Central African Republic was next in line with about CFA260,000,000 and CFA403,000,000 respectively. Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon suffered net losses, contributing far more than they received. From 1966 to 1968, with Cameroon participating, Chad contributed an average of CFA300,000,000 annually, but obtained about CFA1,181,000,000; the Central African Republic also contributed an average of CFA300,000,000 but received about CFA684,000,000 annually. Again Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon along with Cameroon suffered net losses.

But the fact that Chad and the Central African Republic were receiving the lion's share of the Solidarity Fund did not prevent them from being dissatisfied with the industrial and trade trends and financial arrangements within the Union. Of the approximately 300 processing factories in the U.D.E.A.C. in mid-1967, about 43% were situated in Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville had 22%, Gabon and the Central African Republic had 13% each and Chad had only 3%. During a U.D.E.A.C. summit meeting in December 1967, the Central African Republic President, Bokassa, referred to the Solidarity Fund as "that which still does not function very well within the framework of the (Union)". Concerning the application of the provisions of the Union's Treaty on industrial co-operation, General Bokassa said that this was the "problème épineux (thorny problem)" of the Customs and Economic Union and complained about the proliferation of similar industries, and hence a "tendency to contravene the Charter" in matters of light industry before proposing equitable distribution among member states. What Bokassa wanted therefore was that the location of heavy industry should be decided by the Heads of State on the basis of unanimity.

In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the Council of Heads of State indicated, among other things, that in June 1968, their Ministers of Planning and Economic Affairs would meet in order to decide on a common industrial programme for the Union based on an equitable distribution of industrial projects among member states.

1. U.N.E.C.A., Economic Co-operation and Integration in Africa: Three Case Studies, ST/ECA/109, p.95.
2. Afrique Contemporaine, No, 35, January - February, 1968, p.14.

This programme was to be submitted to the Council for approval in December 1968. A special commission was appointed to study the possibilities of co-operation between the Cameroon on the one hand and other members of the Union on the other. However, as we have seen, Chad, the Central African Republic and Congo-Kinshasa announced in February 1968 that they had formed a Union of Central African States. In April, the Charter of the Union was signed, and President Tombalbaye announced later that his country and the Central African Republic had withdrawn from the U.D.E.A.C.

We have already seen the controversy following the withdrawal of the Central African Republic and Chad from the U.D.E.A.C. What should be mentioned here is the fact that Chad imported far more from other members of the U.D.E.A.C. than it exported to them, a fact due principally to the concentration of industries in Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville and, to some extent, Gabon and the Central African Republic. In 1966, the first year of the Union's existence, Cameroon exported about CFA646,000,000 worth of industrial goods to other members of the U.D.E.A.C.; Congo-Brazzaville exported industrial goods amounting to more than CFA3,400,000,000; the Central African Republic's industrial export was about CFA 546,000,000; Gabon exported industrial products to the tune of about CFA 110,000,000; but Chad's industrial export was only about CFA 12,000,000. The figures for 1967, including non-industrial goods were not much more encouraging to Chad. Congo-Brazzaville exported more than CFA 3,087,000,000 worth of goods to the Union; Cameroon's export amounted to CFA 1,914,965,000; the Central African Republic exported products to the tune of CFA 877,298,000; Chad's export totalled CFA 769,413,000, principally non-industrial goods; and Gabon exported CFA 196,537,000 worth of products. Of the CFA 1,739,050,000 worth of non-Union goods re-exported, Cameroon re-exported goods to the tune of CFA 486,240,000; Congo-Brazzaville re-exported products amounting to CFA457,990,000; the Central African Republic re-exported CFA470,718,000 worth of goods; Chad re-exported CFA 197,229,000; and Gabon re-exported CFA 462,212,000. For the same year (1967), Cameroon imported CFA 890,446,000 worth of goods from its partners; Congo-Brazzaville received products amounting to CFA 561,984,000; the Central African Republic's imports totalled CFA1,163,466,000; Gabon's imports amounted to

CFA 2,111,749,000; but Chad imported CFA 3,199,324,000 worth of goods. It was clear to Chad that its "underdog" position in the U.D.E.² would continue in the U.D.E.A.C.

Towards the end of April 1968, President Tombalbaye said that his country "noted within the U.D.E.A.C. a tendency toward indirect colonisation entailing economic stagnation. We proposed that the U.D.E.A.C. Charter be amended, but the proposal was rejected; and so we decided to leave the organisation". In January 1969, the Chadian Finance Minister, Abdoulaye Lamana, claimed that the U.D.E.A.C. was "a failure" and complained that his country's partners "did not deal frankly with us. All U.D.E.A.C. industries were concentrated in the coastal countries, and the Solidarity Fund was a cause of disagreement". M. Lamana said that U.D.E.A.C. members always argued over the Fund, and that payments from it were made late, tending to upset budgetary arrangements.³

But in spite of the fact that Chad and the Central African Republic were dissatisfied with the industrial and trade trends within the Union and the Solidarity Fund, they did not choose to simply disassociate themselves from the U.D.E.A.C., but sought instead, to form an alternative organisation with Congo-Kinshasa. Restated in terms of our model, believing that they could not significantly determine the behaviour of their existing subsystem, these units wanted to establish another one that would be more responsive to their demands. The fact that the Central African Republic later renounced its membership of the Union of Central African States and rejoined the U.D.E.A.C. was due to at least two factors. Firstly, there are strong reasons to believe that France exerted considerable pressure on General Bokassa. We have seen that after the two countries withdrew from the U.D.E.A.C., the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Charge of Co-operation, M. Bourges, visited Bangui, and General Bokassa went to France at the invitation of General de Gaulle. Thereafter, relations between the Central African Republic on the one hand and Congo-Kinshasa and Chad on the other deteriorated. While there is no available evidence to confirm Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko's allegation that M. Bourges had told

1. U.D.E.A.C.. Tableaux des échanges Inter-Etats de l'U.D.E.A.C., No.1629/D1-STAT.

2. For an account of intra-U.D.E. trade, see Robson, op. cit.

3. A.F.P., Africa, April 30, 1968, p.36 and January 21, 1969, p.2.

President Bokassa that President Mobutu's Government was about to be overthrown, and that France would discontinue its aid to the Central African Republic unless the latter withdrew from the newly formed Union, it was after M. Bourges' trip to Bangui and General Bokassa's visit to General de Gaulle that dysfunctional tension began to develop within the fledgling Union of Central African States. Secondly, the Central African Republic did not suffer as much as Chad from the trade (and industrial) trend within the U.D.E.A.C., as is evident from the foregoing figures. In fact, the losses of the Central African Republic were not as much as those of Gabon.

From this necessarily sketchy treatment of the East African Community and the Central African Customs and Economic Union, we may conclude that, when a system fails to perform one of its important intended functions (and for the African states economic and trade co-operation is very important), its units will tend to be under pressure to reinforce old subsystems or form new ones to perform this function. And as these subsystems become successful in one sphere of interaction, other spheres are more likely to be transferred to them, at the expense of the system itself. By way of clarification, as the Community and the Union become more and more successful, their members will tend to extend their economic interaction to other spheres of co-operation, thus making the O.A.U. itself irrelevant as far as interactions within these sub-regional groupings are concerned. We shall find the same process at work in West Africa, though with much less success.

CHAPTER IX

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN WEST AFRICA

Attempts to form a free trade area or an economic community in West Africa have not been as successful as those in East and Central Africa. While we will consider possible reasons for this lack of appreciable success in West Africa, our principal concern here is in continuing to demonstrate the fact that although the search for economic co-operation continues, the O.A.U. has been irrelevant in the promotion of such unity. In this chapter, we examine the proposed West African Free Trade Area, the Organisation of Riparian States of the Senegal River (O.E.R.S.) and the proposed West African Regional Grouping. These three schemes were initiated after the colonial period: of the three schemes, only the O.E.R.S. is at present functioning.

West African Free Trade Area

In August 1964, President Tubman convened a summit conference of Liberia, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone and proposed the formation of a free trade area in West Africa, consisting of the four countries. Dr. Tubman indicated that the free trade area he was proposing was not exactly the same as other free trade schemes. This was so, he said, for two basic reasons. First, a similarity in the economic structures of the four states made it highly unlikely that there would be an immediate increase in trade within the proposed free trade area. Hence, limiting the programme to the lifting of tariffs and other barriers to intra-regional trade would not provide the requisite elements for a rapid regional development. The second reason was that the different external economic links of each of the four countries made it unrealistic to expect that they could form a customs union in the immediate future, with common external tariffs leading to an adoption of identical¹ fiscal and monetary policies.

What Dr. Tubman called for, therefore, was the adoption of complementary development policies and joint action in industrial development, agriculture, trade expansion, transport and communications. In order to ensure the complementary -

1. Govt. of Liberia, Proposal by Liberia for Formation of a Free Trade Area between Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Liberia, p.4.

rather than the competitive - development of the four countries, the Liberian leader called for the co-ordination of industrial development laws, investment codes and other legislation of these states in matters concerning investment and business practices. Although each state would be free to allocate whatever resources it wished to its own development, this would be done after an account had been taken of the entire market and the development plans of other members of the free trade area. In addition, there would be periodic exchange of information and discussion of monetary and fiscal arrangements that would affect co-operative development.¹ Joint industrial studies would be financed by the four countries to identify those industries that would be suitable for their area; these studies would also determine the most economical location for each industry, adequate measures being taken to ensure a balanced regional development.² Concerning agricultural development, Dr. Tubman proposed joint experimental farms, irrigation and supply and training of technical personnel. To expand intra-area trade, the four countries would jointly sponsor a study to identify official regulations and practices which were obstacles to the development of commerce among them. After this study, agreement could be reached for the removal of such obstacles.³ With regards to transport and communications, President Tubman called for a joint study of the intra-regional highway system that would best meet national and regional interests. In addition, steps were to be taken to develop coastal shipping and establish direct telecommunication links among the four countries.⁴ In a joint communique' issued after the meeting, the four Heads of State and Government indicated that they would study the feasibility of establishing a free trade area; consisting of their states. The area was to be open to other African states wishing to join.⁵

At the first Ministerial conference in Monrovia in February 1965, Sierra Leone and Guinea submitted proposals that were essentially in agreement with President Tubman's general proposal at the Heads of State and Government meeting in August 1964;

1. Ibid., p.5.

2. Ibid., pp.5-6.

3. Ibid., pp.6-7.

4. Ibid., pp.8-9.

5. Joint Communique' on the Establishment of a West African Free Trade Area, 1964.

but the Ivory Coast Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, M. Raphael Saller, took a contrary position. The documents submitted, the Minister said, were not sufficient for the conference to decide "categorically" that there should be a free trade area; more preliminary studies were necessary, and he was not prepared "to anticipate" their results. ¹ It should be observed, in this connection, that, at the Heads of State and Government meeting in August 1964, it was decided that the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Sierra Leone would furnish Liberia, before 15 October 1964, with all documents and information on the operation of the proposed free trade area, and that Liberia would distribute these documents and other information by October 31. However, the Ivory Coast and Guinea did not send the requisite documents and information before the deadline. When Sierra Leone sent a special delegation to both countries for these documents, the Ivory Coast informed Sierra Leone that it was not possible to receive the Sierra Leonean delegation in Abidjan because of "commitments" of the Ivorian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. ² In contrast, Liberia had taken the initiative in commissioning a special economic study of the economies of the four countries, which was sent to the four Governments before the meeting in February 1965. ³ To find a common ground to the opposing positions, Liberia proposed a compromise. Instead of establishing a permanent organisation, involving the Heads of State and Government, it was proposed that an interim organisation, limited to the Ministerial level, be set up. This interim organisation would conduct the requisite studies in order to determine the feasibility of establishing the proposed free trade area. The Liberian compromise plan was accepted and, upon the proposal of Diakite Moussa, Minister of Foreign Commerce and Banks of Guinea, Monrovia was selected as the headquarters of the proposed interim organisation. ⁴

In May 1965, a conference of the Ministerial Working Commission was convened in Freetown. Addressing the conference, the Sierra Leonean Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai, said that the:

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1. FTC/19, Minutes of the Second Plenary Session - Morning of the Free Trade Conference, Monrovia, February 1965, p.9ff.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Liberia commissioned the Economist Intelligence Unit, Limited, London, to conduct the study.
 4. FTC/19, p.1ff; FTC/23, p.1ff.

union for which we all strove is now being put to the test. The barriers imposed on us from without during the past 200 years must be swept aside. The selfish interests which were created as a result of colonialism must be discarded, and the closest feasible form of economic co-operation must be established throughout the length and breadth of Africa. 1

After three days of discussions, the conference appointed Donald George of Sierra Leone as Administrative Secretary of the Interim Organisation which consisted of four specialised and technical committees: Trade and Customs; Transport and Communications; Agriculture and Industrial Development; and Monetary, Fiscal and Payments Arrangements. However, the Interim Organisation failed to reach a "take-off stage"; and the Guinea-Ivorian tension, following the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah, made further discussions on the creation of the proposed West African Free Trade Area virtually impossible, despite the efforts of Dr. Tubman to bring this about.

While one might be tempted to attribute the failure of the West African Free Trade Area to the Guinea-Ivorian tension, such tension in itself may not have been so crucial. It is true that the success of a free trade area of this sort usually requires the political and psychological compatibility of the leaders involved. However, even before this tension the Ivory Coast had not shown much enthusiasm for a West African Free Trade Area. As we have seen, the Ivory Coast Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Saller, had taken a contrary position at the first Ministerial conference, claiming that the documents submitted were not sufficient for the conference to decide that there should be a free trade area, and that he was not prepared "to anticipate" the results of subsequent studies. Although one might be hard put to establish a direct link between the Ivorian attitude and that of France towards the proposed Free Trade Area, something that occurred in 1966 tends to give more weight to this factor than to the Guinea-Ivorian tension. In that year, the Americans proposed that roads and railways on the African continent be unified, that a central power station and modern telecommunications be set up, and that a pan-African agronomic institute be established.² The French immediately became suspicious that the Americans were manoeuvring to displace them in the francophone countries. While the French did not state their position in these terms -

1. West African Free Trade Area Conference, MWC/ST/1, Freetown, May 1965, p.2.

2. Afrique Service, No,156, September 1966, pp.10-11.

they could hardly be expected to do so - they claimed that there was no need for the American proposal because, they argued, intra-African trade was of little importance, the production of electricity would "for a long time" be limited to individual countries or "two or three" neighbouring ones, and the agricultural conditions of the various regions "vary widely" to justify a pan-African agronomic institute. Since France was opposed to the project, it was as good as dead in respect of the francophone countries.¹ It is, therefore, more likely that it was the French attitude towards the proposed West African Free Trade Area - including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (countries in which French influence is virtually nil) - which was much more important in determining the Ivorian position vis-a-vis the Free Trade Area. If we accept this assumption, and assuming further that France will continue to exercise such influence in most of its former territories, then we may conclude that, in order for a free trade area or an economic union to succeed in West Africa, either (1) France will have to feel that its interests are not threatened or (2) the francophone countries involved adopt a much more independent policy.

2

Organisation of Riparian States of the Senegal River

During a visit to Guinea in March 1963, President Senghor proposed the formation of a sub-regional grouping consisting of Guinea, Mauritania, Mali and Senegal. Several weeks after the founding of the O.A.U., Presidents Keita and Senghor, who had informally settled the dispute that had brought about the breaking up of the Mali Federation, met at Kidira, Mali, for a formal settlement. President Senghor stated that the meeting signified his country's desire to implement the Addis Ababa decisions and called for the establishment of an "entente", composed of Mali, Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal, to exploit the Senegal River for communication, irrigation and hydro-electric power. To this, President Keita replied that Mali would co-operate closely with Senegal. Upon returning home, President Senghor further clarified his proposal: he was not calling for the creation of a federation; rather, what he wanted was a "vehicle" for economic co-operation.³ Following a meeting of experts in Dakar in February 1964, a Ministerial conference in August decided ...

1. Ibid.

2. This Organisation is also referred to as The Senegal River Basin States.

3. West Africa, June 29, 1963, p.723.

on the procedure for establishing an Inter-State Committee for the exploitation of the Senegal River. The Committee was to have a Secretariat at Saint-Louis-du-Senegal. In February 1965, the Committee along with its Secretariat came into being. In April 1965, the U.N. Special Fund allocated \$5,000,000 for a study of agricultural development of the Senegal River basin and control of the river for hydro-electric power and navigation.

Towards the end of May 1965, Presidents Keita and Senghor agreed to initiate the establishment of a West African sub-regional grouping, consisting of the English- and French-speaking states. On November 13, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea decided, among other things, to take the initiative in setting up a West African sub-regional grouping, and President Ould Daddah was assigned the task of persuading the other ten states. However, as we have seen, in mid-1966, strained relations between Guinea and Senegal had the negative feedback effect of making the Inter-State Committee temporarily dysfunctional. But by November 1967, the two Presidents, Touré and Senghor, had become sufficiently reconciled to meet with their colleagues in Bamako for the second summit meeting of the Committee, after which it was announced that President Ould Daddah had the support of the Committee in his attempts to have the fourteen countries of the sub-region meet in Monrovia in April 1968 in order to form a West African sub-regional grouping.¹

In February 1968, the four countries concluded in Dakar an agreement establishing an Organisation of Riparian States of the Senegal River. The new organisation, which replaced the Inter-State Committee, has a Conference of Heads of State which is supposed to meet once a year; a Council of Ministers, to meet twice a year; a Consultative Commission (which replaced the Inter-Parliamentary Commission in February 1970); and a Secretariat, with headquarters in Dakar. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers in August 1968 in Conakry, it was decided that a multilateral compensation office be established, serving as a bank to make short-term settlements among member states; that statistical methods used in legislation and customs documentation be harmonised; that inter-state trade fairs and exhibitions be organised; that double customs posts be set up at the frontiers; and that a multilateral

1. A.F.P., Africa, June 1, 1965, p.6; November 16, 1965, p.1; November 10, 1967, p.1.

agreement on trade be concluded to replace existing bilateral ones. The Secretariat was instructed to make the requisite arrangements for the "immediate implementation" of these decisions. Another Ministerial meeting in November 1968 proposed that an inter-state navigation company be established, that a sub-regional postal and telecommunications training centre be constructed in Senegal, and that direct telecommunications be established between O.E.R.S. states by January 1969. On January 2, 1969, direct telecommunications links were established within the O.E.R.S.; and in mid-1969, a team of experts under the auspices of the O.E.R.S. and the U.N. Special Fund began conducting the requisite studies of the Senegal River.¹ By early 1970, the U.N. Development Fund had contributed \$10 million to the O.E.R.S. study programme.²

In June 1970, the O.E.R.S. members decided to establish a common inter-state health code; improve their present co-operation against contagious diseases; set up a common pharmacology laboratory and an institute of pharmacopoeia and "traditional medicine" in Mali; and establish a pharmacy in Senegal. In addition, three industries were distributed among the four members: Guinea got the paper industry; Mali and Mauritania were allotted the steel industry; and Senegal the petrochemical industry. The O.E.R.S. Secretariat was instructed to conduct the economic and technical studies concerning these industries, to define their legal status, to formulate means by which these projects could be financed, and to indicate how member states could participate in the scheme. The Secretariat was also told to conduct studies on how existing industries could be harmonised and to make a comparative study of the existing development plans, with a view to harmonisation.³

Without attempting to minimise the success of the O.E.R.S., one can point to at least two initial factors in its favour: (1) the scheme is centred on the joint exploitation of the Senegal River; and (2) of the four countries involved, France is influential in three - it is only in Guinea that French influence is virtually nil. By concentrating on the joint development of the Senegal River, Guinea, Mali,

1. West Africa, August 31, 1968, p.1018.

2. Afrique Nouvelle, 5-11 February, 1970.

3. Afrique Nouvelle, 18-24 June, 1970.

Mauritania and Senegal initiated a project that has developed a dynamism of its own, spreading co-operation to other spheres of interaction. In addition, while French influence exists only in Senegal, Mauritania and, to a lesser extent, in Mali, it should be added that, in spite of periodic verbal assaults, Guinea has been seeking to improve its relations with France. The O.E.R.S. is, therefore, hardly in a position to threaten French interests in the area.

West African Regional Grouping

At the seventh session of the E.C.A. in 1965, the decision was taken to establish in West Africa a sub-regional "inter-governmental machinery responsible for the harmonisation of economic and social development" in the area "taking into account the experience of similar institutional arrangements inside and outside Africa". In October 1966, a West African sub-regional conference in Niamey confirmed the E.C.A.'s decision; and the E.C.A. requested its Executive Secretary, Robert Gardiner, to convene in West Africa a meeting of the sub-region so that Articles of Association could be signed for the creation of a West African Interim Council of Ministers. In April/May 1967, a conference on economic co-operation in West Africa signed the Articles of Association in Accra. The states represented at the Accra conference were Dahomey, Ghana, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta.

In the Articles of Association, these countries agreed to (a) promote the co-ordination and "equitable development of their economies", (b) further the "maximum possible interchange" of goods and services among themselves, (c) contribute to the "orderly expansion" of trade between themselves on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other, and (d) contribute to the economic development of Africa. To attain these objectives, the participants undertook to conduct studies so as to determine the areas of joint economic development; negotiate the progressive elimination of customs and other barriers to the expansion of trade among themselves;

1. Le Monde, 6 October, 1967; Philippe Decraene, "Les relations Franco-Guineennes: une entreprise difficile", Le Monde, 2 November, 1967; Afrique Nouvelle, 16-22 April, 21-27 May, 28 May-3 June, 8-14 October, 12-18 November, 1970.
2. Conference of Heads of State of West Africa on Economic Integration (April 17-24 1968), Advisory Paper on Measures Towards Greater Economic Co-operation in West Africa, p.1.
3. Gambia later signed the Articles of Association.

take measures that would render their products competitive with those imported into the sub-region and obtain more favourable conditions for their products on the world market; adopt common policies and conclude agreements designed to serve the attainment of their aims; and ensure that the common policies adopted and agreements concluded were implemented.¹ Article 5 of the Articles of Association created an Interim Council of Ministers which was assigned the task of drafting a treaty for an Economic Community of West Africa. The Council was empowered to establish a Provisional Secretariat, an Interim Economic Committee and other appropriate subsidiary bodies. In addition, the Council was to determine the areas of joint economic development and the manner and degree of such development.²

At the Interim Council's first meeting in November 1967, in Dakar, President Senghor admonished that:

if we wish to be realistic and at the same time display powers of creative imagination, we shall have to begin with a sort of free-trade area and end up, in stages, with an integrated community. Indeed, the difficulties at the outset should not be minimised. Some of our States are linked with France through the West African Customs Union, others are linked with Great Britain through the Commonwealth. On top of this, most of us are associated with the European Economic Community. Your Council would be wise to scrutinise the real facts behind these special links, upon which depends most of the trade of our States... The Council would also be wise to set in train a procedure which.... will gradually lead to the liberalisation of trade among the Community States and at the same time ... adhere strictly to any earlier agreements contracted with other partners, especially with the former metropolitan powers. 3

With these words from the Senegalese President, the Interim Council proceeded to consider the form of the proposed Community. The consensus of opinion was that the participants should strive towards attaining a common market, rather than a free trade area or customs union. However, it was the unanimous opinion of the Council that further study was necessary in order to have "a more thorough appreciation of all the concrete measures necessary to achieve the economic integration of West Africa...." This said, the Council made a general outline of the treaty. The factors and mechanism for implementing a common agricultural policy in terms of production, prices and marketing were to be defined; there was to be no discrimination in intra-community trade; joint policies on industrialisation were to be adopted;

1. CEI/HSWA/Doc.13, p.1ff.

2. Ibid, p.5.

3. "Annex No. 1", CEI/HSWA/Doc.5, pp.4-5.

economic policies were to be co-ordinated; economic co-operation was to be established within the Community "without effects detrimental to other states"; there was need for a mechanism to compensate for payments deficit in bilateral trade; projects to be jointly undertaken were to be defined; there was need for compensation for loss of revenue as a result of the treaty; development programmes were to be co-ordinated; special measures were required to deal with problems due to the different stages of development of member states; a machinery was needed to finance economic development, recognition being given the fact that the African Development Bank and national development financing institutions already exist; and account was to be taken of the different monetary policies of member states. The Provisional Secretariat was instructed to prepare the first draft of the treaty, using the foregoing points, a preliminary draft prepared by the E.C.A. Secretariat as well as other documents on the subject as guidelines. The Council's next meeting was scheduled to be in Monrovia not later than November 1968.¹

In April 1968, when a summit conference of West African states was convened in Monrovia to sign the draft Protocol creating the West African Regional Grouping, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo and Dahomey were not represented. In his address to the opening session of the preparatory Ministerial meeting, President Tubman observed that while:

in principle, we have all subscribed to the concept of sub-regional economic co-operation, we have failed to translate that concept into working tactics and action. Even if we give considerable merit to the subtle existence of a historically different form of colonialism in Africa today, the failures we have encountered have been primarily ours.

In your deliberations, I sincerely urge you to strive for a new and realistic beginning, using this meeting as the first step which will take our people out of this state of economic retardation. 2

The Ministerial conference recommended that each state diversify its economy and specialise at the regional level. Industrial development programmes were to be undertaken and harmonised so that countries of the sub-region could establish efficient and viable industries whose products could be sold within the sub-region, develop agricultural production for the area and construct the requisite transport facilities for the movement of these products, and conclude trading arrangements

1. CEI/HSWA/Doc.5, p.2ff.

2. "Annex A", CEI/HSWA/Doc.11/Rev.1, p.4.

with each other. In the area of industrialisation, specific projects were to be agreed upon and feasibility studies conducted. On the basis of these studies, the countries of West Africa were to take joint action to develop the particular industries. Accordingly, the Heads of State and Government were requested to take the requisite steps so that studies could be undertaken with a view to the industrialisation of West Africa through the integration of industrial projects and the stimulation of industrial trade.¹ To improve existing transport and communications links as well as develop new ones, the West African states were to sponsor studies which would identify "missing links" to be filled. A study was also to be undertaken to determine the possible gains from sub-regional co-operation in the area of agriculture, and the exchange of technical information in this area was to be encouraged.² Concerning trade within the West African sub-region, the Interim Council called for the submission of proposals for the establishment of a West African common market "at the earliest possible date". This was to be done on a selective basis, with trade barriers being removed so as to increase the flow of products that countries of the sub-region could produce.³ Co-operation in the sub-region was to be extended to education, health and cultural activities. In the area of education, there were to be a greater exchange of students and teachers and joint programmes among the universities and other institutions of West Africa. Existing co-operation among the countries of the sub-region in the control and eradication of diseases was to be intensified, while measures were to be adopted to increase cultural contacts.⁴ Finally, the Interim Council recommended that steps be taken to harmonise the sub-region's fiscal and monetary policies and remove or mitigate the obstacles to increased economic co-operation.⁵

When the summit conference met on April 22, 1968, Dr. Tubman told his colleagues that the meeting:

1. CEI/HSWA/Doc.11/Rev.1, pp.13-14.

2. Ibid., pp.14-15.

3. Ibid., pp.15-16.

4. Ibid., pp.16-17.

5. Ibid., p.17.

comes at a time when we can appreciate the inherent shortcomings of the past due to an adherence to the policy of rigid nationalism. It comes at a time, when we have unsuccessfully tried the old approach of giving mere verbal recognition to these (economic) problems. It comes at a time, when the need for real and concrete results is greater than ever before for the adoption of the concept of integrated development and the final establishment of an economic community within the West African sub-region. 1

After recalling the events that had led to the conference, the Liberian President observed that the U.N. Development Decade was fast approaching an end, but that the minimal goals set by that Organisation had not been attained. Africa, he said, was the least developed of the developing areas. He therefore urged the summit conference to "mobilise our search for effective and practicable co-operative measures which can be taken together, not in some distant future, but in the months immediately ahead..." Not underestimating the obstacles involved, Dr. Tubman enumerated a few of them. Differences exist in monetary and fiscal policies and practices; some members of the sub-region have no exchange control, while others have controls ranging from mild to very strict; some states practice economic liberalism, while others socialism; and there are differences in customs and trade policies. In addition, there are unresolved political and psychological issues. 2

In spite of these obstacles, Dr. Tubman emphasised that:

in the long run, political and psychological differences must not be permitted to prevail over our will for regional integration. At this meeting, we must truly face the realities of the situation and lay the necessary political base for further work. This means committing our nations, at the highest level, to the path of economic co-operation, thus giving our Ministers and technicians a mandate to proceed under our supervision to make this goal a reality. Even with such a political commitment, the achievement of full co-operation may not readily be attained, but there are many practical and meaningful steps that can be taken immediately. A degree of success in achieving useful and concrete, though limited results, will now lay the basis for broader achievements later. 3

There were several forms of economic co-operation, Tubman said; but an analysis of them showed two patterns. Firstly, some countries were seeking to free intra-regional trade by removing tariffs and other restrictions in order to integrate industrialised economies for greater efficiency. Secondly, there were countries endeavouring to build up their economies by regional integration through a greater

1. "Annex A", CEI/HSWA/Doc.13, p.1.

2. Ibid., p.1ff.

3. Ibid., pp.6-7.

utilisation of resources, creation of larger markets and exploitation of all possible economic opportunities available. For the West African sub-region, the second approach was more appropriate because the factors of production in that sub-region are insufficiently developed.¹

After calling on his colleagues to express themselves "fully and frankly" on the issue of economic co-operation, President Tubman added:

We cannot delude ourselves into thinking that the solution to our problems rests with outsiders or future generations. While we expect and welcome help from outside, the nature of our problems imposes upon us absolute responsibility for their satisfactory solution. Too often we have sought short-term solutions which only serve as tranquilisers instead of long-term solutions which would provide adequate remedies. We have chosen the short-term advantages because we lack the courage and fortitude to make the sacrifices which the long-term solutions require. We can never achieve our ultimate goal by travelling along the easy road. We must put our shoulders to the wheel for a long and hard pull. 2

The Liberian leader proposed that an administrative agency be created to identify measures which could be undertaken at an early stage to stimulate co-operation. Since the lack of persistence had led to the erosion of past attempts at co-operation in the sub-region, Dr. Tubman called on the conference to make a firm commitment to meet again within a year to review the work of the agency or agencies created.³

The Presidents of the O.E.R.S., who had asked President Tubman to take the initiative in convening the conference, strongly supported his proposals. President Senghor said that he shared the Liberian President's faith in the West African sub-region.⁴ Mauritanian President Ould Daddah stated that his country considered sub-regional grouping to be the only way of really unifying the African continent because it was the only instrument through which efficient use could be made of the complementary aspects of Africa. While the establishment of a West African Regional Grouping would not provide an immediate solution to all the problems in the area, President Ould Daddah said, it would show a real desire and determination on the part of the participants to enter into "adequate economic commitments".⁵

1. Ibid., pp.7-8.

2. Ibid., pp.9-10.

3. Ibid., pp.10-11.

4. "Annex B", CEI/HSWA/Doc.13, p.1.

5. "Annex C", CEI/HSWA/Doc.13, pp.2-3.

President Touré wanted the conference to give "more tangible form to our new awareness and to our determination to settle our often all-too-slight differences". He therefore called for the definition of a joint economic policy which would safeguard and guarantee the achievement of the well-being of the West African peoples. The people of Guinea, President Touré said, did not believe that Africa's economic development and integration depended on "foreign compassion". The proof of this, the Guinean leader said, could be found, "on mature reflection", in the results of the U.N.C.T.A.D. decision that committed the wealthy states to allocate at least one per cent of their national income to the development of the developing countries. This decision had not only become "meaningless", but what had been "over-optimistically" referred to as the "United Nations Development Decade" was actually the period in which the terms of trade deteriorated "most drastically". It was therefore the duty of the conference to draw the "inevitable conclusions" from this fact and commit the West African sub-region to efforts designed to bring about "independent development". It was "astonishing" that five years after the founding of the O.A.U., African states still maintain their economic and administrative institutions within narrow boundaries. If the conference did not take measures to bring about unity, "we shall be accomplices of those who in the past were our masters dominating and oppressing us in subjection; and accomplices of imperialism, a crime from which neither our peoples not History will ever absolve us".¹

Gambian Prime Minister Jawara said that the "disappointing results" of U.N.C.T.A.D. II and the continued deterioration in the terms of trade made it "imperative and urgent" that action be taken to stop this adverse trend and consolidate the economies of the countries in West Africa into more viable units. The Gambian Premier expressed the hope that the conference would provide a "political setting" for sub-regional co-operation in the economic as well as other areas "which we may consider desirable".² The Vice-Chairman of the Nigerian Executive Council, Chief Awolowo, pledged his country's support for "any agreement" reached by the conference and the Protocol establishing the West African Regional Grouping. Chief Awolowo urged that where the choice was between "continued fragmentation leading to perpetual weakness and

1. "Annex E", CEI/HSWA/Doc.13, p.4ff.

2. "Annex D", CEI/HSWA/Doc.13. p.4.

economic underdevelopment on the one hand and co-operation leading to economic progress and prosperity for our peoples on the other, we have no alternative but to embrace the latter choice".¹ The Ghanaian Commissioner of Economic Affairs, E. N. Umaboe, said that his country "believes strongly" in economic co-operation in West Africa because it was only through such co-operation that the welfare of the peoples of the sub-region could be best promoted.² After the speeches, the Protocol establishing the West African Regional Grouping was signed. The supreme organ of the new organisation is the Conference of Heads of State and Government which is supposed to hold an ordinary session each year; the Grouping also has a Council of Ministers and an Executive Secretariat. Although the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Togo and Niger were not represented at the summit conference, the Protocol came into force at the Monrovia conference when it was signed by a majority of the West African states, as stipulated by Article 4 of the Protocol. A treaty, to be concluded, will define the Grouping more fully.³

To date, the Grouping has still not been launched. Again, if our assumption as to the proposed West African Free Trade Area is accepted, then we may conclude that the present difficulties being faced in the attempt to establish the Grouping are, at least in part, due to the same factor(s) responsible for the lack of success in efforts to set up the Free Trade Area. As was stated earlier, the Ivory Coast and its Entente partners, excluding Upper Volta, did not participate in the Monrovia conference in April 1968. The proposed Grouping will include Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea, countries in which non-French interests are dominant; it is therefore unlikely that the French - ever suspicious that the "Anglo-Saxons" (principally the Americans) are trying to displace them in their former territories - view the formation of the Grouping with enthusiasm. This does not mean that the problem of transport and currency differences is not important, or that the traditional jousting between Dakar and Abidjan for economic (and political) supremacy in francophone West Africa is unimportant. But it is more likely that, over all these problems, a greater one is superimposed: French suspicion of being

1. "Annex G", CEI/HSWA/Doc.13, p.3ff.

2. "Annex F", CEI/HSWA/Doc.13, p.1ff.

3. Article 6, Protocol Establishing the West African Regional Grouping, 1968.

outmanoeuvred in the francophone countries.

We have emphasised in this and the previous chapters three principal areas of co-operation including attempts at reinforcing old subsystems and creating new ones to promote trade and economic co-operation in Africa; there have been other experiments of a similar nature, which are also germane to our argument; they are examined briefly in the following chapter.

CHAPTER X

OTHER FORMS OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

As in the two previous chapters, our objective here is in continuing to demonstrate that, in spite of the fact that the search for economic unity continues, the O.A.U. has not been instrumental in promoting such unity. In this chapter, we shall treat the highly institutionalised ties that exist between the Associated African and Malagasy States and the European Economic Community as well as a number of other forms of bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation on the African continent. Although the various schemes mentioned may appear to be unconnected, they all point to one fact - the irrelevance of the O.A.U. in the promotion of economic unity in Africa. As we shall see in each case, the African states have either bilaterally or multilaterally taken steps to attain an objective set within the framework of the Organisation - namely, the promotion of economic co-operation - but the Organisation itself has not been involved in these measures.

The Associated African and Malagasy States and the E.E.C.

We have seen how U.A.M.C.E. took on a political form when it changed its name to O.C.A.M: but its member states have tended still to emphasise their economic ties with each other. Almost all of the 18 African states presently associated with the European Economic Community are members of O.C.A.M. Under the terms of Articles 131, 132 and 133 of the 1957 Rome Treaty, which created the E.E.C., the member states of the European Common Market agreed to grant associate status to the then dependencies of France, Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands. Member states were to apply to these associate members the same rules applicable in commercial transactions among themselves, and each associate member was to apply to its commercial transactions with other member states and associate members the same rules that were operative in respect of commercial transactions with the European country with which it had special relations. Members were to contribute to the development of associate members. Tariffs on trade between the E.E.C. and the "18" were to be abolished in accordance with the same timetable for the abolition of tariffs within the E.E.C. The "18" were, however, given the option of levying customs duties for development or budgetary purposes; but they were to be non-discriminatory. An Implementing

Convention relating to the associate status of the "18" provided for a Development Fund to promote the social and economic development of these areas; and the Fund's resources were to be distributed "on a rational geographical basis".¹

For the period 1958 to 1963, the E.E.C. distributed more than \$580,000,000 to the "overseas countries and territories", Madagascar receiving the highest amount, \$56,265,000 and the Territory of the Afar and Issa (then French Somaliland) receiving the lowest, \$1,199,000.²

Article 8 of the Implementing Convention stipulated that each associate member would progressively extend the right of establishment to the nationals and firms of member states other than those of the state with which it had special relations. If an associate member imposed an import quota, the quota open to a country other than that with which such associate member had special relations was to be converted to a global quota, open to other members on a non-discriminatory basis, a year after the entry into force of the Convention. On the same date, all global quotas so established were to be enlarged so as to attain an increase of at least 20% of total value as compared with the preceding year. Moreover, the global quota for each product was also to be increased by not less than 10%. From then on, annual increases were to be made in the same proportions. If the global quota for a non-liberalised product represented less than 7% of the total import of an associate member, a quota of at least 7% of such import was to be established not later than the first year after the Convention came into force, and was to be increased annually in accordance with the same rules used in increasing the global quotas of other imports. However, these provisions were not to be an obstacle to the prohibition or restriction of imports or exports for public morality, order and safety, and for the protection of industrial or commercial property and national treasures of artistic, historical or other values. But the measures taken were to be non-discriminatory in application.

In June 1964, the Yaoundé Convention came into force, replacing the provisions of the Rome Treaty and the Implementing Convention concerning the associate status

1. Implementing Convention Relating to the Association with the Community of the Overseas Countries and Territories, 1957.
2. For a country by country break-down, see Appendix E.

of the "18". Under the terms of Article 2 of the Yaoundé Convention, imports into the European Community from the "18" were to enjoy the progressive elimination of customs duties and dues. Upon the entry into force of the Convention, however, the E.E.C. was to abolish all customs duties and dues in respect of such products from these associate members as pineapple, coconut (dried pulp), unroasted and non-decaffeinated coffee, tea (not exceeding 3 kilograms net per package), "pâpper" pepper, uncrushed or unground vanilla, uncrushed or unground cloves, uncrushed or unground nutmeg and cocoa beans. Simultaneously, the Community was to apply a common tariff in respect of these products from third countries. However, the tariffs on these products were modified in respect of certain third countries for the imports of green coffee into the Benelux countries and bananas into West Germany.

Articles 3 and 4 stipulated that each associate state was to apply the same tariff treatment to the products of all member states; those associate members that were not already applying this rule were to do so within six months after the entry into force of the Convention. Simultaneously, the products of all members were to enjoy in the associate states the benefit of the progressive elimination of customs duties and dues by at least 15% annually; this provision was, however, not applicable to non-discriminatory duties and dues that were recognised as being necessary for industrial development or the increase of revenue. But if such duties and dues caused a "serious disturbance" in competition, the Council of Association, provided for by the Convention, was to take "appropriate measures".

All quantitative restrictions imposed by the "18" on imports from the Community were to be abolished not later than four years after the Convention came into force. Again, this provision was to be modified if such restrictions were necessary for development purposes, balance of payments difficulties or, as regards agricultural produce, for reasons of requirements due to existing markets.

The Development Fund was continued under the terms of Articles 15 and 16. The E.E.C. allocated \$730 million: \$666 million was to be given to the Fund, \$620 million of which was to be utilised as non-repayable aid, and the remainder as special-term loans; and \$64 million was to be used by the European Investment Bank as loans. For the period 1964 to 1969, the E.E.C. distributed about \$623 million among the "18",

with Congo-Kinshasa receiving the highest amount, \$74,389,000, and the Territory of the Afar and Issa the lowest, \$1,854,000.¹

The nationals and firms of all E.E.C. members were to enjoy the same rights of establishment and provision of services not later than three years after the Convention came into force. However, the nationals and firms of a member state were to benefit only to the extent that their state granted similar advantages to the nationals and firms of the associate member in question. In the event an associate member granted more favourable treatment to the citizens and firms of a third country than it did to those of the Community, such treatment was to be extended to the citizens and firms of the Community, "save when it is in accordance with regional agreements".²

A Council of Association was formed to specify the spheres of financial and technical co-operation between the Community and the "18". The Council, which is assisted by a Committee of Association, consists of members of the E.E.C. Council and Commission and a representative from each of the associate states. The Council meets at least once a year, and its decisions, which are taken by common accord between the Community members on the one hand and the "18" on the other, are binding. In addition, there is a Parliamentary Conference of the Association as well as a Court of Arbitration. The Parliamentary Conference meets once a year and consists of members of the European Assembly and the national assemblies of the "18" in equal numbers. The Conference receives an annual report from the Council and adopts resolutions on matters concerning the Association. Disputes as to the interpretation of the Convention are settled by the Court of Arbitration, whose decisions are binding on the disputants. Five judges make up the Court: a President appointed by the Council and four independent judges; two of the judges are appointed upon nomination by the E.E.C. Council, and the other two upon nomination by the "18".³

Having given this rather sketchy framework within which Association between the "18" and the E.E.C. operates, let us now return to an earlier assertion, namely, that

1. For a country-by-country break-down, see Appendix F.

2. Articles 29 and 30.

3. Articles 40 to 44, 50 and 51.

the O.C.A.M. states have tended to lay considerable emphasis on the economic function of their organisation. In this connection, when the "18" became dissatisfied with the implementation of the Yaoundé Convention, the O.C.A.M. members used their organisation to articulate and channel the demands of the associate states to the E.E.C., an action that was not opposed by Mali, Mauritania or Somalia, the non-O.C.A.M. members of the "18". In October 1966, the then O.C.A.M. President, Nigerien President Hamani Diori, in compliance with a mandate from that organisation, presented the grievances of the associate states to the E.E.C. The associate members complained that, from 1958 to 1964, the imports of the E.E.C. from other developing countries had increased by 44%, while the corresponding figure for them was 28%. Although the Community purchased about 50% of its peanut, oil palm, logs, cocoa and vanilla from the "18", it obtained only about 25% of its bananas and coffee from the latter. In 1965, there was a further decrease in the imports of oil and oil seeds, bananas and pepper. The associate members estimated that the fall in the prices of their principal agricultural products were as follows: from 1955 to 1965, 10.5% for palm kernel, 14.92% for palm oil, 24.37% for peanuts, 25.82% for cotton, 35.59% for coffee and 66% for cocoa.¹

What had made the situation even more serious, the "18" argued, was the fact that this fall in the prices of their products had been accompanied by increased prices for products from the industrialised countries. Moreover, while the associate members were constrained to sell their products on the basis of the price on the world market, they were, on the other hand, limited to buying the agricultural and industrial products of the E.E.C. at higher prices than those obtained on the world market because they did not have access to other foreign markets, and must therefore buy from the commercial firms of the Community within their territories. Furthermore, the "18" claimed, the notion of a "world market" was a "myth", and the world price was a "surplus price".²

Continuing their argument, the associate states said that a ton of Ivorian coffee could have purchased twenty-four tons of cement in 1958, but only 17.95 tons in 1965. For the same period, the purchasing power of a ton of Ivorian cocoa had

1. Afrique Contemporaine, No.32, July -August, 1967, p.15.

2. Ibid.

been reduced from 19.83 tons of cement to 13.81 tons. In 1960, a ton of Cameroonian cocoa could have bought 2,700 meters of unbleached cloth, but only 800 meters in 1965. While expressing their gratitude for the \$730 million aid which the Community had contributed to cover a five-year period, the "18" estimated that this aid would not compensate for the consecutive fall in the prices of their products. For example, while the Ivory Coast was said to have lost an estimated \$200 million on just three of its principal products from 1960 to 1965, it had received only about \$60 million in aid for the same period from "friendly countries". What the associate states wanted therefore was that the share and value of their exports to the European Community should not decrease, but should increase in proportion to the increase in consumption and the standard of living of the Community. Moreover, they expressed the view that their exports to the E.E.C. could be increased if they were not subject to "extravagant taxes" in "certain European countries".¹

To study the grievances of the associate members and propose solutions, the Council of Association appointed a committee of African and European experts. The position of the African experts on the committee was that the implementation of the Yaoundé Convention had been satisfactory for the first few years, but that France had remained, for the most part, the principle trading partner; they were therefore of the opinion that the Convention was inadequate to allow the introduction and sale of their products in the other E.E.C. countries. The Europeans expressed the view that the measures to take consisted of finding means by which the "18" could participate in European fairs and expositions and a procedure to finance such participation, involving the Development Fund. While not disagreeing with this proposal, the Africans said that, principally, something should be done about consumption taxes (taxes à la consommation) and the organisation of the markets, that their preferential tariffs should be maintained, and that their products should be "truly integrated" with the Community's common agriculture policy.²

In June 1967, the E.E.C. agreed to study the possibility of setting up within the associate states a commercial organisation which would assist those states in presenting a united front as regards European markets. Concerning the increase of

1. Ibid., p.16.

2. Ibid.

tropical products in the Community, the E.E.C. also agreed to participate in a financial scheme which would allow the "18" to take part in European expositions. Commencing July 14, 1967, the E.E.C. said, the Community would subsidise the sale of oil products from the "18" on its market. In addition, West Germany, which traditionally imports bananas from Latin America, undertook to buy about 81,000 tons of bananas from the associate states in 1967. Tapioca from Madagascar could enter the Community, and chocolate from Cameroon could enter the French market without protective tariffs.¹ Early in July 1967, the E.E.C. Commission allocated \$500,000 to assist in financing a programme of participation by the "18" in certain fairs and trade exhibitions in the E.E.C. countries. Since 1968, these states have been participating in this scheme.²

To conduct negotiations with the E.E.C. for a renewal of the Yaoundé Convention, the O.C.A.M. members of the "18" again selected the President of their organisation, President Diiori, to handle this matter; and again, the non-O.C.A.M. members of the group - Mali, Mauritania and Somalia - acquiesced. The O.C.A.M. states have set up a common market for sugar; and although it is not as functional as some members would wish, it is a start. Attempts are also being made to establish a common market for meat. In January 1968, the Council of O.C.A.M. mandated President Diiori to take steps leading to "the opening of a dialogue" between member states and the various foreign firms situated in O.C.A.M. countries, with a view to Africanisation. President Diiori's efforts led to the convening, in April 1969, of a conference in Abidjan at which O.C.A.M. states, international organisations and private firms were represented. This conference recommended, inter alia, that the O.C.A.M. Heads of State should adopt a joint declaration, defining the "ways and means" of bringing about Africanisation and should periodically convene a conference on this question. In January 1970, an O.C.A.M. summit conference issued a joint declaration which called for the periodic meeting of a permanent committee on the question of Africanisation and the establishment of two centres, one in Kinshasa and the other in Abidjan.

1. Ibid., p.17.

2. E.E.C. First General Report on the Activities of the Communities, 1967, p.336; Second General Report on the Activities of the Communities, 1968, pp.361-362; Troisième Rapport General sur l'active des Communautés, 1969, pp.382-383.

to train Africans for the programme. Co-operation within U.C.A.M. has also been extended to the joint operation of an Inter-State School of Science and Veterinary Medicine in Dakar.

Other Forms of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation

Throughout the African continent, in matters of trade and economic co-operation, we observe that constant attempts are being made, either bilaterally or multilaterally, to reinforce old subsystems or create new ones in the absence of an alternative at the system (O.A.U.) level. In addition to the association between the "18" and the E.E.C., there are other forms of co-operation in Africa, a few of which would suffice for our purpose. Early in March 1964, Uganda and the Sudan signed an agreement which allowed Uganda to export coffee, tea and sugar to the Sudan in exchange for Sudanese sheep, dates and some industrial products. On March 10, the U.A.R. and Tunisia agreed to increase the level of their trade to about \$9 million. In April, Mauritania and the U.A.R. concluded an agreement under the terms of which the U.A.R. was to export industrial products to Mauritania in exchange for livestock, salted fish, hides and gum arabic from the latter. In May, Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon agreed, among other things, to treat the Lake Chad basin as an economic unit. The four states undertook not to initiate any projects that would interfere with the normal flow of Lake Chad and its tributaries without consulting each other. On May 30, Tunisia and Congo-Kinshasa signed a trade agreement which allowed Tunisia to export fertilisers, food products, cars, lorries and bicycles in exchange for Congolese copper, cobalt, cocoa, coffee, cotton and palm oil. Also in 1964, the four countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya) established joint institutions (a Council of Ministers, a Consultative Committee and a Centre for Industrial Studies) to co-ordinate their development plans. The headquarters of the Consultative Committee are in Algiers, and the Centre for Industrial Studies is in Tripoli. Although the objectives of the Maghreb states have not been attained thus far, efforts in this direction are continuing.

1. Afrique Contemporaine, No.43, May-June 1969, pp.10-11 and No.48 March -April 1970, p.11.
2. Afrique Nouvelle, 23-29 July, 1970.
3. Africa Research Bulletin, Econ., Fin. and Tech. Series, March 1964, p.33, April 1964, p.50 and June 1964, p.89; West Africa, May 30, 1964, p.599; U.N.E.C.A. Economic Co-operation and Integration in Africa: three case studies, ST/ECA/109, 1969, pp.2-3.

In February 1965, Algeria and the Ivory Coast concluded an agreement which provided for a more balanced trade between the two countries. Under the terms of this agreement, the Ivory Coast was to continue exporting to Algeria coffee, cocoa, bananas, palm oil, dried fish, timber and pineapple in exchange for Algerian wine, food pastes, dates, tobacco, fertilisers, chemical products, tractors and textiles. On June 8, 1966, Guinea and the U.A.R. signed a trade agreement which allowed Guinea to export bauxite, palm oil and tinned products in exchange for Egyptian textiles, dry batteries and plastics. Also in June 1966, the Entente states set up a Fund for Mutual Aid and Loan as a supplement to foreign investments. The Ivory Coast agreed to contribute CFA 500,000,000 per annum, Dahomey, Upper Volta and Niger CFA 42,000,000 each, and Togo CFA 24,000,000. In addition to providing the lion's share of the Fund, the Ivory Coast also undertook not to make withdrawals from the Fund for the period of five years, so that its partners could complete their existing development programmes. On August 29, Congo-Kinshasa and Burundi agreed to develop trade between the two countries.¹

In March 1967, Algeria and Cameroon signed an agreement under the terms of which Algeria was allowed to export tobacco, steel, dates, cast iron, figs and crude oil in exchange for Cameroonian cocoa, bananas, tanned hides, pineapples and tin. On May 26, Ghana and Dahomey concluded an agreement, allowing Ghana to export cement, clothes, alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks, cocoa products, cigarettes and tobacco leaves, electrical materials and pharmaceutical products in exchange for fruits, cereals, vegetables, fish products, copra, coconut oil, perfumes, cotton, radio sets and motorcycles from Dahomey. In October, Nigeria and Tunisia signed an agreement under the terms of which the latter was to export meat, olive oil, wires, phosphate, lorries and cars for Nigerian natural rubber, columbite, tropical timber and crude petroleum. In December, Morocco and Senegal agreed to increase the level of their trade; and Mauritania and Congo-Brazzaville concluded an agreement which stipulated that Congo-Brazzaville was to maintain its purchase of 4,000 tons of Mauritanian dried fish per annum until 1972, and Mauritania was to buy 6,000 tons of sugar annually from Congo-Brazzaville for the same period.²

1. Africa Research Bulletin, Econ., Fin. & Tech. Series, February 15- March 15, 1965, p.249, May 15 - June 14 1966, p.514; U.N.E.C.A. Foreign Trade Newsletter, Nos. 18-19, (E/CN.14/STC/FTN/18-19, December 1968), p.1ff.

2. U.N.E.C.A. Foreign Trade Newsletter, Nos.18-19 (E/CN14/STC/FTN/18-19, December 1968) p.1ff.

In May 1970, a summit conference of West African francophone countries was held in Bamako, in the words of Malian Head of State Moussa Traore, "to forge an instrument capable of effectively promoting co-operation between the States (of West Africa) with a view to the progressive integration of (their) national economies". Since 1959, when the former French colonies of West Africa (excluding Togo and Guinea) signed a treaty in Paris, providing for a customs union, attempts to bring about economic co-operation involving all the francophone states of West Africa have been less than successful, principally because of divergent political views, a fact that was reflected in the formation of the now defunct Mali Federation and the establishment of the Conseil de l'Entente in 1959. The present attempts are designed to revive the largely moribund Union Douanière des Etats d'Afrique Occidentale (provided for by treaties concluded in 1959 and 1966) in order to provide a larger market for existing industries, create new industries, increase inter-state trade, improve the industrial development of the less developed states of the area, abolish all obstacles to inter-state trade and encourage contacts at the political and other levels. The Malian Minister of Finance, M. Louis Negre, who was elected President of the Ministerial conference, is to submit a draft treaty to the other states before June 30, 1971 so that it can be signed by the Heads of State at a meeting scheduled for November 1, 1971. Until then, a Secretariat will conduct studies on the inter-state trade situation, ways of establishing a fund to encourage industries and commerce, industries to be submitted for inter-state agreement, a tax system applicable to products that will benefit from inter-state agreements, and the harmonisation of tariffs.¹ Just before the Bamako meeting, the Entente Heads of State met in Abidjan and agreed to establish an economic community for livestock and meat. The United States has already granted the Entente states an \$8 million loan to finance projects in the area of animal husbandry.²

Without further belabouring the point, we can safely conclude that, as old subsystems are reinforced and new ones formed to solve trade and economic problems, the O.A.U. itself can hardly become - it never has been - relevant in this area; and as the subsystems become more and more functional in matters of trade and economic

1. Afrique Contemporaine, No. 50, July -August, 1970, pp.17-18.

2. Afrique Nouvelle, 21-27 May, 1970.

co-operation, the higher the probability that other areas of co-operation might be transferred to them at the expense of the O.A.U. Already, as we have seen, conflicts within the Entente, O.C.A.M. and the O.E.R.S. have tended to be resolved principally within the frameworks of these subsystems, thus rendering the O.A.U. less relevant in certain aspects of the political sphere of interaction as far as co-operation within these subsystems is concerned. One could argue that the problem of transport, among others, makes a sub-regional approach to economic co-operation much more realistic. But this would be a weak argument in view of the present co-operation within O.C.A.M., whose membership extends from Senegal in West Africa to Mauritania in the Indian Ocean. In addition, as we have seen, bilateral trade agreements have been concluded between countries of different sub-regions. Therefore, continental economic co-operation within the framework of the O.A.U. is not only a desirable proposition to stem the present trend towards sub-regional and bilateral co-operation at the expense of the O.A.U., but is also feasible, even if within limits. For example, a free trade area could be established for industrial and non-industrial products. Although transport would make it impracticable for all O.A.U. members to take advantage of this scheme, those states that are in the position to do so could at least begin to move in that direction, while the O.A.U. took measures (obtaining foreign capital, for example) to develop and improve transport in Africa so that all of its members could participate in the scheme. With this as a start, co-operation could be extended to include such matters as joint industrial ventures and the harmonisation of development plans.

If the O.A.U. continues to be non-functional in the economic sphere of interaction the present trend towards bilateral and limited multilateral economic co-operation will undoubtedly continue, the Organisation being more and more eclipsed by the various sub-regional groupings. And given the fact that its member states have developing economies, the successes of these sub-regional groupings will tend to create a situation in which O.A.U. members will be much more responsive to decisions taken within the frameworks of their sub-regional groupings than to those of the O.A.U., because the obligations of membership in these groupings will be compensated by economic advantages. In this connection, let us conclude by citing the words of two African leaders on the O.A.U. In July 1966, Dr. Nyerere said that "the new tendency

(is) to treat the O.A.U. and all talk of pan-Africanism as matters of form - motions which have to be gone through, while the serious business of building states is continued".¹ A little over two years later, the Malagasy President, Tsiranana, said that he regretted "that political (matters) have taken the place of economic (ones) within the O.A.U.". The Malagasy President expressed the view that:

regionalism - not separatist regionalism - can solve the difficult economic problems that face Africa.

It is not necessary that hours be spent on discussing political issues to adopt a resolution that will never be implemented. What (the O.A.U.) should be concerned with is studying projects like the connection of roads, railways, aviation (and) post which will help to accelerate the realisation of African unity.

Certainly, the O.A.U. has helped to defuse certain conflicts....

But if our organisation wishes to last, it must reflect the realism of O.C.A.M. 2

1. The Nationalist, July 13, 1966.

2. Le Monde, 21 September, 1968.

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Has the O.A.U. been instrumental in the promotion of unity in Africa? To suggest that the Organisation has served no useful purpose would be erroneous. The fact that leaders of the various African states have a common forum in which to exchange views on the pressing issues of the continent is in itself an accomplishment because these leaders are kept in contact with each other. Moreover, the O.A.U. has been functional in certain aspects of the political sphere of interaction. As we have seen, the Organisation has helped to defuse conflicts such as those between Algeria and Morocco, Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, and Rwanda and Burundi. These states were allowed to accept more gracefully what they would have accepted less so in the absence of the O.A.U. or a similar organisation. Issues that might have been the exclusive concern of a few African states, or allowed by default to die away, are being kept alive at the system level, thus distributing participation among the various members. The Organisation's commitment to the fight against colonialism and apartheid in Africa is a case in point. While some African states, left to themselves, would have actively supported the liberation movements in Africa, it is very doubtful whether others would have done so, even passively. In addition, the O.A.U. has been used as a framework to articulate and channel certain demands of the African states to other international bodies and non-O.A.U. states. Again, the fight against colonialism and apartheid comes to mind. Portugal, South Africa and external powers in close relationship with them are about subject at least to criticism and varying degrees of pressure. Clearly, the Organisation has served some useful - if limited - purpose.

But having said this, let us look at the other side of the coin. As stated in Chapter I, when the O.A.U. was founded in 1963, its objectives - and it is useful to re-state them here - were "to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". To these ends, the

O.A.U. states agreed to "co-ordinate and harmonise" their policies with a view to "political and diplomatic co-operation; economic co-operation, including transport, and communications; educational and cultural co-operation; health sanitation, and nutritional co-operation; scientific and technical co-operation; and co-operation for defence and security".

As we have seen, however, the Organisation is becoming less and less instrumental in pursuit of these set objectives (with the possible exception of keeping alive the issue of colonialism, apartheid and the resolution of some inter-state conflicts); and this is due to several factors. Firstly, the desire of certain units to reinforce their subsystem so as to exercise more influence in determining the system's behaviour, and the tendency to transfer other functions to a successful subsystem, have created a situation in which subsystems are eclipsing the overall system of the O.A.U. itself. As we saw in Chapter III, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers - at its August 1963 meeting in Dakar - recommended that regional and sub-regional groupings on the African continent be limited to economic, social and cultural activities common to the states concerned. However, in their desire to exercise more influence within the O.A.U., the Entente states pressed to have the Union of African and Malagasy Economic Co-operation politicised - so that it could handle political as well as economic matters - in order to give the francophone states, as a bloc, much more influence within the O.A.U. and more cohesion inter se. The result has been that O.C.A.M. (the new name chosen for the U.A.M.C.E.) has not only become much more relevant to its members than the O.A.U. in promotion of trade and economic co-operation, but conflicts within this subsystem have tended to be resolved principally at the subsystem level. Hence O.C.A.M. is eclipsing the O.A.U., and this is true even in certain aspects of their political relations. The activities of O.C.A.M. are, however, only one example of how the O.A.U. is being diminished in proportion to the rise in importance of its component units. O.C.A.M. has been singled out in this section because of the direct and dramatic challenge that it posed to the O.A.U. in the political sphere of interaction. Other subsystems that are tending to have the same effect because of their success in their economic relations will be considered later.

Secondly, the types of outputs produced by the system in pursuit of its objective to eradicate colonialism and racial discrimination from Africa have been such that, while there is unity of agreement as to the objective, a unity of action to reach the objective is unlikely under present conditions. The O.A.U. lacks the economic and military power to give it the requisite cohesion in its present approach to the fight against colonialism and apartheid, even assuming that the majority of its members are committed to this fight. We have seen, for example, that in 1963 the O.A.U. called on its members to impose sanctions against South Africa and Portugal and that, in 1965, it recommended that the African states sever diplomatic relations with Britain. However, the O.A.U. was unable to take measures to balance the economic and technical losses that some of its members were bound to suffer had such decisions been implemented. Yet given the fact that O.A.U. members have under-developed economies, it is unlikely that the majority of them would implement such decisions without due regard to the heavy penalties that might be incurred. Nor have the responses of other international organisations and non-O.A.U. states been positive enough to bring about the desired results. The South African Government has continued to enforce its apartheid policy, Portuguese colonialism continues, and Rhodesia is still ruled by a minority regime. While the O.A.U. states have been successful therefore in obtaining majority votes in various international bodies - a trend that had begun to emerge even before the inception of the O.A.U. - the resultant decisions have not brought about the eradication of colonialism and apartheid from Africa, a reminder that there is a sharp distinction between obtaining a majority and being in the position to have decisions implemented-between rhetoric and reality. The Organisation's lack of military power means that it is wholly unable to use force to implement these decisions. As was stated in Chapter IV, of the forty odd O.A.U. members, only the U.A.R., Algeria, Morocco and Ethiopia have the combined air power seriously to challenge South Africa, Portugal and the Smith regime. And each of these four has other priorities: the U.A.R. is preoccupied with Israel; Algeria and Morocco have an unsettled frontier dispute, and are unlikely to undertake commitments that would involve a substantial diversion of forces which could be needed in the event

of another border war; and Ethiopia has an unsettled border dispute with Somalia, in addition to being faced with the guerrilla activities of Eritrean nationalists.

The O.A.U. therefore lacks the leadership of a state or group of states with the economic and military power to introduce the requisite supportive intakes in the fight against colonialism and apartheid. Given this situation, a change of tactic is clearly necessary. As was argued in Chapter V, the Western Powers have contended that military and economic sanctions are not appropriate means to bring about the eradication of colonialism and apartheid from Africa. And since it is arguable at least that these Powers have the military and economic leverage to affect the regimes in Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury - and certainly a greater leverage than the African states - the O.A.U. should perhaps concentrate its efforts to exert pressure on the western powers through international bodies like the U.N. to say what they think the appropriate method is of handling the problem. Having insisted that military and economic sanctions are not appropriate, they are after all under some obligation to suggest alternative means, if only to avoid a situation of having to admit that racial discrimination and colonialism must be tolerated - an unlikely admission by a bloc that claims to represent the "free world." In addition to possibly easing the present strain on the cohesion of the O.A.U., this method might break the "resolution cycle" in which one resolution is followed by another, without any major degree of implementation.

In effect, however, the O.A.U. has continued to rely on majority votes both within its own framework, and those of other international bodies, in spite of the fact that the approach has been not only unsuccessful but counter-productive - the obtaining of majority votes having become a substitute for actual accomplishments. In the language of our model, a system that continually attempts to attain its objective by a method that has proven to be unsuccessful is likely to create a situation in which certain units will be dissatisfied with the means employed and will form subsystems to explore other means of attaining the same objective, thus bringing about competition between a particular subsystem and its parent. Hence, the fact that the O.A.U.'s present tactic has not resulted in any change in Southern Africa has led member states like the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Uganda, the Central

African Republic, Madagascar and Mauritius to join with Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho in calling for a "dialogue" with South Africa. While this ad hoc subsystem has not yet mustered the requisite support within the Organisation to have its approach adopted at continental level, the number of states involved in the call for a "dialogue" clearly suggests that, even in pursuit of the objective of eradicating colonialism and apartheid from Africa - a function that has hitherto been performed principally within the framework of the O.A.U. - a vocal ad hoc subsystem has emerged to challenge the Organisation's present approach to the problem. And as long as this subsystem maintains, or increases its numerical strength, the O.A.U. can hardly be expected to have the same degree of cohesion in pressing the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa.

Thirdly, as was discussed in Chapter VI, the bilateral and multilateral political interactions among the various units have subjected the system to a state of great flux. This is attested to by the cases of Algeria and Morocco, Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi, Niger and Dahomey, the Congolese and Nigerian civil wars, the dispute between the two Congos over the execution of Pierre Muléle, the dispute concerning the overthrow of Nkrumah and that involving Chad, Congo-Kinshasa and the Central African Republic over the formation of the Union of Central African States. A system in which interactions are characterised by such violent changes must have the requisite regulative mechanism to resolve those conflicts that threaten its social or task functions. And this brings us to another point: the O.A.U.'s approach to the resolution of conflict.

The Organisation's approach to the resolution of conflict has made it very difficult for it to cope with the constant change to which it is being subjected. In Chapter VII, we saw that the O.A.U. has been moderately successful in resolving certain inter-state conflicts either by "encapsulation" or "pacification". But apart from the decision to have Nigerian troops replace British soldiers in Tanzania after the army mutiny in that country early in 1964, the Organisation has been singularly unsuccessful in resolving or even helping to resolve intra-state conflicts like the Congolese and Nigerian civil wars; on the contrary, such conflicts have resulted in strained relations between certain member states and the severance

of diplomatic relations between others. Because one of the O.A.U.'s objectives is the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of its members, it has tended to use this aim as a basis for resolving intra-state conflicts by "pacification" to the exclusion of "encapsulation"; but, as we have seen in the Nigerian civil war, Biafra and four O.A.U. member states (Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia) were not prepared to accept the territorial integrity of Nigeria as it stood; hence the Organisation's mediatory role was largely rejected by Biafra. Another aspect to the resolution of intra-state conflicts on the continent has been the fact that the particular governments involved generally rely principally on extra-African aid (including arms) in their attempts at "pacifying" internal conflicts. Here, a further point needs to be emphasised. The special relationship that exists between a number of O.A.U. members and non-O.A.U. states, as well as the military (and economic) weakness of these members, allow for the introduction of inputs that tend to relegate the system to a marginal position in the resolution of domestic conflicts. As we saw in Chapters VI and VII, the army mutiny in East Africa in early 1964 was put down by British troops. When the Gabonese Army overthrew President Leone M'ba in 1964, the French sent in paratroopers to re-install him. With American support and white mercenaries, Tshombe largely ignored the O.A.U. Special Commission on the Congo, and continued his fight against the Gbenye regime until the latter's defeat. The French presently have troops in Chad helping to put down a revolt against President François Tombalbaye's Government. Federal Nigeria used British and Russian arms in defeating Biafra. It is these facts which lend emphasis to the argument that the O.A.U. lacks the leadership of a state, or group of states, with the military (and economic) power to prevent extra-African intervention on the continent. It is faced therefore with the problem of being unable to prevent or neutralise those inputs which inescapably make it much less instrumental in the resolution of internal conflicts in Africa.

If the O.A.U. is ever to reach a position from which it can mediate in conflicts of this nature, at least two variables are required: firstly, the regulative mechanism of the Organisation would have to be made more flexible by a modification of the principles not only of non-interference in the internal affairs

of member states but of their territorial integrity. In this respect, an intra-state conflict would remain an "internal affair" only as long as it did not result in dysfunctional tension within the O.A.U.; once such tension was produced, the particular conflict would no longer be regarded as simply "internal" to one member, but "intra-O.A.U.", allowing the Organisation to use such means as it has to deal with the problem either by "encapsulation" or "pacification". Secondly, non-O.A.U. states would have to be more responsive to O.A.U. decisions in respect of all conflicts on the African continent, whether inter- or intra-state. The prospect of such changes being made is at best poor. The member governments are determined to show that it is they who exercise effective control at home and, given their ability to obtain military aid from non-O.A.U. members, few changes in the direction of greater participation by the O.A.U. are unlikely to be made. The Organisation will continue therefore to be largely irrelevant in the resolution of domestic conflicts, including those that threaten the O.A.U.'s own particular functions.

Finally, the system's failure to become functional in the more crucial sphere of economic interaction has resulted in its increasing eclipse by its regional and sub-regional groupings. As we argued in Part III of this study, the feedback effect is that, as these groupings have become more and more successful, there has been a tendency to resolve such conflicts as arise within their own frameworks, thus rendering the O.A.U. itself less and less relevant in certain transactions within these groupings. In addition, the fact that member states rely principally on extra-African aid and trade for development has implications for the Conversion process of the system as well as in its effect on the responses of member states to certain outputs. That is to say, the dependence of O.A.U. members on non-members for trade and economic aid affects the types of decisions taken within the O.A.U. itself as well as the implementation of those decisions by member states. We have seen that most member states failed to sever diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965, and that the majority of those African states which had trade ties with Portugal and South Africa, at the time of the 1963 decision to boycott trade with these countries, have continued to maintain these ties. Nor is it likely that an O.A.U. decision to boycott trade with France for supplying arms to South Africa

would be supported or implemented by a majority of the francophone states, for very obvious reasons.

As the present groupings continue to be successful in their economic relations inter se, and others are established along similar lines, we can expect the objectives set within the framework of the O.A.U. - other perhaps than the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination, and possibly the amelioration of some inter-state conflicts - to be pursued exclusively by them. Given the fact that O.A.U. members have 'developing economies', there will be a tendency for these states to be much more responsive to the outputs of their regional or sub-regional groupings than to those of the O.A.U., since the obligations imposed by action within these subsystems will tend to be balanced by economic advantages not obtainable within the wider system of the O.A.U. itself. Again, if this trend were ever to be reversed, the O.A.U. would have to become more effective in the economic sphere by the establishment of some form of economic union within the framework of the Organisation. If that were possible, then it is arguable that the demands made by the O.A.U. would be offset by the benefits it bestowed, thus enabling member states to be more responsive to resolutions in connection with other (political) objectives, like the eradication of colonialism and racial discrimination from Africa, and the promotion of unity among the African states. Until the requisite supportive inputs and intakes are introduced, however, to make the system functional in matters of trade and economic co-operation, the trend towards greater co-operation at the subsystem level (with the help of extra-African aid) will continue, and the O.A.U. itself will continue to be eclipsed.

APPENDIX A

Rhodesia's Principal Trading Partners in Africa for Period
1965-1967 (Gross Total converted to Nearest 000 U.S.\$):

Value in Mil. U.S. \$

Country	Year		
	1965	1966	1967
Congo-Kin.....	1.671	7.452	2.456
Kenya.....	1.432	0	.
Malawi.....	24.670	19.452	16.974
Tanzania (Tanganyika).	1.036	.022	.
Uganda.....	.972	.025	.
Zambia	114.822	71.914	47.980

Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.

APPENDIX B

South Africa's Principal Trading Partners in
Africa* for Period 1963-1967

(Gross Total Converted to Nearest 000 U.S. \$):

Value in mil. U.S. \$

Country	Year				
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Central African Rep...	.182	.348	.336	.304	.466
Chad049	.037	.020	.041	.523
Congo-Brazzaville	1.167	1.669	1.531	1.430	1.730
Congo-Kin.	2.169	4.432	5.289	26.392	11.712
Ivory Coast	3.321
Kenya	5.839	.058	0	.003	.
Madagascar569	.669	.631	.	.
Mauritius672	.726	.974	.601	.
Nigeria050	.059	.154	.067	.029
Senegal	1.308	1.300	1.620	1.657	1.106
Sudan321	.009	0	.	.
Tanzania (Tanganyika) .	2.050	.020	.	0	.
Togo113	.173	.0004	.038	0
Tunisia768
Uganda	3.968	.011	0	0	0
United Arab Rep.....	.368	.023	0	0	.054
Malawi.....	.	4.015	4.634	7.134	6.768
Zambia	82.790	93.789	122.292	100.137
Morocco	2.332	.	.	.949	.949

* Figures are not available for South Africa's trade with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; but these states are members of a Customs Union with South Africa.

Sources: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; Mauritius Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Annual Report, 1970.

APPENDIX C

Portugal's Principal Trading Partners in

Africa for Period 1963-1967

(Gross Total Converted to Nearest 000 U.S. \$):

Value in mil. U.S. \$

Country	Year				
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Algeria	6.708	1.479	0	0	0
Cameroon413	.016	.004	.344	0
Central African Rep.	.365	.312	.113	.344	.332
Chad186	.085	.077	.077	.110
Congo-Brazzaville ..	.393	.461	.417	0	.162
Congo-Kin.....	.320	.793	.826	2.1	2.048
Gabon284	.028	0	0	.053
Nigeria	5.933	5.090	13.440	5.984	16.523
Senegal847	0	1.078	5.723	2.800
Sudan525	.970	1.490	.149	.003
Tunisia	1.575
United Arab Rep.....	1.518	.161	0	.230	.063
Malawi333	.249	.174	.
Zambia969	1.599	2.296	2.562
Morocco.....	6.245	7.945	7.925	9.842	7.984

Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.

APPENDIX D

The Value of Kenya's Export to Tanzania and Uganda

For Period 1961-1969 in £000:

Year	To Tanzania*	To Uganda
1961	8,901	7,047
1962	10,017	7,303
1963	10,365	9,425
1964	13,299	12,581
1965	14,087	15,339
1966	13,282	15,619
1967	11,382	14,796
1968	13,069	13,265
1969	12,848	15,949

* Excluding Zanzibar prior to 1968.

Sources: East African Statistical Dept., Economic and Statistical Review. No.20 (September 1966); No.25 (December 1967); The Standard Bank, Annual Economic Review: Kenya (July 1970).

APPENDIX D

The Value of Tanzania's Export* to Kenya and Uganda
for Period 1961-1969 in £000:

Year	To Kenya	To Uganda
1961	1,844	390
1962	1,954	437
1963	2,915	508
1964	4,110	1,021
1965	4,569	1,346
1966	3,806	842
1967	3,288	700
1968	3,692	800
1969	4,018	1,200

* Excluding Zanzibar prior to 1968.

Sources: East African Statistical Dept., Economic and Statistical Review, No.20 (September 1966); No.25 (December 1967); Lloyds Bank, Economic Report: Tanzania (December 1969).

APPENDIX D

The Value of Uganda's Export to Kenya and Tanzania
for Period 1961-1969 in £000:

Year	To Kenya	To Tanzania*
1961	1,704	5,152
1962	1,669	5,386
1963	1,993	6,248
1964	2,442	7,344
1965	2,592	7,135
1966	3,120	7,317
1967	10,200	2,400
1968	8,600	2,000
1969	7,800	1,700

* Excluding Zanzibar prior to 1968.

Sources: East African Statistical Dept., Economic and Statistical Review, No.20 (September 1966); No.25 (December 1967); The Standard Bank, Annual Economic Review: Uganda (July 1970).

APPENDIX E

African Countries that were Beneficiaries of
European Development Fund for Period
1958-1963:

Country	Total Amount in mil. U.S. \$
Algeria	25.320
Burundi	4.926
Cameroon	52.798
Central African Republic...	18.196
Chad	27.713
Congo-Brazzaville	25.036
Congo-Kin.....	19.593
Dahomey	20.778
Territory of Afar & Issa ..	11.199
Gabon	17.761
Ivory Coast	39.644
Madagascar	56.265
Mali	42.023
Mauritania	15.377
Niger	31.291
Rwanda	4.942
Senegal	43.831
Somalia	10.089
Togo	15.936
Upper Volta	28.351

Source: The Europa Yearbook (1970).

APPENDIX F

African Countries that were Beneficiaries of
European Development Fund for Period
1964-1969:

Country	Total Amount in mil. U.S. \$
Burundi	19.973
Cameroon	53.166
Central African Republic...	25.790
Chad	33.664
Congo-Brazzaville	20.686
Congo-Kin.....	74.389
Dahomey	22.769
Gabon	20.364
Ivory Coast	57.173
Madagascar	70.226
Mali	33.089
Mauritania	18.306
Niger	30.135
Rwanda	18.449
Senegal	60.400
Somalia	27.023
Togo	19.330
Upper Volta	29.782
Territory of Afar & Issa ..	1.854

Sources: The Europa Yearbook (1970).

APPENDIX G

CHARTER OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;

CONVINCED that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny;

CONSCIOUS of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples;

CONSCIOUS of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in spheres of human endeavour;

INSPIRED by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our States in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences;

CONVINCED that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained;

DETERMINED to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms;

DEDICATED to the general progress of Africa;

PERSUADED that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation among States;

DESIROUS that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured;

RESOLVED to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions;

HAVE agreed to the present Charter.

ESTABLISHMENT

Article I

1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an Organisation to be known as the ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.
2. The Organisation shall include the Continental African States, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa.

PURPOSES

Article II

1. The Organisation shall have the following purposes:

- a. to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
 - b. to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
 - c. to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
 - d. to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
 - e. to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. To these ends, the Member States shall co-ordinate and harmonise their general policies, especially in the following fields:
- a. political and diplomatic co-operation;
 - b. economic co-operation, including transport and communications;
 - c. educational and cultural co-operation;
 - d. health, sanitation, and nutritional co-operation;
 - e. scientific and technical co-operation; and
 - f. co-operation for defence and security.

PRINCIPLES

Article III

The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State;
6. absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;
7. affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

MEMBERSHIP

Article IV

Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a Member of the Organisation.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBER STATES

Article V

All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties.

Article VI

The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter.

INSTITUTIONS

Article VII

The Organisation shall accomplish its purposes through the following principal institutions:

1. the Assembly of Heads of State and Government;
2. the Council of Ministers;
3. the General Secretariat;
4. the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

Article VIII

The Assembly of Heads of State and Governemtn shall be the supreme organ of the Organisation. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to co-ordinating and harmonising the general policy of the Organisation. It may in addition review the structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialised agencies which may be created in accordance with the present Charter.

Article IX

The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once a year. At the request of any Member State and on approval by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session.

Article X

1. Each Member State shall have one vote.
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the Organisation.
3. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Whether or not a question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple majority of all Member States of the Organisation.
4. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Organisation shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly.

Article XI

The Assembly shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Article XII

1. The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or such other Ministers as are designated by the Governments of Member States.
2. The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. When requested by any Member State and approved by two-thirds of all Member States, it shall meet in extraordinary session.

Article XIII

1. The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the responsibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly.
2. It shall take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly. It shall be entrusted with the implementation of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State, and Government. It shall co-ordinate inter-African co-operation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly and in conformity with Article II (2) of the present Charter.

Article XIV

1. Each Member State shall have one vote.

2. All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the members of the Council of Ministers.
3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council of Ministers shall form a quorum for any meeting of the Council.

Article XV

The Council shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure.

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Article XVI

There shall be an Administrative Secretary-General of the Organisation, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Administrative Secretary-General shall direct the affairs of the Secretariat.

Article XVII

There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Organisation, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Article XVIII

The functions and conditions of services of the Secretary-General, of the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat shall be governed by the provisions of this Charter and the regulations approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

1. In the performance of their duties the Administrative Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organisation. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organisation.
2. Each member of the Organisation undertakes to respect the exclusive character of the responsibilities of the Administrative Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

COMMISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

Article XIX

Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Said Protocol shall be regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter.

SPECIALISED COMMISSIONS

Article XX

The Assembly shall establish such Specialised Commissions as it may deem necessary, including the following:

1. Economic and Social Commission;
2. Educational and Cultural Commission;
3. Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission;
4. Defence Commission;
5. Scientific, Technical and Research Commission.

Article XXI

Each Specialised Commission referred to in Article XX shall be composed of the Ministers concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries designated by the Governments of the Member States.

Article XXII

The functions of the Specialised Commissions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the regulations approved by the Council of Ministers.

THE BUDGET

Article XXIII

The budget of the Organisation prepared by the Administrative Secretary-General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers. The budget shall be provided by contributions from Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment of the United Nations; provided, however, that no Member State shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty percent of the yearly regular budget of the Organisation. The Member States agree to pay their respective contributions regularly.

SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF CHARTER

Article XXIV

1. This Charter shall be open for signature to all independent sovereign African States and shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
2. The original instrument, done, if possible in African languages, in English and French, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all independent sovereign African States.
3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia, which shall notify all signatories of each such deposit.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article XXV

This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by the Government of Ethiopia of the instruments of ratification from two thirds of the signatory States.

REGISTRATION OF THE CHARTER

Article XXVI

This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER

Article XXVII

Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this Charter shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation.

ADHESION AND ACCESSION

Article XXVIII

1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the Administrative Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter.
2. The Administrative Secretary-General, shall, on receipt of such notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member States. Admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Administrative Secretary-General, who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communicate the decision to the State concerned.

MISCELLANEOUS

Article XXIX

The working languages of the Organisation and all its institutions shall be, if possible African languages, English and French.

Article XXX

The Administrative Secretary-General may accept on behalf of the Organisation gifts, bequests and other donations made to the Organisation, provided that this is approved by the Council of Ministers.

Article XXXI

The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immunities to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective territories of the Member States.

CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP

Article XXXII

Any state which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written notification to the Administrative Secretary-General. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State, which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organisation.

AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER

Article XXXIII

This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes a written request to the Administrative Secretary-General to that effect; provided, however, that the proposed amendment is not submitted to the Assembly for consideration until all the Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-thirds of all the Member States.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, We, the Heads of African State and Government have signed this Charter.

Done in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia this 25th day of May, 1963.

ALGERIA	GHANA	NIGERIA
BURUNDI	GUINEA	RWANDA
CAMEROUN	IVORY COAST	SENEGAL
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	LIBERIA	SIERRA LEONE
CHAD	LIBYA	SOMALIA
CONGO (Brazzaville)	MADAGASCAR	SUDAN
CONGO (Leopoldville)	MALI	TANGANYIKA
DAHOMY	MAURITANIA	TOGO
ETHIOPIA	MOROCCO	TUNISIA
GABON	NIGER	UGANDA
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	UPPER VOLTA	

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